HOLOCAUST.   Term Paper ID:25562 Click to get this paper

Essay Subject: Participation by average German & govt., Nazi propaganda, antisemitism, non-Jewish deaths, role of Police, peer pressure, psychology of, religious issues.... More...

16 Pages / 3600 Words 4 sources, 53 Citations, MLA Format $64.00 Return to List of Papers

Paper Abstract: Participation by average German & govt., Nazi propaganda, antisemitism, non-Jewish deaths, role of Police, peer pressure, psychology of, religious issues. Paper Introduction: The purpose of this research is to examine theories of how and why the Holocaust, or the mass murder of the civilian population of Jews (about six million) and non-Jewish civilians targeted for extinction by the Nazi regime (perhaps another six million) could have been perpetrated and supported by ordinary human beings as much as by the official state apparatus of programmatic evil. The plan of the research will be to set forth the explanations offered by Christopher R. Browning in Ordinary Men and Daniel Jonah Goldhagen in Ordinary Men and Hitler's Willing Executioners, respectively, and then to discuss which of the arguments make the most compelling case and whether and to what extent each argument suggests ways of interpreting the human condition and the prospect of future genocides. As both Browning and Goldhagen argue, and as the evidence of the H Text of the Paper: The entire text of the paper is shown below. However, the text is somewhat scrambled. We want to give you as much information as we possibly can about our papers and essays, but we cannot give them away for free. In the text below you will find that while disordered, many of the phrases are essentially intact. From this text you will be able to get a solid sense of the writing style, the concepts addressed, and the sources used in the research paper. Goldhagennotes that Germans' attitudes toward all non-Germans was one of Germandominance, but he adds that between Germans and non-German non-Jews therewas a recognition of common humanity (Goldhagen 314), although humanity ingeneral was hierarchically perceived, with Nordic peoples, including aboveall Germans but entailing Nordic Scandinavians, at the top and Jews at thebottom or outside the structure altogether (Goldhagen 411). The World Must Know. Nor can a claim of antisemitism answer whatthe beleaguered Catholic Poles--or for that matter the myriadconstituencies targeted by the Nazis--might have thought about what they asa group needed. It was after thiscompliance with the genocide order that Buchmann's request was granted; itmust be said both that Buchmann was not militarily penalized and thatHolocaust blood was on his hands by the time he left the battalion.Browning ends his work on this point, asking whether if the men ofBattalion 1 1, ordinary and unexceptional all, could become killers, "whatgroup of men cannot?" (Browning 189). . According to Browning, the men of Police Battalion 1 1 were obeyingorders and conforming to "macho" peer pressure toward cruelty and murder intheir many forays against Jews, a consequence of the confluence of war andracism. It is as if the199 s are as much at risk from Germany as were the 193 s and 194 s, eventhough the weight of evidence is on the side of the view that Germany canbe counted among the more civilized nation-states of the world. Browning's approach, which holds that a variety of cultural elementscan shape mind-sets, is not inconsistent with that, either. The Goldhagen emphasisperforce focuses on and is consistent with the antisemitism explanation forthe genocide and for collaboration in it. This explains the many accounts of "voluntaristiccruelty" (Goldhagen 387) by Germans against Jews in the camps and in thespecial actions. Further,the broad range of genocidal praxis of the twentieth century would not havebeen either probable, possible, or necessary after World War II. The plan of the research will be to setforth the explanations offered by Christopher R. Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 1 1 and the Final Solution in Poland. Now the German priests' action may be evidence of apreference for one group over another, for Catholics over Jews, but it isdifficult to see why this is coeval with culpability in the Holocaust. Twoexamples that Browning does not specifically refer to but that illustratethe problem of logic created by Goldhagen's approach to the subject mayhelp explain this statement. It seems doubtful that Goldhagen would say so. This explains the use of Soviet POWs forlabor (rather than discarding them for starvation) that Jewishconcentration camp prisoners might earlier have accomplished. Heexplicitly says so, indeed, in his rejoinder to Goldhagen, when he saysthat he does not view antisemitism as something that was "'pre-existing,pent-up,'" something "that Hitler had merely to 'unleash' and 'unshackle'"(Browning 222) in order to accomplish the project of a Jew-free Europe. Browning does not excuse perpetrator behavior in any case,but he cites variable behavior patterns within the battalion, from theextreme cruelty of some members to the weeping figure of the commandingofficer, Trapp, upon relaying the orders regarding the first special actionat Jozefow (Browning 188). While the power ofantisemitism should not be underestimated--or understated--as a (or thechief) motivator of the Holocaust, Browning's case against Goldhagen'sunitary explanation is on the whole more persuasive, owing to what must beseen as a more careful scholarship than Goldhagen's. Browning (17 ) also alludes to this point, sayingthat "any punishment or censure that occasionally did result from suchdisobedience was never commensurate with the gravity of the crimes the menhad been asked to commit." But Goldhagen adds that Browning's view that themen of Battalion 1 1 did not really want to kill Jews "is psychologicallyimplausible in light of what the perpetrators were being asked to do,namely to slaughter men, women, and children" (Goldhagen 592). A complex issue that must be considered as informing the whole processof policy making and policy implementation is the history of antisemitismin Europe, before, during, and after World War II. New York: Harper Perennial, 1998.Goldhagen, Daniel Jonah. Goldhagen is willing to concede that only with a smallnumber of Germans did anything like peer pressure, whether from militaryauthority or from in-group mores, overcome moral qualms; for the vastmajority, owing to anisemitism, the question was not one of principled,legal, or moral opposition to genocide of Jews but rather a function of"the perpetrators' temper of mind" (Goldhagen 388), which was very muchopen to judenfrei Europe. He asserts the greater need of Polish Jews than PolishChristians for protection as proof of the German priests' antisemitism, afunction of German culture, history, and so on. As both Browning and Goldhagen argue, and as the evidence of theHolocaust Museum in the U.S. Goldhagen argues, inother words, that the perception of Jews as actively evil translated intothe perception of Jews as nonhuman, that therefore they were legitimatetargets of genocide. Goldhagen's view of antisemitism is that it was indeed the primaryfactor of the behavior of Battalion 1 1, or anyway the enabling factor ofthe brutality and extent of murder enacted by Battalion 1 1. At virtually every pointalong the continuum, whatever an individual person felt did not prevent himfrom acting as a murderer. But fact that ordinary Germans involved in killing Jews could forma range of attitudes about Jews as a group tells Browning that antisemitismwas not the overarching factor in the murders enacted by the Germans. Further, says Goldhagen, brutality,murderousness, and cruelty were more amplified in the case of Jews than non-Jews because non-Jews were treated more in line with "calculations ofmaterial rationality" (Goldhagen 315), i.e., war production. By and large, says Browning, any choice that individual members had torefrain from murdering Jews, they did not take. Goldhagen's observation that no one waspersecuted for refusing to persecute Jews is an indirect account of thesubsumption of individual personality into the antisemitic ethos of Nazism.It is also consistent with Nazi Party membership in Battalion 1 1.Browning's version is that there was minimal individual self-selectionassociated with behavior in Battalion 1 1, i.e., that no specialcredentials were required. Browning's emphasis inciting massacres in Lithuania and the Ukraine is on the instrumental use byGermans of indigenous non-Jewish nationals to do the dirty work. Browning cites the theory of the "gray zone," the name given toa challenge to "simplified Manichean images of perpetrator and victim"(Browning 187). He says that if they had felt that way, thefeelings would have come across in the testimony (Goldhagen 592). If the need of all is to stay alive, how is the Jews' needgreater than that of the murdered gypsies, homosexuals, communists,Lutherans (e.g., Dietrich Bonhoeffer), and Catholics, who were just as deadas the murdered Jews after the war had ended? Theevidence of Rwanda, Cambodia, Ireland, Bosnia, and all the rest is that theimpulse toward genocide was not exorcised by World War II. Goldhagen altogether discounts the integrity cross-border religiousempathy between German and Polish Catholics in a way that amounts tospecial pleading. If it could,then there would not have been millions of gentiles caught by it. Was Wiseantisemitic? Further,Browning cites psychological experiments by Milgram, in which laboratorysubjects were given (and exercised) the authority to punish persons whogave wrong answers and which led to the conclusion that most people willobey orders (Browning 174ff). It is the equivalent of accusing politically inactive abstainersof endorsing alcoholism or drug addiction because they did not campaign forProhibition or for (say) life sentences for first-offense drug users. The dominant point is that theGermans "were the prime movers, and the central and only indispensableperpetrators of the Holocaust" (Goldhagen 4 9). The power of propaganda in general tomobilize a whole range of sentiment, including but not limited toantisemitism, is of more explanatory importance to Browning. On the other hand, Browningcites "moral norms of German society" and "earlier standards by which tojudge the Nazi policies they were asked to carry out" (Browning 182) thatthe members of Battalion 1 1 would have absorbed years before theappearance of Nazism in Germany. He persisted until given a direct order tosupervise a "Jew Hunt" firing squad, though when one subordinate requestedto be excused from the task, he agreed (Browning 111-13). Goldhagen seesantisemitism, driven by a programmatic irrationality, as the decisive andconclusive explanation for the differences of German attitudes andtreatment alike between Jews and non-Jews. Boston: Little, Brown, 1993.Browning, Christopher R. The Jews as Jews, in this view, would have been anafterthought, or as Browning has it "an anonymous collective" rather thanpersons who had "personal identity" (Browning 153) or humanity. Browning sees Goldhagen's single-reason explanation, where"action dovetailed with belief" (Goldhagen 315) in antisemitism, asinadequately entailing multiple causal arguments. "Otherwise," says Goldhagen,"people seek ways . Further, not every single tiny little detail of theHolocaust can be explained with reference to antisemitism. Goldhagen cites German priests' advocacy for Poles but not for Jews,citing the overwhelming fact of Polish Roman Catholicism but stating thatthe Jews' "condition and fate [were] far worse than that of the Poles'"(Goldhagen 117). To supportthis view of antisemitism, Browning cites postwar interrogations of membersof Battalion 1 1 that he says betrayed wide differences of opinion abouttheir victims. Nowhere--appropriately--does he make the pointthat all the other American journalists of the world were responsible forthe Holocaust because they did not follow the prescience of DorothyThompson. Finally,with regard to the actions of religious leaders in particular, Goldhagendoes not help his antisemitic case against the German priests or againstany advocates for gentiles but not Jews in the course of the Nazi regimewhen he engages in what amounts to selective employment of evidence.Consider a 1932 pronouncement by the American Rabbi Stephen S. . Franklin D. Beingpolitically inactive, endorsing alcoholism, and not campaigning forProhibition may all be morally and ethically reprehensible, but they belongto different logical exercises, and it is a failure of logic to conflatethem into the same exercise. Accordingly, peer pressure per se does not operate exceptinsofar as the individuals of the group bring to the group project a sharedvalue set: "Indeed, if Germans had disapproved of the mass slaughter, thenpeer pressure would not have induced people to kill against their will"(Goldhagen 384). . Browning pointsout, on the other hand, that once the project of judenfrei Europe wassettled as a matter of policy, other out-groups were no less instrumentalin accomplishing the war project. The Nazis simply ignoredprotests and went ahead with their project, and the German churchmen voicedno protest anyway. Browning argues that antisemitism was part(and an important part, to be sure) of an unrelenting propaganda machine,but it was not the only part. A key exception involved one LieutenantBuchmann, who requested transfer out of Trapp's command after Jozefow andexplicitly refused to "take part in Jewish actions" (Browning 1 2),apparently on moral grounds. Onthe other hand, Browning acknowledges the significant institutionalizationof race-based antisemitism prevailing in Germany and Europe, butsignificant for its symbolic value as "an integral part of the conservativepolitical platform and [as something that had] penetrated deeply into theuniversities" (Browning 196). For example, hesays that German hatred of the Slavs and the German view that Slavs weresubhuman "had neither the near universal acceptance nor as tenacious a holdon Germans' minds as had antisemitism" (Goldhagen 313). Goldhagen's decision to explain the Holocaust in terms ofantisemitism presents problems that Browning addresses in his afterword,which is a response to Goldhagen's various criticisms of Browning'sanalysis. Their "prior belief" determined how theybehaved. This merges group/peer consciousness with a culturaltradition of authoritarianism that pervaded Germany and that Nazipropaganda and its war machine were able to exploit; Browning cites "themultifaceted nature of authority at Jozefow" (Browning 175). The fact that Germany "had givenitself to Nazism" (Goldhagen 118) and that antisemitism drove Nazism isunanswerable in Goldhagen's view. This is the background for what Goldhagen describes as"eliminationist" antisemitism. The purpose of this research is to examine theories of how and why theHolocaust, or the mass murder of the civilian population of Jews (about sixmillion) and non-Jewish civilians targeted for extinction by the Naziregime (perhaps another six million) could have been perpetrated andsupported by ordinary human beings as much as by the official stateapparatus of programmatic evil. Antisemitism as an ingrainedhabit of German mind--which may be true--cannot explain the fate ofHitler's murdered gentiles, even though, as Berenbaum explains (2), thefate of the murdered gentiles cannot be explained without reference to thefate of the Jews. That is,in one village, Germans "provide[d] the cordon and [left] the shooting tothe Lithuanians" (Browning 19). Reference has also been made to German priests' advocacyfor the Poles. In other words, the affirmative case for one group doesnot make it the negative case for another. Goldhagen's view of peer pressure is exemplified in the fact that "noone was ever executed or sent to a concentration camp for refusing to killJews" (Goldhagen 379). In retrospect, the mass murder of severalmillion European Jews by the Nazis in World War II emerges as a faitaccompli--something that was part and parcel of Hitler's plan from themoment he rose to power in Germany. On onehand, then, Jews as a group were perceived as attacking Germans, not asanything like passive in the face of the German majority. into the 'image of the enemy,' or Feindbild" (Browning186). However,Browning notes that in Battalion 1 1, antisemitic propaganda may not havebeen as influential as elsewhere in Germany, owing to the appearance ofsome of the most widely disseminated tracts well into the course of the warand Battalion 1 1 operations, to the age and class composition of thebattalion, and to evidence that anticommunism was of more ideologicalimportance than antisemitism (Browning 183). But the distinction between what was and was not done on one hand andwhat was done and what should have been done on the other is importantbecause nothing about advocacy of one group per se, as a logical matter,proves hostility toward another group whose cause is not being pleaded.Goldhagen's text (125-6) indirectly confirms this when he cites theprescient journalism on the eliminationist implications of Nazi praxisearly in Hitler's regime. Works CitedBerenbaum, Michael. Indeed,Browning cites examples (Browning 153-4) of Battalion members' failing tointervene on behalf of Jewish servants who were peremptorily transported bythe SS. This is consistent with Hitler'scharacterization of Jews in history as active opponents of non-Jews.Goldhagen cites a speech by Hitler that characterized Jews as activerobbers, "plundering traveling caravans, and . Also in this regard, Browning (Browning 162)cites Hilberg's thesis of the impersonal bureaucracy of mass murder, whichsuggests an institutional character to orders proclaimed from on high. Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust. But however morallycompelling the assertion of need differential, it does not rise to thelevel of evidentiary rebuttal. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963. . What is important about the difference ofemphasis is that implies different conclusions about motivation anddifferent attributions of the foundational explanation for genocide.Goldhagen's focus on antisemitism as a cultural norm throughout Europe andas something embedded into the internal grammar of Germans means thatantisemitism can really explain both German and non-German behavior.Browning's focus on German use of non-German perpetrators asinstrumentalities points toward shared responsibility for the action, andbeyond this, for a shared "psychological burden" between Germanperpetrators and collaborators in occupied territories (Browning 25). Wise that he"would as little support a war to crush Hitlerism as a war for thestrengthening of Jewish claims in Palestine" (Leuchtenburg 198). Further, as Browning points out, if the prewar antisemitism of theGerman mind was so virulent, how could postwar Germany have beenconstructed without it, and how could anyone in the world be assured thatit would not overtake and quash redemptive postwar efforts? Browning far more than Goldhagen gives credence to the role thatindividual personalities and the vicissitudes of individual situationsplayed in Police Battalion 1 1. Indeed, theworking-class, relatively less well educated, and relatively older makeupof the demographic composition of the "ordinary men" of Battalion 1 1 arguethat ideology might not have been sufficiently absorbed by the men to haveallowed them to connect "Jew hatred" with the killing programs. . New York: Vintage, 1997.Leuchtenburg, William E. According to Goldhagen, it was among the Germans that this antisemitictemper of mind was most prominent. Browning says that beginning with the first extermination byBattalion 1 1 at Jozefow, Poland, the men as a group fell in with an ethosof authority, however reluctantly the Battalion's officer might haveconveyed the order, and even though the officer appears to have made apoint of explaining the order as having come from "highest authority"(Browning 1-2; 174-5). Thedifference of emphasis is subtle but distinct. . This was not a group ofrebels or individuals given to either self-scrutiny or scrutiny of theimplications of immediate action. But although hating Jews may be a moral lapse ormoral failing, and although it may lead to murder, it is qualitativelydifferent from killing Jews, from enabling or acceding to the Holocaust, orfrom making a project of turning away from the plight of the Jews once thekilling started. plundering indebtedfarmers, industrialists, middle-class people, etc." (Goldhagen 281). The Browning emphasis isconsistent with his more general, more diffuse psychocultural explanationof the Holocaust as a whole and the multiplicity of psychological,cultural, educational, class, and emotional factors, including but notlimited to antisemitism, that Browning says were at work in Battalion 1 1. Both Browning and Goldhagen make their analytical case persuasivelyinasmuch it seems important for a coherent conceptualization of civilsociety--more exactly civilization itself--to have the concrete details ofthe Holocaust in hand in order to see and appreciate the reality of itscontent. According to Goldhagen, any difference in Nazi treatment of out-groupsother than Jews can be explained solely by antisemitism. Goldhagensays that Jews were perceived of "as being powerfully evil" (Goldhagen 279)and "axiomatically identified with 'bandits' and their anti-Germanactivities" (Goldhagen 28 ). The evidence ofpostwar genocide is that the minds of ordinary people are all too readilyopen to justifying it. On the other hand--more exactly, in Goldhagen's formulation, in a perception that passes fromone hand to the other--Jews were not considered human. While the intent of the Nazis can beseen as murderous from the beginning of the Nazi regime, a clear idea ofthe way the murder would be carried out was the result of a series ofadministrative decisions within the German ideological bureaucracy thatwere implemented with the collaboration of millions of Germans who hadhighly variable degrees of ideological commitment to Nazism. Even ifGoldhagen is wrong in attempting to explain the Holocaust solely in termsof antisemitism, he seems to be on target in equating murder with habits ofmind. By age, education, and social class, the battalion comprisedthe "'dregs' of the manpower pool available at that stage of the war"(Browning 165). As such, its members appear to have had little interest incareer advancement, but rather in a more general, unfocused way wererecruited and fell in with prevailing moral norms. The battalion "was not sent to Lublin to murderJews because it was composed of men specially selected or deemedparticularly suited for the task" (Browning 165). The work of both Goldhagen and Browning must be taken as evidencesupporting the view that the prospect of genocide, and more, of genocideperpetrated by ordinary people, is not only possible but likely. However,Goldhagen does not uniformly attribute non-German genocide undertaken atGerman behest to antisemitism for the reason that research information onnon-German national groups is not extensive. Browning's view of the targeting of Jews by the Nazi regime inparticular begins with the antisemitism repeatedly articulated by Hitlerand aggressively embedded in Nazi propaganda (Browning 179-181). These were the"ordinary" citizens of Germany. Thefailure of the German church to protest what was happening in Germany,especially after challenge from the American churchmen, can be interpreted,as a logical matter, as an enabling act of the Holocaust informed bycultural and political antisemitism. Some members described them according to "Nazi stereotype .. Yet the logical structure of the journalistic failure is notdifferent from other failures that Goldhagen cites. But it is difficult to see howadvocacy for one gentile constituency, e.g., Polish Catholics, does notamount to antisemitism as a matter of logic, as Goldhagen suggests--evenif, as seems perfectly possible, the advocates for the Polish Catholicswere antisemitic. In that theory, corruption and collaboration overlap andconverge across both victims and perpetrators, so that ranges of behaviorcan be observed. Suppression of the Jews became a primaryinstrument of policy early in the regime, and their eradication a primarypolicy focus during the war. Browning alsocites "the use of labor to punish and torture inmates rather than forproduction [as] part of the institutional culture long before Jews were asignificant portion of the inmate population" (Browning 2 6). The background of Battalion 1 1 was notconducive to challenge to an authority or a cultural norm informed bypropaganda. (It wasnecessary to go to a source outside Goldhagen, Browning, and Berenbaum tochallenge Goldhagen's core argument because of its emphasis and becauseneither Berenbaum nor Browning relies on the explanatory power ofantisemitism in the manner that Goldhagen does.) Goldhagen's great reliance on antisemitism to explain sins ofcommission by Germans and their non-German collaborators and sins ofomission by entities that somehow should have been more aggressive inhelping Jews in particular creates difficulties for the integrity of hisargument. For Browning,antisemitism is undoubtedly a factor of the processes that led to themurderous behavior of Battalion 1 1, the focus of his book, but it issubsidiary to his argument that the shape and priorities of German culturemore generally, complicated by the fortunes of war, including the energeticanti-Jewish Nazi propaganda apparatus, and the vicissitudes of battalionlife and culture in wartime. On the other hand, from ademographic point of view there appears to have been some degree ofuniformity. Goldhagen cites the confrontation between American and Germanchurchmen on the "Jewish question" (126-7). The involuntary euthanasia that targeted the physicallyand mentally defective among Jews and Gentiles alike came in for formalcriticism whereas targeting Jews as such did not (Goldhagen 119-2 ); thiswas early in the Nazi regime, not in the years of the war, when anti-Jewishpolicies were in full form. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-194 . makes clear, the primary target of the Naziregime was European Jewry. The omission of Jews fromadvocacy in a plea on behalf of Catholics may well be a moral failing, oras a Catholic might have it a sin of omission. Among those who most closely aided in the genocide (Ukrainians,Latvians, Lithuanians), says Goldhagen, the cultures from which they camewere historically "profoundly antisemitic," and the perpetrators themselves"were animated by vehement hatred of the Jews" (Goldhagen 4 9). In this manner were the Jews"subsume[d] . 'dirty,' 'unkempt,' and 'less clean'" than Poles, while otherscharacterized them as "dressed in rags and half starved." By the sametoken, Jewish behavior was described variously as passive and offering noresistance, hence "complicit in their own deaths," or alternatively ashaving "astonishing" dignity when facing certain death (Browning 152,passim). Goldhagen(Goldhagen 428) cites "the genocidal cohort that was Police Battalion 1 1."Battalion 1 1 had more Nazi Party members than other police battalionsengaged in similar activities, which tells Goldhagen that the Nazipropaganda apparatus actually had little motivational work to do in orderto get the ordinary Germans who made up the battalion to kill Jews: "[T]heNazi regime and the Order Police did not conceive of the possibility thatmuch further ideological preparation would be necessary in order to gainthese men's acedence and willing cooperation in Jew-killing" (Goldhagen278). Thismakes antisemitism a factor but not the only factor of genocidalactivities. not to violate their deepest moral beliefs"(Goldhagen 383). Equallyimportant to Browning is what he calls the "mutually intensifying effectsof war and racism," which comes down to an argument that the killingproject, coupled with "years of anti-Semitic propaganda (and prior to theNazi dictatorship, decades of shrill German nationalism) dovetailed withthe polarizing effects of war" (Browning 186). To thecontrary, says Goldhagen, Battalion 1 1 comprised a body of willing workersmotivated and mobilized by deeply ingrained antisemitism. InGoldhagen's view, that characterization essentially opens the way toexonerating the persons in the battalion from moral responsibility.Goldhagen adds that his reading of postwar testimony of battalion membersindicates that they never felt a responsibility to fellow members in thematter of killing, i.e., possible feelings of guilt had they left thekilling duties to others. Undoubtedly the fact that so many ordinary Germans killed so manycivilians and that so many of those civilians were Jews argues that at somelevel the killers were able to discard any notion that the Jews were humanbeings, hence able to kill them with little if any remorse. He rejects thepsychology-lab experimental conclusions about the impulse to obey authorityas "untenable" because what is required is a legitimating factor, whichantisemitism provided to Battalion 1 1. . This is not meant to excuse antisemitism, a point made by Browningspecifically; indeed, antisemitism undoubtedly informed Holocaust praxisand in a significant way. Jews rather than some other group were the Nazi regime's primarytarget because they were the most visible of Europe's minority populationin general and Germany's in particular, according to Goldhagen. When Browning says that "Jews stood outside[the battalion's] circle of human obligation and responsibility," (Browning73) he is making the point that antisemitism would have been a factorsupporting or legitimating killing Jewish civilians but not the drivingforce for murder. Browning in Ordinary Menand Daniel Jonah Goldhagen in Ordinary Men and Hitler's WillingExecutioners, respectively, and then to discuss which of the arguments makethe most compelling case and whether and to what extent each argumentsuggests ways of interpreting the human condition and the prospect offuture genocides. If this paper is not what you are looking for, you can search again: Search for: or Click here to request an essay written just for you.

Many of our Papers can be Downloaded From This Site!

PLEASE READ THIS, IT IS IMPORTANT!

Office hours are Monday through Friday, from 9 am to 5 pm (PST). You may place orders for custom research over the phone during office hours. E-mail requests can be made to our graduate and undergraduate department any time, and will be reviewed during office hours. You may also contact customer service any time through e-mail, and we will review your message during business hours. A great many papers can be downloaded right from this site, but not all of them. If you would like to know if a particular paper is downloadable, just look in the description for: "Available for Internet Download: Y" or "Available for Internet Download: N" If you wish to purchase a paper which is NOT available for immediate download, you will need to make other shipping arrangements. Also, please be aware that these orders are processed Monday through Friday from 9 am to 5 pm (PST). If you place your order after 4:45pm on Friday, it will not be processed until the following Monday morning. We charge $8 per page for all of our pre-written reports, plus shipping (and tax for California residents). However, the highest cost of any ONE report is $136, or 17 pages. Please, take a moment. Make sure you have chosen the report you want or need BEFORE you complete your order. If you are not sure, allow us to help you. We do not offer refunds or exchanges, so it is important for you to let us answer your questions during office hours. Reports which are e-mailed or downloaded are in Microsoft Word format. We are making more reports available for e-mail delivery faster than we can update our listings. Please call to check on the status of particular reports. There are many other shipping options which are listed on the Checkout page.