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INEVITABILITY OF COLD WAR.
  Term Paper ID:25341
Essay Subject:
Examines origins of Soviet-American struggle from 1945 to 1947 & argues conflict was inevitable after WWII.... More...
9 Pages / 2025 Words
9 sources, 24 Citations, MLA Format
$36.00

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Paper Abstract:
Examines origins of Soviet-American struggle from 1945 to 1947 & argues conflict was inevitable after WWII.

Paper Introduction:
COLD WAR: ITS ORIGINS AND INEVITABILITY 1945-1947 This essay analyzes the relative positions of the United States and the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the Second World War and discusses the origins of the Cold War, including whether its coming was inevitable. A power vacuum was created in the center of Europe and other areas on the periphery of the Soviet Union by the defeat of the Axis. The methods used by the Soviets to pursue their interests provoked vigorous defensive countermeasures by the United States and its allies. No other response from the West could have been realistically anticipated so long as the Soviet Union remained under the control of Josef Stalin. Legacy of the Past According to La Feber, "the Cold War developed on a

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Conclusion The Cold War was the inevitable consequence of the destruction of theAxis and the entry of Soviet power into the center of Europe. . . Armed Truce: The Beginnings of the Cold War 1945-46. andconsolidated his Eastern European empire, he might have won the cold war .. . America, Russia, and the Cold War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998.Clifford, Clark with Richard Holbrooke. Marshall told hisuniversity audience that without such assistance Europe faced "economic,social and political deterioration of a very grave character" (The AddressA 2). Acheson: The Secretary of State Who Created the American World. Chace says that "confronted by American resolveand the naval task force in the Turkish Straits, the Russians backed down"(154). New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967."The Address of Secretary Marshall at Harvard." New York Times, 6 June 1947: A 2.Thomas, Hugh. He has broken every one of hispromises made at Yalta" (Thomas 121). According to Chace, "in 1945and 1946 American foreign policy fluctuated like a compass needle seekingthe right azimuth" (135). A statesman with his pronounced paranoidtendencies would never have permitted international inspection to permitverification. NSC-68, which became American policy in the spring of195 , concluded that the Soviet Union "animated by a new fanatic faithantithetical to our own, seeks to impose its authority over the rest of theworld" (Chace 175). The events of '48-'5 , especially the outbreak of the Korean War,contributed to a deepening of the Cold War and a conviction on both sidesof the iron curtain that no resolution of the Cold War was possible in theforseeable future. Its senior policy makers were, therefore, quitesensitive and felt vulnerable (despite the American monopoly of the atomicbomb) to the growing evidence that the Soviet Union intended to throw itsnew found military weight around outside its own borders. Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan In a meeting in the Kremlin in late 1944, Stalin had agreed withChurchill that Britain would be the dominant great power in Greece.However, toward the end of the war, the Soviets began to take a morestrident approach toward Soviet interests in the Turkey and Greece. He and his first Secretary ofState, James Byrnes, alternated between making protests to the Russians andseeking to arrange a modus vivendi with them. The antagonism betweenRussia and the West was somewhat muted during the early interwar period asStalin concentrated on building socialism in Russia. In his speech delivered at Harvard on June 5,1947, Secretary of State George Marshall unveiled the outlines of themassive program of foreign aid which came to be called the Marshall Planand is generally credited with saving Western Europe. .we can't do business with Stalin . The British with some help fromFDR attempted to persuade Stalin to accept non-communist elements, butLondon-based Poles who returned to Poland tended to disappear. . Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959.Gaddis, John L. Revisionist American and Soviet historians have suggested that theCold War could have been avoided if the West had beenmore sensitive to Russian security concerns, had not rearmed West Germanyand had shared its temporary monopoly of nuclear weapons with the Soviets.For example, La Feber argues that Stalin's priority was "not worldrevolution," but "Russian security and his own personal power" (211).Kennan exposed the fallacy in the Russian security argument at the timeWallace and others made it. FDR's successor, President Harry Truman, was reluctant in 1945 andearly 1946 to rupture relations with America's recent Soviet allies andwavered in the face of conflicting advice. In August 1945, the Soviets used those troops to prop up apuppet government in the northern Persian province of Azerbaijan. As early as 1943-1944, friction had been generated by Soviet obduracyover the composition of the postwar government of Poland, which had beenthe traditional invasion route to Russia. COLD WAR: ITS ORIGINS AND INEVITABILITY 1945-1947 This essay analyzes the relative positions of the United States andthe Soviet Union in the aftermath of the Second World War and discussesthe origins of the Cold War, including whether its coming was inevitable. Accordingto Hyland, "after the war, had Stalin stopped at some point, . . Relationsbetween the West and Russia were interrupted and distrust between the twoblocs was sown by the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, Russia's departure fromthe First World War, the repudiation of its war debts, communist subversiveactivities in Europe and Allied, including American, half-hearted militaryintervention in the Russian Civil War of 1918-1921. The Greek civil war between communist and monarchist forces whichfirst erupted in 1944 and which was patched over as a result of Britishmilitary intervention broke out again in 1946. One was a speech given by Stalin tothe Supreme Soviet on February 9. Even before the war in Europe ended, tensions had begun to developover the tactics used by the Soviet Union to dominate the affairs ofeastern Europe. Kennan cut the ground out from under Westerners such as VicePresident Henry Wallace who argued that Soviet actions could be explainedas reactions to Russian feelings of insecurity. He had sought to ensure this through public deference to Soviet security interests, mixed with subtle behind-the-scenes pressures to encourage Moscow's cooperation (26). Counsel to the President A Memoir. . New York: Atheneum, 1987.----------------------- 9 In it hewarned that the hostile Soviet attitude toward the outside world was amixture of traditional "Oriental secretiveness and [Bolshevik[ conspiracy"(La Feber 53). The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War. In March 1946, 2 , Soviet troops concentrated alongthe Russo-Turkish border. Memoirs of the Second World War. No other response fromthe West could have been realistically anticipated so long as the SovietUnion remained under the control of Josef Stalin. On February 22 Kennan sent hisLong Telegram to the State Department from the American Embassy in Moscowwhich helped reshape American attitudes toward the Soviet Union. "The Sources of Soviet Conduct." Foreign Affairs 25 July 1947: 566-582.La Feber, Walter. The United Statesforesaw the development after the war in Europe of a liberal political andeconomic order. It flared up again inthe late 193 s after the West and the Soviet Union failed to form an effectalliance against Hitlerism and reached its nadir after the Nazi-Soviet pactof August 1939. Sovietpromises at Yalta to permit democratic elections in Poland and elsewhere ineastern Europe had largely been ignored although a freely electedgovernment did function for about two and a half years in Czechoslovakiabefore democracy was abruptly ended by a Soviet-engineered coup in February1948. No responsible Western statesmancould afford to risk the safety of his countrymen on the assumption thatthe bloodthirsty dictator who had killed all (tens of millions) of hisinternal enemies, real or imagined, would not go further, especially afterthe Czech coup and the initiation of the Soviet blockade of Berlin in June1948. The Soviets sent the Turks a virtual ultimatumdemanding Russian military bases in the Dardanelles on August 7. The Soviet Union needed external enemies tojustify its totalitarian apparatus and was not at all averse to pushing asfar as forceful methods would take it. . It mightnever have occurred had the Soviet Union not been in the grip of amegalomaniacal leader. Russia reconquered territories in the Far East it hadlost in the Russo-Japanese War of 19 5. Kennan said in a laterarticle which reformulated his views in the Long Telegram that "the stresslaid in Moscow onthe menace confronting Soviet society from the world outside its society isfounded . It did so with the acquiescence ofthe West, which lacked the military power to prevent it, but also becausePresident Roosevelt had high hopes of postwar Soviet-American cooperation.According to Gaddis, Roosevelt had built his whole strategy upon the expectation that the wartime alliance would survive the end of the war. Dealing with such an implacable adversarywould be difficult, but could be "contained by the vigilant application ofcounterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographic and politicalpoints" (571). The Soviets sent a formal note to Turkey in December1945 under which, according to Chace, "Russia still demanded a coastalstrip from Turkey on the Black Sea, parts of Turkish Armenia, and rights inthe straits" (135). TheAmerican response was swift. but it was in his nature to press on . . Shortly before his death, Roosevelt reportedly said:"Averell [Harriman, American Ambassador to the Soviet Union] is right . Apower vacuum was created in the center of Europe and other areas on theperiphery of the Soviet Union by the defeat of the Axis. Part of Kennan's strategy was "keeping key power centers --notably Great Britain, the Rhine-Ruhr industrial complex, and Japan, fromfalling under Soviet control, not by extending American control over them,but rather by encouraging their development as independent forces with thestrength and self-confidence necessary to defend themselves" (Gaddis 58). New York: Oxford U P, 1987.Hyland, William G. Former Prime Minister Winston Churchill ofGreat Britain expressed the growing concerns of many in the West when hesaid the following at Fulton College in Missouri in March 1946 "FromStettin on the Baltic to Trieste on the Adriatic an iron curtain hasdescended across the Continent" (997). in the necessity of explaining away the maintenance ofdictatorial power at home" (57 ). The primary strategic goal of the United States during this periodwas to prevent Russian domination of Western Europe. Some earlier American documents, such as the Clifford-Elsey Report toTruman, attributed an eventual aim of "world domination" to the Soviets(Clifford 126), a view which was shared by other hardliners such as DefenseSecretary James Forrestal; however, most of the American officials whosupported the containment policy in 1946-7 simply believed that the Sovietshad expansionist aims and threatened American interests, especially inWestern Europe. The United States reduced its armed forces in Europe from eightmillion in April 1945 to 4 , a year later (Thomas 145). The methods usedby the Soviets to pursue their interests provoked vigorous defensivecountermeasures by the United States and its allies. It hadintervened twice in the 2 th century to prevent any one power (Germany)from dominating the affairs of Europe and choking off its Atlantic sealanes. New York: Random House, 1991.Churchill, Winston S. American Supreme Court Justice William Douglas called it "theDeclaration of World War III" (La Feber 3 ). The Cold War: Fifty Years of Conflict. Stalin's intentions were abundantly clear by the fall of 1946,but by mid-1948 only the blind could have failed to detect them. and he pressed too far" (6). Few American leadersthought that the Soviets would --in the face of the American atomicmonopoly -- launch an invasion of Europe, but there were ominous signs thatit was ripe for internal subversion, especially France and Italy which hadstrong communist parties. It curiously forecast further antagonismswithin the capitalist world, which might lead to war within it, but alsocalled for renewed and enormous sacrifices by the Russian people andcontinued emphasis on industry to the detriment of consumer goods (La Feber3 ). . Works CitedChace, James. From that point on, both sides were deeply committed toan ideological struggle and arms race against each other. AtYalta, Stalin indicated that the old Montreux Convention should be revised.At the Potsdam Conference of July-August 1945, he demanded joint control ofthe Turkish Straits. When the Britishnotified the American government in February, 1947 they could no longerafford to render aid to Greece and Turkey, Truman with the support of abipartisan coalition led by Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg fashionedthe Truman Doctrine to replace British with American assistance. Afterbeing warned by American diplomat George Kennan in Moscow that the Sovietswere dragging their feet on troop removals, Truman ordered the StateDepartment to send the Soviets a stiff note calling for their withdrawalwhich was delivered in early March 1946 and which Chace says "brought thecrisis to an end by encouraging Stalin to work out a deal with theIranians" (144). Chace suggests that Secretary of War Henry Stimson was right that astronger effort should have been made in 1945 to share nuclear energy withthe Soviets, but it is now known, as Chace acknowledges, that Stalin toldRussia's leading nuclear physicist "to provide us with atomic weapons inthe shortest possible time" (128). In the view of many officials in Washington, two of whatthey regarded as the most objectionable features of the Soviet government,"arbitrary rule and ideological militancy," were being exported to EasternEurope by force (Gaddis 34). Stalin gave only modestassistance to the communist guerrillas who received more substantialassistance from the Yugoslavs under Marshall Josef Tito. According to La Feber, "Hitler's invasion of Russia in 1941forced a four-year partnership upon the Soviets and America" (6). As Trumandescribed that Doctrine to Congress, "the policy of the United States [mustbe] to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation byarmed minorities or by outside pressures" (Chace 168). American and Soviet Postures in 1945 With the destruction of Germany and Japan, Soviet power thrust deeplyinto Central Europe. New York: Random House, 199 .Kennan, George. Despite agreat deal of mutual suspicion, that military and political allianceremained intact until the common Axis enemies were destroyed. Truman sent the Russians an official warningrejecting any such arrangement and dispatched an American aircraft carriertask force to the Straits. Legacy of the Past According to La Feber, "the Cold War developed on a foundation of ahalf century of Russian-American distrust and apprehension" (6). American military strategists understood very well that by the endof the Second World War air power would soon be capable of operating on anintercontinental basis. . Under the November 1943 Tehran Declaration, the Soviets werecommitted to withdraw within six months after the war's end from northernIran the 1 , troops they had stationed there to secure Iranian oildeposits and to ensure the safety of Lend-Lease supplies en route to theSoviet Union. Fortunately, the United States then possessed thewherewithal and the national will to stem his ambitions until sanerleadership could come to power in the Soviet Union. Deciphering Soviet Intentions A number of factors contributed to the hardening of the Americanposition vis-a-vis the Soviets in 1946.

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