THE PRAETORIAN GUARD OF ROMAN EMPERORS.   Term Paper ID:28991 Click to get this paper

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Paper Abstract: Examines the Guard's power as the only military force in the Capital city. Issues of loyalty & disloyalty to various Emperors. Evolution of the Guard under the Julio-Claudian Emperors up to the death of Nero. Problems presented by armies, citizen militias. History of the Roman Army. Organization & mission of the Guard. Emperors Agustus, Tiberius, Caligula, Claudius, Nero. Paper Introduction: QUIS CUSTODIET IPSOS CUSTODES? The Praetorian Guard under the Julio-Claudians The Praetorian Guard, the personal guard force of the Roman emperors, has become a byword for the ability of a bodyguard to control, and ultimately to elevate or depose, the person whom it is supposed to guard. By the nature of its situation throughout the early and middle eras of the empire -- as the only military force in near the capital of an empire most of whose armies were dispersed among the frontiers -- it had the potential to control its imperial masters. Against a conspiracy or riot an Emperor could call upon the Praetorian Guard, but if the Guard itself Text of the Paper: The entire text of the paper is shown below. However, the text is somewhat scrambled. We want to give you as much information as we possibly can about our papers and essays, but we cannot give them away for free. In the text below you will find that while disordered, many of the phrases are essentially intact. From this text you will be able to get a solid sense of the writing style, the concepts addressed, and the sources used in the research paper. Burrus,the sole praetorian prefect at the time, was an associate of Agrippina andat least de-facto co-conspirator with her, and when Claudius met hismysterious end the Guard did not riot and choose its own candidate, as ithad chosen Claudius, but endorsed or acquiesced in the accession of Nero. The prefects did not call upon it toget rid of him, but joined in a palace conspiracy to assassinate him(Alston, pp. Put simply, an army can defeat and eitherkill or impose its will on a political leadership, a general population, orany faction of either that is not itself organized as an army.Alternative Possible Solutions States have found, or attempted to find, various means to deal withthis latent threat from their own armed defenders. The position of Tiberius, his first successor, had strengths andweaknesses that were nearly the mirror image of Augustus'. A final common solution -- perhaps the most common -- to the problemof armies has been to make the military and civil leadership one and thesame. For a republican state, or at least onewhose government rests in some way on popular assent, this solution seems anatural one. Augustus took two further measures, one to lower the profile of thePraetorian Guard and the other to ensure its loyalty. Italy was almost entirely denuded of troops. Nero committedthe fatal error of extending the circle of his executions from the Senatein Rome to encompass serving generals such as Corbulo. A variation on this theme has beenprominent in modern times, when draftee armies have proven fully as capableof carrying out coups on behalf of their commanders as have long-servicecareer regulars. Octavian-turned-Augustus had no wish to rule by naked militarypower, surely not least because that would be an invitation to the nextambitious general. On Caligula's death, however, the Praetorian Guard played its firstdirect part in an imperial accession. He did the former by nominally restoring the Senate'sauthority, while accepting a web of interlocking offices that ensured hispower. The latter was not followed outside Italy (until very muchlater, by which time the meaning of Roman citizenship had changed), andeven planting colonies was not a sufficient means to provide forces overmuch of the Mediterranean world. Bourne. He was indeed the first emperor to be brought down ultimatelyby the army rather than by a conspiracy within Rome (or even within theimperial household), but it was the larger if more remote military threat,the armies of the frontier, whose revolts sealed his fate. Thus thedevelopment of manipular tactics did not in itself threaten the citizenmilitia basis of the Roman state's security, but Roman military successeventually did. According to Tacitus, when Nero came out of the palace and waspresented to the troops, "some of the men are said to have looked roundhesitantly and asked where Britannicus was. QUIS CUSTODIET IPSOS CUSTODES? The titleself-adopted by Augustus was Princeps, "First Citizen." This deliberatelyvague formulation has come down into English as "prince," originally ageneral term for personal rulership (as in Machiavelli's The Prince), butalso for a personal ruler of vaguely lower rank than a king, and ultimatelyapplied specifically to a king's sons. The nature ofsoldiers is such that this measure tended to bind them directly to theemperor rather than to their immediate commanders. (The short history of air forces suggests nostrong tendency for them to be either launchers of or deterrents againstmilitary coups.) In a Western tradition going back to classical antiquity, reliancehas often been placed in a citizen militia, as counterweight against orsubstitute for a standing army. The Roman civil wars that followed mighthave roots in social conflict and factional struggles within Rome itself,but the outcome was determined by successive generals and their legions.Caesar's crossing of the Rubicon may mark symbolically the point at whichraw military power became dominant, but it was only the punctuation mark ona process already completed. No one could know in advance that thecivil wars of the late Republic had come to a permanent end; thepossibility remained open that an ambitious general or senatorialconspiracy would launch another round. 75). Augustussurvived as a general term of respect, to become a formal title for a"senior" emperor under the system of divided imperial authority underDiocletian. The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire.Abridged by Frank C. Roman generals had longbeen accompanied by a small personal guard, the cohors praetoria, a termderived from the praetorium or headquarters tent in a Roman encampment.During the civil wars, generals had (unsurprisingly) vastly enlarged thesebodyguards.The Praetorian Guard: Organization and Mission Augustus regularized his guard, forming an establishment of ninepraetorian cohorts. He was young and without personal prestige or apersonal following. Ultimately Augustus' authorityrested on his prestige, but the Praetorian Guard was a useful instrument toraise the immediate cost of any potential rebellion. A rebel generalcould not confidently expect to defeat the Praetorian Guard with a singlelegion (even if it was at its lower possible strength); two or threelegions was the practical minimum for a march on Rome, and so employingthem would mean stripping an entire sector of its troops. The reign that followed made Nero Hollywood's favorite Roman Emperor(the recent "Gladiator" and the 196 s "Fall of the Roman Empire" both choseCommodus -- a prominent figure in the later political development of thePraetorian Guard -- but it is fair to say that few in either audience knewwho Commodus was, whereas everyone has heard of Nero). This spectacle sealed the enduring popular reputation of thePraetorian Guard, but it -- and indeed the whole career of the Guard -- wasin fact an instance of a more general problem, faced potentially by allstates, the problem of controlling its army. 1241). 74-75). Regular action was not in fact contemplated. This of course is the outcome of any successful military coup: amilitary government by a generalissimo or junta. Manipular tactics required greater training inweapons-handling and tactical maneuver than did phalanx tactics, but notbeyond the reach of the citizen militia of a warlike state. 1238). [Britannicus being the onecredible and popular rival claimant.] However, as no counter-suggestionwas made, they accepted the choice offered them" (Tacitus XII, 66, pp. A few, facing nosubstantial foreign threats (or none they had any serious hope of fightingoff in any case) have done without armies. (1996). They conducted him to their camp andproclaimed him emperor. However, Rome -- and the emperor's person -- could not be leftabsolutely undefended. 242). How it was restrained,and how it gradually emerged, was largely shaped by the individualcharacter of the early emperors.The Praetorian Guard and the Emperors Augustus, who created the Praetorian Guard in its imperial form, wasin a sense both the most secure and least secure of the early emperors. Against a conspiracy or riot an Emperorcould call upon the Praetorian Guard, but if the Guard itself turneddisloyal the Emperor could have no direct recourse unless personally at thehead of legions, which the for the first half of the empire's history theemperors seldom were. By the final round, Octavian against Antony,the Republican political questions had faded to insignificance; it wassimply a matter of which Roman general would emerge to dominate the Romanworld.The Augustan Solution What in retrospect is seen as victorious Octavian's transformationinto the Emperor Augustus was at the time a series of stabilizationmeasures. That process waspushed further along by the sheer expansion of Roman power, and theresulting necessity of stationing more or less permanent garrisons inconquered territories. Rather few states, however, can availthemselves of this option. A few other states, who by geography and strategic requirements haveprimarily maritime defenses, have been able to rely on a navy as theirprimary force. These werein the nature of a city guard or police force, and had some weight as apolitical factor. The militia, in principle, is the citizenry in arms, bydefinition loyal to itself, capable of meeting an army on reasonable equalterms, or of suppressing a revolution-from-the-top by a political elite.The militia theory underlies the second amendment to the AmericanConstitution. Against unarmed or at least unorganized civilians theywould enjoy a strong margin of superiority, but could not hope to stand upagainst the Praetorians, who were at the least trained and equippedcomparably to army regulars. 261). (1974). The Praetorian Guard could have no role as kingmakeror king-breaker; indeed, Tiberius could withdraw to Capri in the latteryears of his reign, evidently without concern for the loyalty of thePraetorians in his prolonged absence. Thus Augustus minimizedthe impression that his authority was based on military force -- though infact that is precisely what it was ultimately based on. The PraetorianGuard was not invincible, but it raised the cost of rebellion to a levelnormally beyond the reach of the frontier generals. The civil warshad indeed been fought the length and breadth of the empire, but thefarther a general was from Rome, the less likely he was to be drawndirectly into politics, and the greater the sheer practical difficulties ofa march on Rome itself. On the one handhe was not the creator of the system over which he presided and could notenjoy comparable prestige. It escaped the usual deficiencies of citizen militias due to thespecial circumstances that applied through most of earlier classicalantiquity, originally in Greece but eventually in a much largerMediterranean region, including Italy, that fell under Greek culturalinfluence. Reduced to its essential terms, an armyis a body of men (invariably men, save in rare emergencies and very recentyears) who are equipped, trained, and organized to fight. Navies, historically, seem far less predisposed tooverthrow their governments than do armies; in the words of William H.McNeill, "sailors fresh from long weeks at sea have other things in mindthan seizing power on behalf of their commanders" (p. The Western Way of War. New York: Dell.Hanson, Victor Davis (1989). The sametemptation in lesser degree arises with respect to the "praetorianism" ofthe Praetorian Guard. Tiberius was moreover an experienced politicianand general, who in his latter role could expect to command the personalloyalty of soldiers. Aspects of Roman History, AD 14-117. xxvii.) Militia tend either to be too poorly equipped, trained, anddisciplined to stand up against regulars, or, if their training andexperience are intensive, the militiamen become in effect a standing armyin their own right, set off from the mass of their fellow-citizens -- andperhaps imbued with the dangerous belief that they are the "real"embodiment of the national will. Venice, the Hinge of Europe. New York: OxfordUniversity Press.Hornblower, Simon; and Spawforth, Antony, eds. No senatorialconspiracy could hope to raise a sufficient force from among its members'private retainers to match the Praetorians in either numbers or quality.The Praetorian Guard's monopoly of official force was not absolute; Romehad also the "urban cohorts," under the praefect of the city. 27ff). ReferencesAlston, Richard (1998). He sought instead to accomplish two things: to restorethe appearance of constitutional normalcy in Rome (while reservingeffective power for himself) and to render the army non-threatening tohimself and to Rome. Caesar, originally a family name, also survived as a generaltitle of respect, and ultimately gave rise to Tsar in Russian and Kaiser inGerman. 354; 465 n29). But it had no plan for the succession,at least not one that could be put into action. August did indeed have the title of Imperator, from which "emperor"derives, but it was not his chief or most distinctive title. But only at most3 troops, and perhaps as few as 15 , were directly visible in theneighborhood of Rome. The accession and reign of Gaius "Caligula" posed a somewhatdifferent set of problems. The most notorious instance is the popular-cultureassociation of Neronian decadence with the Fall of Rome. But Rome was not primarily a maritimepower; the fleets seldom appear in the history of Roman power struggles,and evidently did not have the security role that the Byzantine fleet laterdid. The OxfordClassical Dictionary. The Guard rioted, fillingthe streets of Rome and rendering any further political action impossible.It is not clear whether the Guard's actions represented a residual loyaltyto Caligula, on which he might have drawn, or only a more general loyaltyto the imperial idea and imperial family. It must be remembered that at its beginning the Empire had no"emperor" as such. The Beginnings of Rome. The conspiracy against Caligula hadsucceeded in doing away with him. 139).Conclusion The Roman Empire lays so far in the past that a strong psychologicaltemptation exists to foreshorten its history and commingle events or trendsfar separated in time. The Praetorian Guard is conventionally described as an elite force,which it certainly was in terms of pay -- the praetorians received morethan three times the normal legionary pay. An army istherefore at great advantage -- usually overwhelming advantage -- in anyarmed confrontation with a group that lacks these characteristics, or hasthem in markedly lesser degree. Claudius' character, and how much he was incontrol of his own reign, has been a persisting matter of interest anduncertainty, but this much is clear: the Praetorian Guard was no more ableto protect him from a palace assassination than it had Caligula. In practice, however, citizen-militia have for the most part been ofdecidedly limited effectiveness -- as Niccolo Machiavelli, a greatproponent of militia, found to his cost when he tried to organize aFlorentine citizen militia against the Medicis. New York: Routledge.Gibbon, Edward (1963). Finally, Augustus retained formal command of the Guard in his ownperson, and diplomas (grants of privileges) were always issued in theemperor's own name (Hornblower and Spawforth, p. Such forces would have been nearly irrelevant to its mission, andwould have added to the security complications. In the increasinglyerratic course of his rule, moreover, Nero eventually failed to see to itthat the Praetorian Prefects were men he personally could count on.Nymphidius Sabinus, whom he had appointed prefect, proved to be a politicalrealist rather than a Neronian loyalist. Moreover the very fact of imperial heritabilitywas not insured in advance -- hence Tiberius famous initial show ofrefusing the authority the Senate (apparently) sought to thrust upon him.But whatever exactly was behind this process, it also demonstrated a strongpresumption that the imperial office, however indirectly defined at thetime, was a permanent one. Instead, Sabinus gave orders for Nero to be arrested forhaving deserted Rome and the Guard. Assuming they were normalcohorts, the praetorian guard as a whole was thus equivalent to a legionand a half. But it is emperor, from the military title Imperator, that becamethe imperial title par excellence.The Roman Army: From Militia to Caesarism To trace how this came about, and how it related to the rising powerof the Praetorian Guard, it is necessary to examine how the Romans, atsuccessive periods, solved -- or attempted to solve -- the problem of theirarmy. The Prince and the Discourses.Introduction by Max Lerner. It had an attached cavalry formation, the equites singularesAugusti (Hornblower and Spawforth, p. This potential, however,remained only latent in the Julio-Claudian period. Annals of Imperial Rome. Having come to power through the Guard, however, Claudius ruledthrough his family and household, most famously his notorious successivewives Messalina and Agrippina. At that point the Guard -- accustomedby tradition to ample gifts on the accession of a new emperor -- took thisprinciple to its logical limit and put the throne up for auction to thehighest bidder (Gibbon, pp. Instead he fled thepalace and city. 89-9 ). It could not, because the concept did not exist in theprevious Roman political lexicon, and August, who we look back on as thefirst emperor, was a great pains to avoid instituting it in any overt form. A cavalry troop was sent after him,and on their approach Nero committed suicide (Alston, p. The remainder of thisdiscussion will first outline the nature of this problem, and somesolutions that various states have employed. He did the latter by sharply reducing the size of the army,completing its "regularization" (e.g., a standard term of enlistment) --and by stationing the great bulk of it very far from Rome. In that, perhaps,Augustus might have taken a grim sort of satisfaction. New York: Modern Library.McNeill, William H. For the samereason (and because navies are not primarily equipped to fight on land), aloyalist navy might seem little protection against a rebellious army evenif the latter were much smaller, but in practice the protection they offerhas been substantial, notably in the case of Rome's eastern continuation orsuccessor, the Byzantine Empire. They might well have personal andfamily ties to individual senators, but the emperor was the source ofpreference and advancement -- and the office of Praetorian Prefect wasnaturally given to close personal associates of the emperor. The long and difficult struggle against Hannibal began a process thatconverted Roman citizen militia into semi-regulars. (They were promptlydefeated, and Machiavelli imprisoned and then exiled to the countryside;see Max Lerner's introduction in the Modern Library edition of Machiavelli,p. In none of these overthrowsdid the Guard play a direct part, save the passive one of not coming to theaid of the threatened emperor. The strength of each, 5 or 1 men, appears to beuncertain, though a thousand men would be the normal strength (at least the"paper" strength) of a Roman cohort at the time. At one point, according to Suetonius, "from the near-bycamp soldiers began shouting about the defeat which Galba would inflict onhim" (Suetonius, p. Clearly, however, it was notunder control of its prefects, who had been part of the conspiracy. The militarysuperiority of Sparta over its neighbors was essentially that of full-timesoldiers against militia, and so later was that of Macedonia over the Greekcities. Nevertheless the potential risk was already evident under the Julio-Claudians. (1995). On the other hand, the pre-imperial era was nearlybeyond living memory, and the office of emperor was beginning to acquirethe weight of tradition. The one thing the Guard had accomplished was tocomplete the marginalization of the Senate in favor of the Julio-Claudianfamily, at least so long as that family existed. Historians speak of the earlier period of the Roman Empire as thePrincipate, but it is fair to say that as a primary title for Augustus'successors it fell into relative abeyance at an early date. For its other mission, internal security within Italy (and especiallythe neighborhood of Rome), the Praetorian Guard was ample. The Twelve Caesars. In early republican Rome, the army was essentially a citizenmilitia. The only force that might have been comparable was themarines of the fleets, and these were apolitical. In any case, whatever Caligula's initialstanding he succeeded after a few years in alienating practically everyone,including both of his praetorian prefects. This danger became most dramatically manifest toward the end of thesecond century, after the death (by assassination, not at the hands of thePraetorians) of Commodus, the son of Marcus Aurelius. At this time anythreat to imperial security would almost certainly arise from within theSenate; as equestrians the Praetorian Prefects were effectively precludedfrom usurping power in their own name. 282-83). The division of authority was afirst line of defense; no single Praetorian Prefect could mobilize theGuard on behalf of an uprising or conspiracy. NewYork: Routledge.Cornell, T.J. 78). As a second line of defense,the office of Praetorian Prefect was assigned to members of the equestrianor middle rank (Hornblower and Spawforth, p. If it had been,Augustus would have provided himself with a much larger force, comparableto the "palace" forces of the later Empire: three or four legions, capableof defeating any force likely to march on Italy under a rebel general. In addition they enjoyedsomewhat more favorable terms of enlistment, 16 years instead of 24.Whether they were an elite in the military sense of superior equipment andtraining is more open to question. The "regularization" of the Roman army became nearly complete underMarius, with the institution of regular pay; only the reforms of Augustuswere needed to complete the process. In this period it was never tested; thePraetorian Guard was not directly involved in the military uproar of AD 68-7 and the "year of the four emperors," and so was never in a regularengagement. Chicago:University of Chicago.Suetonius (1957). The Guard was not yet in a position to make anemperor of whoever it chose, but it was at least in a position to imposeits own concept of imperial legitimacy -- Claudius was the last male memberof the imperial family -- and the Senate lacked an alternative even if ithad been willing or able to defy the Guard. As Nero's political position in Rome collapsed, it was clear that oneplace he could not turn was to the Praetorian Guard. As "little boots" he apparently began with theaffection at least of the legions in Germany, if not the sort of loyaltythat adheres to a commander. Of the nine Guardcohorts, only three were encamped directly outside Rome, the other sixbeing dispersed among garrisons in nearby towns. Hewas most secure in that he was the victor of the civil wars, real ratherthan merely nominal commander in chief of its armies, and firmly astridethe entire Roman political system. Third edition. The first two emperors died in bed and were followed by theirintended successors. Two naval bases wereestablished, at Misenum and Ravenna. Moreover, by reducing the army to something nearthe minimum required for security, Augustus ensured that his generals wouldhave their hands full in their own sectors. Eventually this is precisely what happened, and in the turbulentperiod after the death of Marcus Aurelius the Praetorian Guard would gainnotoriety for making and unmaking emperors. We will then examine therisks posed to the Roman state by the Roman army, and the place of thePraetorian Guard in the response to this risk devised by Augustus Caesar.Finally we will trace the early evolution of the Guard under the Julio-Claudian emperors, up to the death of Nero.The Problem of Armies Every state that possesses an army finds itself confronted with afundamental political challenge: the risk of a military coup. Starting sometime about 7 BC, and substantially perfected by about5 BC, the Greeks developed a system of warfare, the close-order phalanx,that allowed citizen militiamen (primarily small farmers in civilian life)to fight on equal or superior terms against nearly any force they mightencounter (Hanson, pp. New York: Penguin.----------------------- 21 The Augustan solution had in fact failed on both counts; thePraetorian Guard gave emperors protection neither against conspirators inRome nor against the frontier armies should their generals choose to march-- and in the face of Nero's execution of generals, and the increasedstability of the frontiers after a century of relative peace, generals wereready and able to march. But theGuard was at the least not inclined to fight on Nero's behalf againstGalba's legions -- the first time they might have been called upon to facerebel legions. The risk isinherent in the nature of an army. Sometime broadly around 3 BC the Romansgradually developed a quite different system of organization and tactics,the manipular legion, which eventually proved superior even to the phalanx(Cornell, pp. On the other hand, Suetonius says only a fewlines later that a Guard veteran recognized and saluted Nero. The next two were assassinated by palaceconspirators, and Nero committed "assisted suicide" in the face of amilitary uprising by the frontier armies, in which the Praetorian Guardshowed no disposition to come to his support. 183-86). Medieval European kings wereexpected to command in the field; even in the early 2 th century, afterthis custom had long fallen into abeyance, European kings and emperorsroutinely affected military costume. The Guard itself was notdirectly involved in his downfall. New York: Penguin.Tacitus (1956). At the death of Nero, the spectacle of the Guardauctioning off the empire still lay over a century in the future, and muchof the intervening time was filled with strong emperors who had nothing tofear from their bodyguards. A general who marched on Rome,only to leave provinces revolting or barbarians invading behind him, wasunlikely to win political allies. The early Roman law forbidding carrying armswithin the Pomerium, the traditional sacred boundary of Rome, and thedivision of authority between two consuls, both testify to anxiety aboutwhat later ages would call caesarism on the part of generals. Within three months he had been overthrownand killed by the Praetorian Guard. Thus the Praetorian Guard enjoyed "escalationdominance" against any force that might be raised or brought against themwithin Italy. 1238), but did not dispose of thelarge proportion of auxiliary troops that would be attached to a frontierlegion. The citizen army of the early Roman Republichad, on the limited evidence available, a typical phalanx organization ofthe time (Cornell, pp. New York: Oxford University Press.Machiavelli, Niccolo (195 ). Even within the militia context, a successful general notinfrequently could use troops loyal to him personally to imposeextraconstitutional rule. As an assurance of loyalty, Augustus assigned administrative controlof the Guard to two Praetorian Prefects. He was least secure, however, in that -- as noted earlier -- the concept of "emperor" did not really exist yet, orwas at most a work in progress. But at the same time, with MariusRome was at last fully exposed to the threat of military power directedagainst the civil authorities. Even in the heyday of the phalanx, professional soldiers organized onphalanx principles had an advantage over ordinary militia. Guard troops took it on themselves to roam the palace until theyhappened upon Claudius, supposedly hiding either behind a curtain or in adark corner (Alston, p. Ultimately, however, all of these measures -- like any measures forthe control of armies -- were imperfect and potentially subject tocollapse. To meet this security requirement, Augustus,typically, adapted old forms to new substance. In some societiesmilitary government has become so established as to be entirely customary;Amir or Emir, the usual title for an Islamic ruler between the effectiveend of the Caliphate and modern times, meant "general." (Amir al-Bahr,"general at sea," was adopted by medieval Christians to become our wordadmiral.)Princeps and Imperator Even in societies where the army is not the traditional path topower, however, great real or symbolic effort has often been made toidentify the ruler with army command. And our word emperor, which has cometo connote a monarchical authority of even higher rank than a king, was inRome originally a specifically military title and authority, imperator.The evolution of this word's meaning is a striking demonstration of therelationship between political and military authority as it developed inthe early period of the Roman Empire, and in turn of how the early Empirehad to deal with the inherent threat of its army. These states are few -- evenfewer in practice than in name, since nominally army-less states frequentlyhave some sort of national paramilitary police who have nearly as muchadvantage over civilians as a "real" army would have. In its earlier expansion within Italy, Rome hadsolved the garrison problem partly by planting colonies of Roman citizenveterans, and partly by incorporating conquered peoples directly into theRoman state. Thestrength of the Praetorian Guard, initially equivalent to a legion and ahalf (or perhaps only to three-fourths of a legion) was clearlyinsufficient for this task, no matter how good its individual troops.The Praetorian Guard in Augustan Security Strategy As suggested earlier, however, Augustus' overall security strategyrendered a larger force unnecessary and undesireable. By default, however, the absence of the Guard wascrucial; Caligula could not flee to the safety of the Guard encampment nearRome, or at any rate made no effort to do so, and in a palace corridor hediscovered, as Dio put it, that he was not a god (Alston, p. In the wake ofCommodus' ill-rule and death, the Senate chose a distinguished eldermember, Pertinax, as Emperor. (Caligula might possibly have called on theGuard, but made no attempt to do so.) Yet already with Claudius the Guardplayed the central role in the accession of an emperor; it was mademanifest that in the event of an uncertain succession it was the Guard, notthe Senate, that had the deciding vote. The Praetorian Guard under the Julio-Claudians The Praetorian Guard, the personal guard force of the Roman emperors,has become a byword for the ability of a bodyguard to control, andultimately to elevate or depose, the person whom it is supposed to guard.By the nature of its situation throughout the early and middle eras of theempire -- as the only military force in near the capital of an empire mostof whose armies were dispersed among the frontiers -- it had the potentialto control its imperial masters. There is no evidence, however, that the Guard figured directly inNero's fall. The Praetorians of the early Principate were doubtless farfrom the decadent troops that Gibbon loves to castigate, but the conditionsof their service, in peaceful Italy, cannot have left them as combat-readyas, say, a legion stationed on the German frontier. If this paper is not what you are looking for, you can search again: Search for: or Click here to request an essay written just for you.

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