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Paper Abstract: Examines Germany's military strategy in early World War II. Great Britain as German's single enemy of the time (1940-June 1941). Consequences of Hitler's obsession with Russia. Germany not engaging in a peripheral campaign against Britain's overseas interests. Italy and the Mediterranean sector; possibility of Italian defeat. Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of Russia. Paper Introduction: From May of 1940 until June of 1941, Germany was at war against a single enemy, Great Britain. The most basic principles of strategy thus argued that Germany should devote its resources as far as possible toward defeating that enemy. The most obvious means, invasion, which had so decisively solved the problem of France, was rendered problematical by the insular status of Britain. Economic war against its lifeline, by U-boats or strategic bombing, was a second means. This option was however somewhat one-dimensional, and did not provide a useful task for Germany's great land power. A third option, however, was a peripheral campaign against Britain's overseas interests [Van Crevald 28]. Many of these were out of reach, but a crucial component of Text of the Paper: The entire text of the paper is shown below. However, the text is somewhat scrambled. We want to give you as much information as we possibly can about our papers and essays, but we cannot give them away for free. In the text below you will find that while disordered, many of the phrases are essentially intact. From this text you will be able to get a solid sense of the writing style, the concepts addressed, and the sources used in the research paper. Partisan activity in Yugoslavia and Greece would be aheadache for the duration of the war, but in spite of the legend that hasgrown up, these imposed no major drain on German military strength.Germany was thus remarkably free at this time to choose its objectives, andassign suitable resources to meeting them. The North African coast, all the way from Gibraltar toEgypt, was in the hands of Spain, a friendly neutral, Vichy France, adefeated and cowed neutral, and Italy, an Axis ally. The potential for Iranian disaffection, however, wasobvious. Germany did make war with U-boats, as Britain with heavy bombers --the bombing option being abandoned partly because RAF air superiorityprevailed in the Battle of Britain, but also because the Luftwaffe was atactically oriented force that had no heavy bombers. The Channel crossing, for example, was to be made in small boatstraveling at 7 knots. The force assigned to do this was described by someGerman officers as himmelfahrtskommando - "heaven bound command" -conveying their assessment of the chances of a successful crossing [Von derPorten 9 ]. D. The German Navy in World War II. (Original publication 1947.)Rommel, Erwin. It was noted above that the Mediterranean and North African theaterwere originally forced on Germany, and thus an intrusion on German militaryplanning. Germany also had a prior history of interest in the region, asexemplified before World War I by the project for a Berlin-Baghdad railway. Thus a push toward the Middle East, in addition to its inherentadvantages, had precedents in German strategic thinking. Once Germany was drawn in, however, what began as a problembecame almost at once an opportunity to exploit. Not only had no replacement materialarrived, but, with an almost unbelievable lack of appreciation of thesituation, the supply authorities had actually sent only three thousandtons to Africa during June, as compared to our real requirement ofsixty thousand tons, a figure which was never in fact attained [Rommel243]. Both of these meanswere however "strategic" weapons, affecting not the direct military balancebut underlying economic strength. Between May of 194 and June of 1941, however, the Wehrmachtfaced no other urgent, pressing tasks. Churchill could not know how thoroughly deficientGerman planning for an invasion of England was, and in the aftermath of thefall of France, there was always the risk of being caught off balance. Naval superiority in the English Channel, a prerequisite forany cross-Channel landing, was unattainable. (In the event, in fact, neither proved as effective as itsproponents hoped.) Each antagonist thus faced a basic problem of how to mount a usefuloffensive against the other. In July of 194 , Hitler gave preparation orders for the Mediterraneanplan, but never seriously followed up on them [Von der Porten 1 4] -- apoint to which we will return below. Perhaps understandably, Hitler was also reluctant to opt for amilitary move across Spain that would threaten to open a new front, perhapsa reprise of the Peninsular campaign in the Napoleonic Wars. (The third means, subsidizing allies,was nullified by the fall of France.) From the British point of view, a peripheral strategy focusing on thesouth was not only "natural," but reinforced by the status of Italy as theweak link of the Axis. Hitler could not allow an Italian defeat that would threaten to makethe Mediterranean a British rather than Italian lake, and might endangerthe Fascist state itself. Thislimitation, however, still left open the option of a thrust against Egyptand Suez, opening the way also to the Persian Gulf region. Instead, on June 22, 1941,Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of Russia, commenced. The island itselfseemed on the point of falling. Hewas not prepared, however, to concede the Mediterranean to Italy. New York: McGraw Hill, 1988.Puleston, W. In that respect,the intervention in the south was inevitably a disruption of Germanplanning. Works CitedBelot, Raymond de. Their effects would be felt only in thevery long term. Economic war against its lifeline, by U-boatsor strategic bombing, was a second means. As a lifeline ofBritain itself, it was second only to the North Atlantic. No major physical or military obstacles separated Egyptfrom the oilfields of the Persian Gulf [Van der Porten, 1 ], while ifEgypt were lost the British could only attempt to defend them from India, adifficult proposition at best. JamesA. Thevery magnitude of his triumph ... Hitler's War. At the center, the war thus became akind of standoff, with neither Britain nor Germany able to launch a directoffensive against the other. Field, trans. For Germany also, however, the Mediterranean was not simply avulnerability, but a potential target of opportunity. The Struggle For the Mediterranean 1939-1945. New York: Scribner's,1969.Von der Porten, Edward P. Significantly, however, Goering at this timerejected the alternative of a paratroop attack on Malta, a decision thearmy command attributed to Goering's fears that Malta would be moredifficult to take [Puleston 176]. Suez would be taken by a military advance,while Gibraltar would be obtained either by a diplomatic arrangement withSpain's pro-Axis dictator Franco, or if need be by a military thrust acrossSpain from the Pyrenees. A couple of more divisions -- or even adequate support for thedivisions he had -- would have been sufficient. Its capacity to function as anoffensive strong point was eliminated by constant Luftwaffe air attacks,which required all its military resources to fend off. The Influence of Sea Power in World War II.Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 197 . He had sent that firstarmored division to Africa eagerly; now he was bogged down there" [Hoyt191]. On November 11,194 , in an operation that tactically foreshadowed Pearl Harbot, Britishnaval aircraft raided Taranto harbor. Meanwhile, on the northern side of the Mediterranean, events weredeveloping as a reprise of those in Africa. This Mediterranean strategy called for seizing Gibraltarand Suez, the two gateways of the Mediterranean, thus excluding the Britishentirely [Van der Porten 97ff]. The Germans might also anticipate substantial local support, asliberators of the Arabs from British and French colonialism. In the air, Italian naval aviation proved inadequate [De Belot 47].This problem was not peculiar to Italy, but was suffered by all countrieswith unified, independent air forces, whose high commands tended to regardmaritime operations as secondary. The Battle For North Africa. closed his eyes to the rapidlychanging strategic and supply situation in the Mediterranean and NorthAfrica [Strawson 1 6]. Malta surelywould have fallen if subjected to the full attention of the Luftwaffe, andperhaps airborne assault, rather than to the limited attention theLuftwaffe could spare from the Russian effort. One writer has criticized Rommel at this point for losing sight ofthe broader strategic balance: It was then that he overlooked his own previous warning that'without Malta the Axis will end by losing control of North Africa'. The Italians, however, never solved their navalair deficiencies. One hinge of the plan, Gibraltar,became problematical when Franco pegged the price of his support, in Frenchcolonies and other concessions, at a higher level than Hitler was willingto pay [Hoyt 169]. The following discussion will considerthe causes of this failure, which lay ultimately in Hitler's obsession withRussia and the resulting loss of German strategic focus and initiative. Thegeneral high quality of the Luftwaffe allowed it to achieve someeffectiveness in over-water operations, though not as much as a true navalair arm might have had. In the event, however, Italian operations were a debacle. The Wehrmacht quicklytook over from the stalled Italian advance, occupying Yugoslavia andGreece. With a victory in the Mediterranean and NorthAfrica, Britain could hope to knock Italy out of the war -- even,plausibly, to bring it around to the Allied side, should an Italian defeatlead to the fall of Mussolini. For the British, the response was natural: aperipheral strategy, aimed at Churchill's "soft underbelly of Europe."This, along with economic blockade, were two traditional means by whichBritain fought continental enemies. When, however, the Luftwaffe turned tosupport Rommel directly, its pressure on Malta flagged. Moreover, themilitary technology of 1945 had already reduced it from an ocean to a lake-- and much of its shoreline was under direct or indirect Axis control. Italy was the Axis partner for which a southern focus was botha natural fit and a long-standing interest. The geography was such that British shipping could besubjected not only to naval attack but also in many sectors to land-basedair attack as well. Many of these were out of reach, but a crucial component of them, theMediterranean and Egypt, were potentially vulnerable to German land and airpower. Italy had no aircraft carriers, but much of the centralMediterranean, particularly the vital passage between Italy and Tunisia,could potentially be dominated by Italian land-based air. PaulFindlay, trans. The gravest Italiandeficiency, however, was in senior leadership, about which Rommel wouldexpress his frustration with weary regularity. London: Collins, 1953.Strawson, John. From aGerman option, Africa had turned into a liability. Italianequipment was mediocre; a byproduct of Italy's early rearmament was thatmuch of its armaments were already obsolescent. If either Gibraltaror Suez could be taken, Britain's line of communications throughout theMediterranean could be cut outright. To command them hedispatched General Erwin Rommel, who arrived in Tripoli on February 12,1941 [Hoyt 191]. Even in caution, they found limited safety. He thus felt compelled to reinforce thestruggling Italians with two German panzer divisions. This, however, quickly bogged down. The real problem, however, was Russia, which wasnow absorbing all available Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe resources. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1951.Crevald, Martin van. A force of German U-boats was dispatched to theMediterranean. Contrariwise, supply to Axis forces in North Africarequired only a short sea passage, within the protective reach of land-based air. Ironically, onthe previous day Rommel had succeeded in retaking Tobruk [Strawson 1 6].In Rommel's view, the way to Egypt was now open. Hitler's underlying motivations for rejecting this option in favor ofa Russian campaign lie outside the scope of this discussion, and areultimately to be found in his ideological and psychological obsessions.What is clear from a strategic perspective, however, is that in failing tolend full support to a peripheral campaign against Britain, beforediverting the bulk of German strength to Russia, Hitler doomed Germany to atwo-front war in which requirements increasingly outstripped the means ofresponding to them. The fall of France was swift andcomplete, calling for retention only of a small occupying force and aminimal guard on the Atlantic Wall -- a serious British invasion attemptbeing wholly implausible in this stage of the war. On land, the Italian plan was for an advance eastward from Italian-held Libya to Egypt. He was deposed in favor of his son by theBritish, who subsequently occupied southern Iran, while the Sovietsoccupied the north. From Greece, in a move of extraordinary boldness, German paratroopstook Crete in May of 1941, providing another airfield from which Britishshipping could be harassed. India might be the jewelin the crown of the British Empire, but from an industrial and strategicpoint of view, the most valuable part of the empire was the Middle East oilfields. Nevertheless, a southern-oriented peripheral strategy would have beenonly of abstract interest to Germany had its Italian ally been moreeffective. New York:Thomas Y. Mussolini directed his forcesinto the Balkans, where once again they bogged down. At sea, in the Mediterranean, the Italians were unwilling to risktheir heavy ships to action, sharply reducing their ability to challengethe British. Finally, adominating position in the south would have been of value in the event ofwar with Russia, opening the possibility of a flanking attack [Von derPorten 1 ]. Even in advance of such an outcome, British supplies had to traversethe entire length of the sea, some 2XXX miles, in which Britain had only ahandful of bases. Unrest in occupied France and other occupied Western countries was atthis time minimal. Moreover, the possibilities for Germany in the Mediterranean sectorextended beyond cutting a line of communications. Plans were drawn up, but it was fortunate for the Germans thatthey were never carried out. This option was however somewhatone-dimensional, and did not provide a useful task for Germany's great landpower. Viewed in this light, Italian failure in the south wasserendipitous. A third option, however, was a peripheral campaign againstBritain's overseas interests [Van Crevald 28]. Hitler's Strategy 194 -1941: The Balkan Clue.London: Cambridge University, 1973.Hoyt, Edwin P. The Rommel Papers. Thus, after in effect briefly mulling the idea, the Germans turnedaway from it [Von der Porten, 82]. It had obtained North Africancolonies in the late 19th century, and expanded them -- albeit withhumiliating difficulty -- under Mussolini. The one logical requirement, to return to the point made at the startof this essay, was to find an effective means of pursuing the war withBritain. While the Italians telegraphed their punches, the Britishlearned to exploit time and distance effectively. The peripheral option, however, wasnever applied with decisive effect. They had only limited success against Allied merchantshipping, but in the fall they succeeded in sinking two major British navalunits, the battleship *Barham and the carrier *Ark Royal [Puleston 193].The latter in particular was costly to the British, severely limiting airsupport for the convoy route to Malta. "Hitler was powerlessto stop the chain of events in North Africa. The Luftwaffe could directits attention to one or the other, but not to both at the same time. Under Rommel's brilliant leadership, the Afrika Korps would in facthold out until May of 1943. Germany could now, if it chose, pursue a peripheralstrategy against Britain with its own forces, defining specific objectivesaccording to its own strategy, and claiming the fruits of victory foritself rather than conceding them to an ally. One of the new Italian battleships,*Italia (formerly *Littorio) was sunk in shallow water, as was one of themodernized older ships, while another was badly damaged. The Mediterraneanwas the primary traffic artery of the British Empire. From May of 194 until June of 1941, Germany was at war against asingle enemy, Great Britain. In Iran, ShahReza Pahlavi was so pro-German that he changed the name of historicalPersia to Iran (i.e., "Aryan"). Whenit concentrated on Malta, Rommel's forces found themselves subjected towithering British air attacks. What developed instead was a peculiar interaction between Malta andthe fighting in the desert [Strawson 11 -11]. It was anexceptionally bold move. Crowell, 1969.----------------------- 15 The Wehrmacht had no amphibious doctrine,much less appropriate training or equipment. By February of 1941,Italy had lost the key staging base of Tobruk, and their entire position inLibya was in danger of collapse [Puleston 62]. This possibility had already been grasped by the naval command underAdmiral Raeder. Moreover, Hitler was not attached to the conquest of Britain the wayhe had been to the conquest of France, or would be to the conquest ofRussia. Italy sat athwart the Mediterranean, confining passage to a seawayonly XX miles wide. Rommel's detailed analysis of the supply problem primarily blames theItalians [Rommel 243-44]. Italy also had a powerful fleet, comprising two new battleships, withtwo more under construction, as well as four older battleships that hadbeen extensively modernized to the point of being almost completely rebuilt[De Belot 36-7]. B.H. Hitler, however, rejected this option without appearing to everseriously consider it [Van der Porten 1 4]. Germany was thus drawn into the Mediterranean theater in the firstplace for a negative reason, in order to bail out Italy. Malta's offensive capability thus revived, and the vital logisticlifeline to Africa was threatened. In fact, in the summer and fall of 1941 the Mediterranean situationwas full of potential. All three wouldbe out of action for months [Puleston 61]. The British would solve the problem byreturning naval aviation from RAF to Royal Navy operational control. Exploiting its central position, Italy could potentially mount a veryserious challenge to the British position in the Mediterranean, as well asposing a land-based threat to Egypt that the British would be hard-pressedto counter. Scaling up the Afrika Korps to a level even remotely comparable tothe forces assigned to Operation Barbarossa was out of the question due tothe problem of supply. The most basic principles of strategy thusargued that Germany should devote its resources as far as possible towarddefeating that enemy. Mobility was crucial in desert warfare, but this was just what theItalians lacked, less because of material deficiencies than indecisiveleadership. By the end of September 41 - only 1/3of troops and 1/7 of supplies needed by Germans had arrived [Strawson 75].Rommel would write of the campaign that led to Alamein that This series of engagements had brought the strength of my Army tothe point of exhaustion ... Rommel severely criticized the failure todrive the attack home, and believed that he could have taken Malta [Rommel289]. The most obvious means, invasion, which had sodecisively solved the problem of France, was rendered problematical by theinsular status of Britain. Even if Malta hung on, anunhindered Luftwaffe could have at once suppressed its offensive power andlent air support to Rommel. Such famous episodes of the war as theKasserine Pass still lay before it, but after Alamein it never had any realchance of victory, and could serve only to slow down the Allied advance.Nevertheless, the fact that Rommel and the Afrika Korps achieved so muchwith so little is a starkly clear indication of what might have beenaccomplished. For Britain, a southern peripheral strategyhad everything to recommend it. An Axis victory in the Mediterranean sector would render this outcomenearly certain. This potential vulnerability was in fact realized, to the extentthat the Afrika Korps, and its commander General Erwin Rommel, figureprominently in the saga of the war. With Egypt and Suez taken,Malta would be reduced to an irrelevant outpost even if it survived. An invasion of Britain seems never to have been really seriouslyconsidered. However, without the enormous drag imposed by theinvasion of Russia, much more attention could have been given to thelogistic dimension of the Africa and Mediterranean campaigns. Likewise, Rommel did not need an army group totake Egypt. Losing them would be very costly to Britain, while gaining themwould be of even greater value to a fuel-short Germany. Liddell Hart, ed. Hostilities in the Mediterranean commenced in June of 1941.Churchill, aware of the importance of Africa and the Mediterraneanlifeline, transferred two divisions from Britain in mid-194 . Malta itself was under severe strain. 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