U.S. NUCLEAR POWER & AMER. FOREIGN POLICY.   Term Paper ID:5175 Click to get this paper

Essay Subject: Focuses on 1945-1950. Contends U.S. nuclear monopoly gave it a position of power which developed into a hard line toward Russia leading to the Cold War.... More...

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Paper Abstract: Focuses on 1945-1950. Contends U.S. nuclear monopoly gave it a position of power which developed into a hard line toward Russia leading to the Cold War. Paper Introduction: This research studies the impact that U.S. nuclear power had on American foreign policy between 1945 and 1950. It is assumed that the United States did not, for moral reasons, take advantage of this power. This research will examine the validity of this assumption. What was the post-war situation the United States faced in 1945? Most important was that the United States had not only unlocked the secrets of nuclear fission, but had also demonstrated this to the world in two explosions at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It has been suggested that the major reason for the United States dropping the bombs was to affect the post-war balance of power. Commentators argued that the reason for dropping the bombs was not to shorten the war; the war with Japan was already guaranteed to be ending, and they believed that the Text of the Paper: The entire text of the paper is shown below. However, the text is somewhat scrambled. We want to give you as much information as we possibly can about our papers and essays, but we cannot give them away for free. In the text below you will find that while disordered, many of the phrases are essentially intact. From this text you will be able to get a solid sense of the writing style, the concepts addressed, and the sources used in the research paper. By 1949, the UnitedStates was said to have approximately 4 naval and air bases around theworld. [8]Howard K. Smith, The State of Europe (New York: Knopf, 1949), 7 -1. Thiscould have been a deterrent to American use of nuclear power, as explainedby Lippmann.[26] Some, like David Horowitz, saw something sinister in aU.S. (New York: Doubleday, 1961), 539. [19]Speech of Dean Acheson given in Berkeley, California, [March 195 ];quoted in D.F. Blackett, Military and Political Consequences of AtomicWeapons (London: Turnstile Press, 1948), n.p.; David Horowitz. foreign policy aims--primarilycontaining the Soviet Union--could be achieved without the threat ofnuclear weapons. The Soviet Union did notoppose this militarily.Following the withdrawal, the Americans were able to bring Iran into theirsphere of influence. ed. [3]Horowitz, 57. Walter Millis. Commentators[1] argued that the reason for dropping thebombs was not to shorten the war; the war with Japan was already guaranteedto be ending, and they believed that the bombs were dropped to end the warbefore the Soviet Union could enter the conflict. 3. monopoly on nuclear weapons does seem to haveinfluenced the "hard line" policy toward the Soviet Union during thesecritical years. nuclear attack.[25]NATO was originally supposed to have only 22 miltary divisions, while theSoviet Union was estimated to have 18 . Fleming, The Cold War and Its Origins, 2 vols. [5]Ibid. This is acontroversial question, but these policies did develop into the Cold War.Whether the United States would actually have used the A-bomb again is notclear, but the U.S. [4]Ibid., 58. This research studies the impact that U.S. It is assumed that theUnited States did not, for moral reasons, take advantage of this power.This research will examine the validity of this assumption. 5. This fact was cited to support theview that the United States was using its nuclear supremacy as a politicaladvantage. At the time, the Americans were alreadyplanning for a hydrogen bomb, using fusion power that was expected to be athousand times more powerful than the A-bomb.[21]Acheson's speech was an indication of the the "hard line" which the UnitedStates intended to take. What was the post-war situation the United States faced in 1945?Most important was that the United States had not only unlocked the secretsof nuclear fission, but had also demonstrated this to the world in twoexplosions at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Russian defense to atomic attack is, therefore, self-evident; it is to over-run continental Europe with infantry, and defy us to drop atomic bombs on Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Switzer- land, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden. To contain Soviet expansion, the United States took a "hard line,"which, in retrospect, seems to have made the situation worse. 4. The Soviet Union,however, held eastern Europe, and a communist regime was established inChina. Even hostileobservers pointed out that U.S. actions inthe 194 s reflected the belief that it would be a long time before theSoviet Union was a nuclear competitor. [9]Horowitz, 87. Some, such as P.M.S. [2 ]Blackett, Atomic, 149-52. Itssuccess meant there was less need for military might. In a major address by Secretaryof State Dean Acheson in Berkeley, California, in March 195 (according tothe New York Times, all top State Department officials contributed),Acheson argued against those who were urging a shift in U.S. [21]Horowitz, 256. New York: Hill and Wang,1949.Smith, Howard K. Atomic Weapons and East-West Relations. Blackett, argued that thevery firmness of Western demands in Europe "could only be carried out byclear threat of preventive war."[12] However, most U.S. Allthese suppositions are hotly contested, and it was argued that the bombswere used to shorten the war and save lives.[6] The new atomic power was not all that had shifted in favor of theUnited States as a consequence of winning the war. American dominanceextended 7, miles from America's shores, including dominance over Japan,which had been the strongest power in Asia. The Soviet Union stayed past the deadline.During this period, the Soviets caused a rebellion in Northern Iran and setup a pro-Soviet "autonomous" republic. It has been suggested that the majorreason for the United States dropping the bombs was to affect the post-warbalance of power. The chiefproponent of this view was Walter Lippmann. Another aspect of U.S. Dependence on the UnitedStates means that, "by a decision on whatever grounds to reduce or cut offthe flow, America could stop factories, cause riots and upheaval, and breakgovernments."[8] This demonstrated that, where military power could be used, economicpower could be used more subtly and achieve the same result. Military and Political Consequences of AtomicWeapons. The mostobvious reason for this build-up was that the United States wanted toprevent the Soviet Union from occupying Western European cities. The UnitedStates became the strongest naval power, even displacing Great Britain informer strongholds like the Eastern Mediterranean. [14]Ibid. This meant control over the air, similar to the control Britain hadexercised over the seas in the 19th century. At first, the United States didnot need to threaten the use of nuclear force, since it was in a strongposition to use nonviolent methods. He thought that preventitiveatomic war against the U.S.S.R. The Forrestal Diaries. [24]James V. 2 vols. nuclear monopoly werecontroversial, and complicated to analyze. The stopping of propaganda in other countries which speak of "capitalist encirclement" and of Americans "craftily and systematically" plotting World War III. The Iranian central governmentconceded oil-exploitation rights in Northern Iran. The State of Europe. A Soviet agreement to "realistic and effective" treaties to control atomic weapons.[22]If these conditions were accepted by the Soviet Union, "they wouldvirtually cease to be Communists."[23] It is clear that U.S. Forrestal, The Forrestal Diaries, ed. As the economy of Western Europe wasstrengthened, the threat from communism was lessened. [12]P.M.S. [23]James Reston, New York Times, 19 March 195 , quoted in D.F.Fleming, The Cold War and Its Origins, 2 vols. position.[7] The following statement reflects oneanalyst's opinion of the European situation. [25]Horowitz, 261. The Western powers managed to mobilize world opinion and forced theSoviets to withdraw from Iran. The more we threaten to demolish Russian cities, the more obvious it is that the Russian defense would be to ensconce themselves in European cities which we could not demolish without massacring hundreds of thousands of our friends.[15] Blackett points out that it was not an accident that the only U.S.cabinet member to oppose Truman's diplomatic offensive was Henry Wallace.Wallace's estimate of the situation agreed with Lippmann's. This prevented Soviet expansion in Iranand a Communist take-over in Italy. It further included controlover Germany, which had been the strongest nation in Europe. Following the war, it was agreed thatall three powers should leave. [7]Ibid., 86-7. Since U.S. The Free World Colossus. [6]Ibid., 55. It should be noted that the Russians had beengiven the right to be in Port Arthur and Dairen by the already-concludedYalta agreements. (New York: Doubleday,1961), 531. American leaders were so "beguiled by the newly evolved policy ofcreating 'situations of strength', that even the explosion of the Soviet A-bomb did not compel a shift from optimism to realism."[17] On June 1,195 , Lippmann wrote that no Washington observer could help but think "theAdministration's foreign policy during the past year created the impressionhere and abroad, that it places virtually complete dependence on militaryand material power."[18] If the nuclear monopoly had shaped American foreign policy, it couldbe argued that policy should have changed drastically when the Russiansexploded their bomb in 195 . [13]Horowitz, 255. Once in there, he felt, it would not be easy to get them out."[2]This may have seemed the far-sighted action of a statesman who wanted tothwart Soviet imperialism. BibliographyBlackett, P.M.S. [11]Ibid., 4 7-8. NewYork: Viking, 1951.Horowitz, David. Forrestal wrote the following in1948: The Russians cannot possibly have the industrial competence to produce the atomic bomb now, and it will be five or even ten years before they could count on manufactures of it in quantity."[24] When NATO was formed in 1949, there were two views of its potentialrole. nuclear power had onAmerican foreign policy between 1945 and 195 . [22]This would tend to keep the U.S. Blackett, Atomic Weapons and East-West Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956), 86. [26]Ibid.----------------------- 12 In the second,NATO was to provide a "trip wire" so that, if the Soviet Union invadedWestern Europe, they would be under threat of U.S. This wasdeemed wise because the Iranian government had been behaving in a veryfriendly fashion toward the Nazis. [16]Ibid. The alteration of the Soviet position on the outstanding peace treaties. After the pro-Soviet republic was brokenup, the Iranians disavowed the oil concessions. In 1952, NATO's ground forces were strengthened. policy inlight of the Soviet development of the A-bomb.[19] Others, likeBlackett, drew different conclusions from the government's continued firmattitude. (New York:Doubleday, 1961), 531. The Meaning of Yalta. During World War II, the three alliedpowers--the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain--alloccupied Iran in order to assure a continued supply of oil. At this point, U.S. 2. [15]Blackett, Military, 74. London: Turnstile Press, 1948.Fleming, D.F. New York: Knopf, 1949.Snell, John. The Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe. [17]Horowitz, 255. Iran is often held to be the first example of attempted Sovietexpansion in the post-war period. [2]Horowitz, 57; John Snell, The Meaning of Yalta (Baton Rouge:Louisiana State University Press, 1956), 129-3 . They argued that the reason there was little change in the U.S.attitude is that the situation had not really changed that much. The Iranian government received funds and advisers;in return, America was granted the right to have bases in Iran.[11] Thisbase, although it was 6, miles from the United States, was on the Sovietborder. Mention should be made of the Marshall Plan (the European RecoveryProgram), which helped to strengthen Western Europe against communism. Walter Millis (NewYork: Viking, 1951), 495-6. The cessation of Communist Party efforts to overthrow the governments of countries friendly to the Soviet Union. He was eagerlysupported by the American Communist Party, in hopes that his viewpointwould prevail and the United States would become less adamant toward theSoviet Union. leaders were "prudent enough to limit theirobjectives in this period (and thus to avoid unnecessary reactions to theirdominance)."[9] A case in point is how the United States used the economicthreats in the Italian elections of 1948 to block a Communist victory.[1 ]The successful intervention in the Italian elections showed that the UnitedStates could peacefully contain the Russian threat of expansion. TheSoviets could not possibly have had a large nuclear stockpile or extensivemeans of delivering such bombs to the continental United States at thattime.[2 ] Facts indicated that the Soviet's discovery of fission power wouldnot be all that important. In the first, NATO was supposed to help avoid the use of nuclearpower, by being able to contain a Soviet land aggression. foreign policy concerned the feasibilty ofpreventitive atomic war against the Soviets. They quoted then-Secretary of the Navy James V. The Soviet Union wantedto win oil resources very badly, since its Caucasian fields had been badlydamaged by the war. Dairen was supposed to become an internationalizedcommercial port, while it had been planned to lease Port Arthur to theSoviets as a naval base.[3] Evidence supporting this theory is the fact that the A-bombs weredropped in haste (without any wait to see what effect Russian entry intothe war would have on the Japanese) and that there was no second ultimatumissued between Hiroshima and Nagasaki.[4] Immediately after, the U.S.-Soviet friction began.[5] Another possibile motivation for dropping thebombs in haste was to show the world the meaning of this new power. [1 ]Smith, 2 4-6. policy did not change, it was notreally determined by such considerations. Agreements on arms furtherstrengthened the U.S. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1956.Blackett, P.M.S. advantage because of the headstart and superior power of the United States at that time; Fleming, 531. policymakers acted"as if their atomic monopoly were such a powerful trump card as to enablethem to wait until the political and economic situation in Europe wouldpermit them to 'bring matters to a head and make a final settlement.'"[13]Nuclear power need not be used or even openly threatened; policy could bebacked up by the implicit threat. Without firing a shot, the United States had achieved what theSoviets had attempted. was not practical, and he questioned thewisdom of the policy of ultimatum.[14] Here is what Lippmann thought in1946: No atomic bombardment could destroy the Red Army; it could destroy only the industrial means of supplying it. New York:Doubleday, 1961.Forrestal, James V. New York Times writer James Reston, reporting onthe Acheson speech, listed the five conditions he laid down: 1. It can be seen that the effects of the U.S. [18]Walter Lippmann, (1 June 195 ), quoted in D.F. Forrestal from his diaries: "Byrnes said he was most anxious to get the Japanese affair over with before the Russians get in, with particular reference to Dairen and Port Arthur. Baton Rouge: Louisiana StateUniversity Press, 1956.----------------------- [1]P.M.S. attempt to prevent Soviet occupation of Europe. He stated hisposition in a famous letter to President Truman in 1946.[16] Thedifference in opinion caused a break with Truman, and Wallace ran forpresident in 1948 on the Progressive Party ticket. Fleming, The ColdWar and Its Origins, 2 vols. The other school of thought was for negotiating Soviet withdrawalfrom its positions in Eastern Europe, rather than compelling it. The Cold War and Its Origins. Free WorldColossus (New York: Hill and Wang, 1965), 58. There were two counterpoisedviews during this period. If this paper is not what you are looking for, you can search again: Search for: or Click here to request an essay written just for you.

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