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Paper Abstract: Analyzes military & moral aspects of decision to A-bomb Japan. Paper Introduction: To most Americans at the end of 1945, the question of whether the dropping of the atomic bombs on Japan was justified or unconscionable was probably one that hardly needed to be asked. After years of desperate war, beginning with what almost all Americans viewed as a treacherous attack on Pearl Harbor (Roosevelt) and proceeding through island battles with appalling American casualties, and even greater Japanese casualties, as at Iwo Jima, where more Americans died than in the Normandy landings (Connor, p. 283). It was seriously anticipated that an invasion of Japan itself might cost more American lives than the whole previous war in Europe and Asia, two atomic bombs were dropped -- and Japan surrendered in a few days. The bombs had brought Text of the Paper: The entire text of the paper is shown below. However, the text is somewhat scrambled. We want to give you as much information as we possibly can about our papers and essays, but we cannot give them away for free. In the text below you will find that while disordered, many of the phrases are essentially intact. From this text you will be able to get a solid sense of the writing style, the concepts addressed, and the sources used in the research paper. The Glory and the Dream. The only certain way to end the warwas an invasion. However, a central fact of the prospective Soviet entry into the waragainst Japan is that it could not have any immediate, direct bearing onJapan itself. A History of Warfare. This would go on until somecombination of continued attacks, Soviet entry into the war, or an invasionled to Japan's surrender. 151). Thischoice, made in the darkest days of the war, was the decisive one. 283). Moreover, if required-- and Soviet entry into the war was no guarantee that it would not be,even if a subsequent Japanese surrender were accelerated -- the invasionwould not have been attempted until well into 1946. The bombs had brought victory and peace; that must have seemedjustification enough. (The lingering effects of radiation werenot fully appreciated at the time, or until long afterward, and in any casethe bombs' blast and fire claimed far more victims.) For the planners ofthe air campaign, the most distinctive feature of the atomic bomb wassimply its efficiency; one B-29 could do the work of a thousand. This was aformidable opponent, but since the Japanese Navy had effectively ceased toexist, it was effectively cut off from Japan itself. Additional ReferencesKeegan, John (1993). 597-99). Contrariwise, even its defeat at Soviet hands wouldnot in itself eliminate -- or even directly reduce -- the potential for alast-ditch desperation defense in Japan, if the Japanese leadership chosethat course. Three hundred thirty-four thousand B-29s droppedincendiary bombs in an X-shaped pattern over Tokyo. Moral judgment of the atomic bombings must be made in the context ofthe times. It therefore couldnot contribute directly to defense of the home islands, whether engaged bythe Soviets or not. If itis accepted as a conscionable decision, then the decision to use the atomicbomb ought to be viewed as its natural extension. These fire raids culminated in the attack on Tokyo in the predawnhours of March 1 , 1945. In this new light, a skepticism about the atomic bombings grew up,exemplified by Gar Alperovitz' article. Hiroshima and Nagasaki woulddoubtless have found their way to the top of the target list during thesemonths, and both would have been burned to the ground. Outraged, the woman asked if he took her for aprostitute, whereupon Shaw said that had already been settled; now theywere merely haggling price. All other options -- continued fire raids against Japan'scities, Soviet entry into the war, the atomic bombs -- might produce anearlier surrender, but could not be counted on in advance to do so. She answered yes, and he then asked her if she would do it for amore ordinary sum. To most Americans at the end of 1945, the question of whether thedropping of the atomic bombs on Japan was justified or unconscionable wasprobably one that hardly needed to be asked. Even if theUnited States and the Soviet Union had been on genuinely friendly terms,foreseeing postwar cooperation rather than rivalry, it is implausible thatAmerican policymakers would have held back from using the bomb in the hopethat an ally's entry into the war might, but not with certainty, bringJapan's surrender. An invasion thus still had to be contemplated. The primary means by which that war was already being prosecuted inthe summer of 1945 was the "conventional" bombing of Japan's cities, andthat bombing is a crucial element of context for the atomic bombings. Until that point wasreached, negotiations regarding the Emperor remained only a possibility,not confident grounds for ceasing prosecution of the war. Alperovitz asserts that "American leaders rejected the most obviousoption -- simply waiting for the Red Army to attack -- out of political,not military concerns" (Alperovitz, p. Even General Marshall's report to Truman,as cited by Alperovitz, acknowledged that Soviet entry into the war mightlead to Japanese capitulation "at that time or shortly thereafter if weland" (Alperovitz, p. As with the atomic bombings, the death toll isuncertain, but estimates are on the order of 1 , -- comparable to theaverage toll of each atomic bomb at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Secretary Stimsonreported that he had been given an estimate of one million Americancasualties (Manchester, p. The Emperor Showa, known in his lifetime as Hirohito, filleda role entirely unlike that of Stalin, Churchill, Hitler, or FDR. He wasnot an active political leader; at best he can be distantly compared to aBritish monarch, who reigned without ruling. Soviet entry intothe war might be the final blow that would drive the Japanese leadership tosurrender. During the interveningmonths, the United States would certainly have continued the fire raids,wreaking havoc on Japanese civilians. Only in later years were many questions raised, and these came amidchanged circumstances. The Making of the Atomic Bomb. But the predicate to thisargument does not stand up, because the Red Army could not directly andmilitarily bring Japan to its knees. Thisbombing campaign was carried out on a vast and devastating scale. In August of 1945, therefore, the real choice facing Americanpolicymakers was not simply to use the bomb or refrain from doing so, butto use it or to go on achieving much the same result, the mass incinerationof Japanese cities and their people, by continuing the fire raids, whilecarrying forward preparations for an invasion. New York: Simon &Schuster.----------------------- 8 Viewed in this light, the effect of the bombs as a diplomatic weaponagainst the Soviets was a secondary issue for American policymakers, usefulin the long term but not central to the immediate problem. The latter is the one on which Alperovitz lays greateremphasis, the implication being that the atomic bombings were intendedlargely as a diplomatic shot across the Soviets' bows, and to forestall aSoviet claim to a share in victory against Japan. 15 ). (A similar firestorm developed inHiroshima, and had occurred in a handful of the raids against Germany,notably Hamburg and Dresden.) Most of Tokyo was burned to the ground(Rhodes, pp. From early 1942 on, the Allies had accepted indiscriminate"area bombing" as a valid means of making war (Keegan, pp. But if it failed to do so -- and nothing made that outcomecertain -- the Americans would still be faced with the prospect of aninvasion, an Iwo Jima on a hundred-times larger scale. By the same token, though aware of his quasi-sacred significance tothe Japanese, they could not be utterly certain that his word for peacewould in fact bring peace, even if they hoped that it might. 38 ). Alperovitz makes two arguments: first that Japan was already on thepoint of surrender, and second that even if they were not, they would havebeen driven to surrender by the imminent entry of the Soviet Union into thePacific war. 374-75). It was seriously anticipated that an invasion of Japan itselfmight cost more American lives than the whole previous war in Europe andAsia, two atomic bombs were dropped -- and Japan surrendered in a few days. After years of desperate war,beginning with what almost all Americans viewed as a treacherous attack onPearl Harbor (Roosevelt) and proceeding through island battles withappalling American casualties, and even greater Japanese casualties, as atIwo Jima, where more Americans died than in the Normandy landings (Connor,p. American leaders did notregard him as the author of the war -- if they had, his survival wouldnever have been acceptable, as in the end it was. BecauseJapanese cities were tightly packed and their residential areas largelybuilt out of wood, the principal weapons used were incendiary bombs; hencethe term fire raids. There is a famous story, perhaps apocryphal, that George BernardShaw once asked a society lady if she would sleep with him for a millionpounds. There wasalways the opposite possibility that the Japanese militarist leaders,emboldened by an apparent softening of terms, might politely ignore theirEmperor and fight on. Thus, the fate of Japan's mainland army, and therefore the prospectof a Soviet entry into the war, was for American war planners ultimately adiplomatic prospect rather than a directly military one. 371). The Soviets' military target would have been the powerfulJapanese army (some two million men strong) in China. New York: Knopf.Manchester, William (1974). The fear of general nuclear annihilation lurked fora generation and more, while a military and political debacle in Vietnamraised doubts about the Cold War against communism, a Cold War that itselfhighlighted the nuclear spectre, and which was already incipient in thelast weeks of the Second World War, when the atomic bombs were dropped onJapan. New York: Bantam.Rhodes, Richard (1988). The same essential argument applies to the question of whether thewar might be ended by accepting peace terms that allowed Japan to retainits emperor. The conflagrationdeveloped into a firestorm, a fire-induced weather system that fed theflames with hurricane-force winds. That question is a valid one, but not onethat can be answered by arguing from developments of the war's final weekstaken in isolation. It is worthnoting that as late as July 28, the Japanese premier, Admiral Baron Suzuki,dismissed the Potsdam terms with contempt (Manchester, p. The real moral questionin 1945 was thus that of total war as it was already waged before the firstbomb dropped from the Enola Gay. For the victims, there must have seemed little to choose between thehorrors of a fire raid and those of an atomic bombing; in both cases thegreatest killer was incineration. The same might be said of the distinctionbetween using one B-29 to level a city with an atomic bomb as compared tothe use of three hundred B-29s to level one with incendiary bombs. Only if Japan's leaders were brought to the verypoint of unconditional surrender might the allowed retention of the Emperorbe a final tipping point, as was finally the case. If this paper is not what you are looking for, you can search again: Search for: or Click here to request an essay written just for you.

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