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Paper Abstract: Compares traditional, revisionist and non-revisionist views. The breakdown of World War II patterns of cooperation. Division of the world into competing armed camps. Postwar Western-Soviet relations. Argument that neither side had sole responsibility for the Cold War. Shift in balance of power with Soviet power entering Europe. Paper Introduction: ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR: TRADITIONAL, REVISIONIST AND NEO-REVISIONIST INTERPRETATIONS This research paper compares various traditional, revisionist and neo-revisionist views of the origins of the Cold War --i.e. the breakdown of wartime patterns of cooperation between the United States and other Western powers and the division of much of the world into competing armed camps during the period 1946-1949. In doing so, the referenced quotation from Eric Hobsbawm's The Age of Extremes: A History of the World 1914-1991 serves as a focal point of analysis. Legacy of the Past The Hobsbawm quotation follows the more or less standard revisionist interpretations of the origins of the Cold War which appeared in the 1960s and 1970s and largely represented ela Text of the Paper: The entire text of the paper is shown below. However, the text is somewhat scrambled. We want to give you as much information as we possibly can about our papers and essays, but we cannot give them away for free. In the text below you will find that while disordered, many of the phrases are essentially intact. From this text you will be able to get a solid sense of the writing style, the concepts addressed, and the sources used in the research paper. Churchill in his Fulton speech and Kennan in his LongTelegram in February 1946 opined that Stalin probably was unwilling to riskwar with the West at that time. .. . Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 4th ed. Onthe other hand, he anticipated an eventual war between capitalism andcommunism. 2 Arthur M. America, Russia, and the Cold War. Sources of Postwar Discord and Division The collapse of Nazi Germany created a power vacuum in Central andEastern Europe. McMahon, and Thomas G. Stalin's Unwanted Child The Soviet Union, The GermanQuestion and The Founding of the GDR (New York: St. Britain had gone to war against Germanyover Poland's right to exist. "The Primacy of Security in Soviet Foreign Policy." In The Origins of the Cold War, eds. Robert J. That certainly was not the perception of responsible Westernstatesmen at the time who had to make decisions not on the basis of whatthe Soviets could or might do, assuming they acted rationally, but ratheron the basis of the evidence before their eyes that strongly suggested thatthe introduction of Soviet power into the center of Europe and later theChinese communist takeover threatened to shift to the disadvantage of theWest the world balance of power. Dueto domestic political opposition and the desire to use a postwar loan toRussia as leverage for political concessions, the loan was never finalized.The Russians in turn helped themselves in Germany. The Allies belated invasion of the Continent opened the wayfor the Red Army to take over most of that region. . Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 4th ed. Robert J. we can't do business with Stalin . Stalin's Unwanted Child The Soviet Union, the German Question and The Founding of the GDR. Robert Cowley (New York: G.P. 243-264. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 4th ed. He wanted to avoid confrontation with the West."[xvii]Stalin backed down over Iran, the Dardanelles, the Berlin Blockade, and theexpansion of the Korean War to include direct Soviet-American conflict. McMahon, and Thomas G. Acheson: The Secretary of State Who Created the American World. Conservative neo-revisionist Gaddissaid, "having just defeated one dictator thought to have unlimitedambitions, Americans could not regard the emergence of another without thestrongest feelings of apprehension and anger."[xv] Did the West Misread Russian Intentions? As another revisionist historian, La Feber pointed out, "theCold War developed on a foundation of a half century of Russian-Americandistrust and apprehension."[vi] The Bolshevik Revolution, the repudiationof Russian debts to the West and the Soviet Union's departure from theAllied coalition in World War I as well as its efforts during the 192 s tosubvert capitalist governments, spawned deep Western distrust of the SovietUnion. Stalin must bear much of the blamefor the Cold War."[xx] According to traditional historian Schlesinger, "the great omissionof the revisionists . London: Pantheon Books, 1994.Kolko, Joyce and Gabriel. 1999.Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. It also was troubled by the heavy-handed Soviet approach to governing the East. . 1995), 74. . 24 Gaddis, 357. Eisenberg went even further whenshe suggested that the West accelerated the Sovietization process throughits intransigence: "East Germany was abandoned to the Russians."[xii] The response of orthodox or traditional historians is that the Westopposed Russian actions in Eastern Europe mostly rhetorically andeventually acquiesced in a permanent division of Europe.[xiii] Trumanflipped flopped a lot over these issues in 1945 and early 1946. "Economic Crisis and American Militarization."In The Origins of the Cold War, eds. . Putnam's Sons, 1999), 357. Leffler said "Stalin . Leffler, "The Primacy of Security in Soviet ForeignPolicy," in McMahon, and Paterson, 211. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967.Lange, David Clay. He told Yugoslav communist Milovan Djilas in 1944: "whoeveroccupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system . "Funeral in Berlin The Cold War Turns Hot. 14 James Chace, Acheson: The Secretary of State Who Created theAmerican World (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998), 135. The Soviet blockade of Berlin was highly provocative.We also know that the Korean War would never have begun if Stalin had notsanctioned Kim Il Sung's invasion of South Korea.[xviii] Gaddis pointed outthat "the Soviet leader failed to make the limited nature of his objectivesclear."[xix] And even neo-revisionist McCauley acknowledged that "theSoviets were their own worst enemies . Essex, England: Longman, 2d ed. To be sure, Stalin had since 1939 beenfairly overt about his aim to gain control of a buffer zone in Poland whichhad been a traditional route of invasion of Russia and elsewhere along itseastern border. In doing so, the referenced quotation fromEric Hobsbawm's The Age of Extremes: A History of the World 1914-1991serves as a focal point of analysis.[i] Legacy of the Past The Hobsbawm quotation follows the more or less standard revisionistinterpretations of the origins of the Cold War which appeared in the 196 sand 197 s and largely represented elaborations of positions which weretaken by critics of the Russian policy of the administration of PresidentHarry Truman, such as former Vice President Henry Wallace. Martin's Press, 1997),6. Paterson, eds. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 4th ed. 351-375. Conflict over Germany The revisionists such as Eisenberg were certainly correct in pointingout that the American government helped confuse the Russians by theiroscillation between a policy of retribution and reprisal or one ofrehabilitation of Germany. This rather benign view of the capabilities and intentions of JosefStalin's Soviet Union after the war also did not square, said more orthodoxor traditional historians, either with Soviet conduct prior to 1945 or in1945-1949. .the balance of power in the region [Europe], at least in terms ofconventional military strength, had now shifted dramatically in favor ofthe Soviet Union."[v] The United States had effectively demobilized itsgreat army in Europe. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 4th ed. 1999.----------------------- 1 Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: A History of the World 1914-1991 (London: Pantheon Books, 1994), 232. New York: G. Despite moves toward rapprochement such as therecognition by the United States of the Soviet Union in 1933, Western-Soviet relations remained troubled during the 193 s largely due to Westernnegative reactions to the brutal and despotic domestic policies of Stalin'sRussia, including the starvation of millions of peasants pursuant to thecollectivization of agriculture and his bloody purges, and the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact. Putnam'sSons, 1999.Leffler, Melvyn P. . Paterson. Robert J. Lewis, and Xue Litae, "The Conflictedand Troubled Origins of the Sino-Soviet Alliance," in McMahon, andPaterson, 257. The Origins of the Cold War 1941-1949. . Hence, their firm response. 142-157. "Dividing Germany." In The Origins of the Cold War, eds. Revisionist and neo-revisionist historians argue that the Westexacerbated relations with the Soviets by failing to acquiesce sooner thanit did to Soviet domination of the area. 8 John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the ColdWar (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 64. 21 Schlesinger, in McMahon, and Paterson, 21. McMahon, and Thomas G. The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947. 4 McCauley, 13. In his MadisonSquare Garden speech of September 12, 1946, Wallace argued in favor of acontinuation of America's wartime policy of cooperating with the SovietUnion and that the United States should recognize the legitimate securityneeds of the Soviet Union for a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe.Wallace said: "we have no more business in the political affairs of EasternEurope than Russia has in the political affairs of Latin America, WesternEurope, and the United States."[ii] Otherwise, Wallace said: "the tougherwe get, the tougher the Russians will get," thus raising the risk of WorldWar III.[iii] The revisionist view that, as McCauley put it, "the Soviet Unioncannot be held responsible for the Cold War," gained currency in the 196 sand 197 s for several reasons: revulsion by many in the West to the anti-communist hysteria and McCarthyism which in America accompanied theoutbreak of the Cold War, revelations in declassified Western archives ofpostwar differences of opinion concerning Western policy toward the SovietUnion and the unpopularity of the Vietnam War.[iv] The revisionist argumentbasically was that the Soviet Union posed no postwar threat to the vitalinterests of the West because Russia had suffered great damage during theRusso-German war of 1941-1945 and was a considerably weaker power than theUnited States which emerged from World War II as the dominant economicpower in the world and with a [temporary] monopoly on atomic weapons. 1999.Zubok, Vladislav, and Constantine Pleshakov. Robert J. as faras his army can reach."[ix] FDR tacitly acknowledged at the 1943 Tehran andYalta summit conferences that the West was not in a position to preventRussian domination of Eastern Europe. 23 Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, "American Capitalism and Expansion," inMcMahon, and Paterson, 4; and Thomas J. McMahon, and Thomas G. Robert J. Paterson. 13 Robert Garson, "The Limits of American Power in Eastern Europe,"in McMahon, and Paterson, 143. 1999.Loth, Wilfried. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 4th ed. 1999.Goncharov, Sergei, John W. Conclusion The contributions of the revisionists and neo-revisionists havefilled in the mosaic of postwar Western-Soviet relations and supportGaddis' overall conclusion that "neither side can bear sole responsibilityfor the Cold War."[xxv] And, as Paterson pointed out, many systemicfactors, such as the postwar political vacuums and instability in Europeand parts of Asia, economic chaos and devastation and the introduction of abipolar great power system in lieu of the previous multipolar system allwere destabilizing factors which helped result in a breakdown of East-Westrelations. They both, however, expressed the opinionthat the Soviet Union was inclined to exert pressure to expand thefrontiers of Soviet communist power and to exploit Western weakness orirresolution. The Americans eclipsedthe other European nations in the West. 1999), 16. 1999.Gaddis, John Lewis. 22 Loth, 6. Gaddis says that the revisionists and neo-revisionists, as economicdeterminists, overemphasize the importance of economic factors inexplaining the origins of the Cold War, and that they neglect other equallyimportant factors such as "the profound impact of the domestic politicalsystem on the conduct of American foreign policy."[xxiv] Atomic Diplomacy Most historians of whatever background now agree that the UnitedStates attempted without much success to use its temporary monopoly overatomic weapons as a club to induce the Russians to make concessions inEastern Europe, Japan and elsewhere in 1945-1946. Hobsbawm and other revisionists argue that due to its weakness,Stalin's Soviet Union did not have expansionist ambitions outside theeastern bloc. wanted to avoid military conflictwith the United States."[xvi] Based on their study of recently declassifiedSoviet documents, Russian historians Zubok and Pleshakov agreed: "Stalin .. Heargued that expansionist policies were necessary to ensure the continueddomination of the Communist Party at home. He was not averse to exerting very strong pressures or takingserious risks of war. Soviet suspicions and hostility stemmed from the basic tenets ofMarxist-Leninism and the ineffective Western intervention in the RussianCivil War of 1918-1921. ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR: TRADITIONAL, REVISIONIST AND NEO-REVISIONIST INTERPRETATIONS This research paper compares various traditional, revisionist and neo-revisionist views of the origins of the Cold War --i.e. In August1943, FDR told former ambassador to Russia, William Bullitt, a Riga axiomadherent, "I think that if I give him [Stalin] everything I possibly canand ask for nothing from him in return, noblesse oblige, he won't try toannex anything and will work with me in a world of democracy andpeace."[viii] This was a rather naive and ultimately unproductive approach. . Their rapacity in turnantagonized Germans, British and Americans and led to conflict. He has broken every one of hispromises he made at Yalta."[xi] The Sovietization of Eastern Europe took place in stages. 1995.McCormick, Thomas J. Paterson. Armed Truce: The Beginnings of the Cold War 1945- 46. 1999.Thomas, Hugh. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 4th ed. In What If?, ed. Thisretrospective view ignored the fact that, as Lange put it, "by 1948 . Robert J. He, therefore, supported the concept of German unity, but theeconomic burden unreconstructed Germany represented to the West, theaggressive behavior of the Russians, including the rape of thousands ofGerman women, and the pressures they exerted to force German Socialists tojoin with German Communists eventually led to a Western decision to alignWest Germany with the West and to divide that nation. .in whom one could place great trust. He and Winston Churchill had,however, pledged themselves to respect the right of peoples in liberatedterritories to self-determination. the breakdown ofwartime patterns of cooperation between the United States and other Westernpowers and the division of much of the world into competing armed campsduring the period 1946-1949. McMahon, and Thomas G. 2 McCauley, 1 8. McMahon, and Paterson, 26. The Marshall Plan was rejectedby the Soviets because it threatened communist control over the easternbloc economies. 1999.McMahon, Robert J., and Thomas G. New York: Columbia University Press, 1972.Garson, Robert A. 11 Hugh Thomas. Paterson. Revisionists and neo-revisionists maintain that the Western Alliesexaggerated the Soviet threat. 16 Melvyn P. . Armed Truce: The Beginnings of the Cold War 1945-1946(New York: Atheneum, 1987), 121. was not prepared to take a course of unbridled unilateral expansionafter World War II. 9 Wilfried Loth. Chace said"in 1945 and 1946 American foreign policy fluctuated like a compass needleseeking the right azimuth."[xiv] Moreover, it had good reason to refuse toacquiesce in the Soviet takeover without first protesting against whatChurchill at Fulton, Missouri in early 1946 characterized as the loweringof an Iron Curtain over Central and Eastern Europe. 1999.Hobsbawm, Eric. lies precisely in the fact that the Soviet Unionwas not a traditional nation state."[xxi] Kennan in his Long Telegrampointed out that traditional Russian suspicion of foreigners, imperialisttendencies and Marxist-Leninist ideology made up a potent mixture. 4th ed. The refusal of the UnitedStates and Britain to share control of atomic weapons with the Sovietsduring the war (or later unless the Soviets would accept the internationalcontrol and verification measures of the 1946 Baruch Plan) was a source ofconflict. 19 Gaddis, 355. . . "Stalin's Road to theCold War." In The Origins of the Cold War, eds. The Origins of theCold War. Schlesinger, Jr. Stalinwanted to gain access to the wealth of West Germany and feared Germanrearmament. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998.Eisenberg, Carolyn. 127-142. Robert J. Their central thesis, however, that, as Hobsbawm argues, theWest was principally responsible for the Cold War simply does not holdwater. Lewis, and Xue Litai, "The Conflicted and Troubled Sino-Soviet Alliance." In The Origins of the Cold War. 17 Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, "Stalin's Road to theCold War," in McMahon, and Paterson, 72. Paterson. 25 Ibid., 36 .----------------------- 16 In Poland repression andeven the disappearance of non-communist Poles took place much earlier --in1945-1946. President Franklin Rooseveltknew of Stalin's repressive domestic policies but believed that it was bothessential and feasible to obtain Russian postwar cooperation. 18 Sergei Goncharov, John W. They sought a newpostwar world economic order in which free trade and investment wouldprevail.Moreover, American defense planners understood that the national securityof the United States was highly dependent on the continued prosperity ofWestern Europe and Japan and access to the raw materials of Southeast Asia.For those reasons, they were gravely concerned that critical foreignindustrial areas, such as the Ruhr and Manchuria, might come undercommunist control and that communist parties might take advantage ofpostwar chaos and devastation to overthrow the governments of France andItaly.The 1947 Marshall Plan was a direct result. . Economic Factors Many revisionists, such as the Kolkos, and neo-revisionists such asMcCormick, make much of American attempts to impose a liberal and opencapitalist trading system dominated by the United States on Europe and therest of the world as a cause of the Cold War.[xxiii] Top American officialssuch as Secretary of State Cordell Hull believed that economicprotectionism and autarky were major causes of war. However, it is hard to argue that the West was imprudent in thisrespect, given the massive Soviet infiltration of the American governmentand nuclear espionage effort, the first evidence of which in 1946 (theGouzenko case) helped harden American public opinion against the SovietUnion. 2 5-218. not the type of gentlemen . Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 4th ed. As Yergin pointed out, a key cadre of American Russian experts,including George Kennan, Charles Bohlen and others, who assumed importantpolicy-making roles in the late 194 s, developed during the 192 s and 193 swhat he called the Riga axioms, namely, "an image of the Soviet Union as aworld revolutionary state, denying the possibilities of coexistence,committed to unrelenting ideological warfare, [and] powered by a messianicdrive for world mastery."[vii] Nazi Germany's invasion of Russia triggered a marriage ofconvenience, the Grand Alliance of the mid 194 s, during which conflicts ofinterest, such as over the failure of the Allies to open a Second Front inWestern Europe before 1944, friction over Lend-Lease, Soviet complaintsabout Allied surrender discussions in Italy, etc., were downplayed in theinterest of the common effort against Hitler. McMahon, and Thomas G. Paterson (Boston: HoughtonMifflin, 4th ed. 6 -76. Americans had learnedfrom their experiences with Germany that totalitarianism often foundexpression in a hostile foreign policy. Paterson. McMahon, and Thomas G. 1999.La Feber, Walter. Robert J. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 4th ed. 7 Daniel Yergin, "American Ideology: The Riga and Yalta Axioms," ineds. 1 Gaddis, 175. Martin's Press, 1997.McCauley, Martin. The Soviets then had 175 divisions, 2.5 million armedmen, in Central Europe. 25-39. 6 Walter La Feber, America, Russia, and the Cold War (New York: JohnWiley & Sons, 1967), 6. 175-189. Thecommunists used what Hungarian Party leader Matyas Rakosi called salamitactics, tolerating for several years in Czechoslovakia (until the coup ofearly 1948), mixed 'popular front' governments. "American Ideology: The Riga and Yalta Axioms." In The Origins of the Cold War, eds. Robert Cowley. New York: Atheneum, 1987.Yergin, Daniel. New York: St. P. In negotiating at Yalta a compromise underwhich Stalin agreed to allow a few London non-communist Poles into anotherwise communist-dominated government and the Declaration on LiberatedEurope under which the Big Three pledged themselves to free electionseverywhere, Gaddis said "the President by his actions had led the Americanpeople to expect free elections in Eastern Europe while at the same timeleading the Russians to expect a free hand."[x] After FDR's death in April 1945, the Truman administration protestedSoviet absorption of Eastern Europe. 5 David Clay Lange, "Funeral in Berlin The Cold War Turns Hot," inWhat If?, ed. 12 Carolyn Eisenberg, "Dividing Germany," in McMahon, and Paterson,141. . "Communist Ideology, StalinistTotalitarianism, and American Universalism," in The Origins of the ColdWar, eds. McMahon, and Thomas G. Paterson. FDR and Churchill at Yalta attempted to resistStalin's demands for $2 billion in German reparations. 3 Martin McCauley, The Origins of the Cold War 1941-1949 (Essex,England: Longman, 2d ed. At Potsdam Trumanand Secretary of State James Byrnes eventually acceded to a much smallersum. Paterson. Endnotes BibliographyChace, James. The Age of Extremes: A History of the World 1914-1991. 15 Gaddis, 355. "American Capitalism and Expansion." In The Origins of the Cold War, eds. Robert J. 3-11. Loth said Stalin's instructions to his subordinates in Germany were:"steal as much as you can."[xxii] Here cause and effect gets confused. During 1945-1946 friction developedamong the former Allies over a series of issues, the most important ofwhich were unilateral imposition of Soviet rule in Poland and elsewhere inthe East, quarrels over Soviet claims for reparations from Germany andvarious Soviet pressures on the periphery of Europe, including Russianslowness in withdrawing from Iran and its demands for bases in theDardanelles and other pressures on Turkey. "The Limits of American Power in Eastern Europe." InThe Origins of the Cold War, eds. . . "Communist Ideology, StalinistTotalitarianism." In The Origins of the Cold War, eds. McMahon, and Thomas G. It found itself trapped politically byprevious declarations of principle. Stalin's February 9, 1946 speechin which he cited the irreconcilability of capitalism and communism andcalled on the long-suffering Russian people to accept further exactions tosupport rearmament after the most devastating war in Russian historycertainly gave the West reason to be alarmed concerning Soviet intentions.In addition, as Nikita Khrushchev noted in his 1956 speech denouncingStalinist excesses, nations and persons dealing with Stalin in his lateryears never were sure whether his reactions would be prompted by prudenceor paranoia. Even FDR before his deathsaid, "Averell [Harriman, American Ambassador to the U.S.S.R] is right . McCormick, "Economic Crisis andAmerican Militarization," in Ibid., 175-176. 11-25. If this paper is not what you are looking for, you can search again: Search for: or Click here to request an essay written just for you.

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