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Essay Subject: Examines meeting between Western powers & Soviet Union to deal with Cold War issues. Objectives, differences, leadership, outcome.... More...

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Paper Abstract: Examines meeting between Western powers & Soviet Union to deal with Cold War issues. Objectives, differences, leadership, outcome. Paper Introduction: THE GENEVA CONFERENCE OF 1955—MOTIVATIONS, OUTCOMES, & IMPLICATIONS Introduction This research examines the Geneva Conference of 1955. Addressed in this examinations are (1) the motivations for the meeting, (2) the participants in the conference, (3) the issues dealt with by the participants while at the conference, (4) the outcomes of the conference, (5) the future impact of the conference outcomes, and (6) a concluding assessment of the success of the conference. The Geneva Summit Conference was the direct outgrowth of the foreign ministers conference that had been held earlier. As the foreign ministers conference was so essential to the summit meeting, and as the foreign ministers conference itself produced a major successful outcome in the form Text of the Paper: The entire text of the paper is shown below. However, the text is somewhat scrambled. We want to give you as much information as we possibly can about our papers and essays, but we cannot give them away for free. In the text below you will find that while disordered, many of the phrases are essentially intact. From this text you will be able to get a solid sense of the writing style, the concepts addressed, and the sources used in the research paper. Macmillan contended that the issue affected to future ofmankind and that: "World War I-the war which nobody wanted-came because ofthe failure of the leaders at that time to meet at the summit. Basically, he remained rigid onthis question for the same kind of reason that Adenauer did. But the foreign ministers were instructed tomeet again at Geneva during October to go into the matter further, 'takingaccount of the close link between the reunification of Germany and theproblem of European security.'"[xx] Anthony Eden, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, proposed "aneutral belt down the dividing line between the East and West in Germany."[xxi] The proposal "was soon to be overtaken by the much wider generaldebate about so-called 'disengagement,' and Dulles himself never for onemoment accepted any of this thinking. As events transpired, the foreign ministers conference not only providedan indication of potential success for a summit, it produced a clearlysuccessful outcome in its own right in the form of the Austria StateTreaty, which provided for the sovereignty of Austria, as well as endingthe occupation of the country by the Soviet Union and the Western allies. [iv]Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 351. President Eisenhower, however, was most concerned with reports thatPrime Minister Macmillan was prepared to participate in a summit meetingwith the Soviets "without any sort of promising preliminary sessions withthe Soviets. [xxii]Goold-Adams, 181. Grey [SirHarold Grey, British Foreign Minister at the time] went fishing and the warcame in which the United Kingdom lost two million. Ferrell, (Ed.). New York: W. W. At the time, the British and theAmericans held different positions on several issues, and the positions ofother allies, including by this time the West Germans, also had to beconsidered. For my part I was in no mind to change our basicposition."[iv] The most important and most difficult issue likely to be dealt with ata summit was the unification of Germany. [viii]Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 354. Edgar Faure's concept of putting into the underdevelopedcountries the money that might be saved from defense expenditure. Each of these issueswere considered prime topics for a summit meeting with the Soviets. "Austria and U.S. [xii]S. Waging Peace: 1965-1961. [xxiv]Goold-Adams, 182. ... Washington: Foreign Service Institute, United States Department of State, 1987.Rathkolb, O. [xix]Goold-Adams, 18 . U.S.-Soviet Summitry: Roosevelt Through Carter. Because he sought eventual German unification,however, the Chancellor was adamantly opposed to any form of officialrecognition for an East German state. [xiii]Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 47 . Until the Berlin issue was settled, the United Statesalso held to the position that no violation of the rights of the Westernallies in Berlin could be tolerated. [xxvii]Goold-Adams, 184. The bulk of the responsibilities in theAmerican delegation, however, fell to Secretary of State John FosterDulles. The Austria State Treaty recognized Austria as asovereign independent and democratic state. The Cold War, it was contended, may have become a "hot war" hadit not been for the Geneva Conference of 1955. D. The Cold War may have become a "hot war" had it not been for theGeneva Conference of 1955. Austria also opposed the Soviet proposal to link the neutrality ofAustria with the neutralization of Germany, because this might revivetendencies tendencies toward a unification with Germany. (Ed.). [ix]Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 354. Eisenhower, Mandate For Change: 1953-1956 (Garden City, NewYork: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1963), 51 . [iii]D. Chancellor Adenauer's in West Germany, however, was pressuring forseparate sovereignty for a West German state, association with the West fora West German state, and the eventual, but not necessarily immediate,reunification of Germany. [xv]R. McDonald, Jr., (Ed.), U.S.-Soviet Summitry: Roosevelt ThroughCarter (Washington: Foreign Service Institute, United States Department ofState, 1987), 2 . R. "Austria and European Integration After World War II." Contemporary Austrian Studies 1 (1993), 42-61.----------------------- [i]J. [xxxi]Goold-Adams, 187. By 1955 control of the Soviet Union was "passing into the hands ofNikita Khrushchev, even though the titular head of the Soviet state wasNikolai Bulganin, who together with Khrushchev appeared at Geneva and whosat proudly for a picture out on the lawn of the former palace of theLeague of Nations together with the other world leaders-Eisenhower, EdgarFaure of France, and Anthony Eden of Britain (by that time Churchill hadretired in favor of Eden). TheRussians stuck rigidly to their old demands for the withdrawal of Americanforces from Europe and the end of NATO, making it very plain that the onlycondition on which they would be willing to agree to German reunion wouldbe the abandonment by the West of its defenses."[xxix] The fourth significant outcome of the Geneva Conference of 1955 wasthe failure to reach agreement on German unification. [xxiii]Goold-Adams, 182. Gehler, "State Treaty and Neutrality: The Austrian Solutionin 1955 as a Model for Germany?" Contemporary Austrian Studies 3 (1995) 3:33. British Foreign Secretary countered that little reasonexisted to have a foreign ministers conference if a summit meeting was notto follow. H. The outcome was that no solutions were reached on eitherEuropean security or Germany. Issues Dealt With by the Participants While At the Conference One of the proposals made by President Eisenhower at the GenevaConference of 1955 was the Open Skies proposal. State was ready to sign but Defense feared the unreadiness ofthe Austrian military in the face of Soviet aggression. In fact nothing was changed by Geneva, and the so-called Geneva atmosphere gradually evaporated."[xxvii] The second outcome of the Geneva Conference of 1955 was that, "inspite of Dulles's stand, the United States did manage to make its peacefulpurposes relatively clear. The Austria StateTreaty was especially important within the context of this thesis. R. He was always in total disagreementeven with Eden's minimum plan, though he thought it best not to makeanything of this disagreement in public. [xxviii]Goold-Adams, 184. By the time theWestern powers had smoothed out their differences, the Soviet Union hadchanged its mind because of the division of Germany, their successfultesting of an atomic device, and the beginning of an anti-Tito movement,which made the presence of Soviet troops in Austria important anew.[xxxii] Larson contended with reference to the Austria State Treaty that:"Neutralization, a classic diplomatic technique for crisis avoidance,resembles a prisoner's dilemma game; although the great powers benefit fromremoving a particular state from the realm of competition, there is atemptation to achieve higher payoffs by moving into the power vacuum andviolating the state's neutrality. Moscow was indeed demanding,as it constantly has since, the abolition of all military bases on foreignsoil as a condition for further progress in the discussions ondisarmament."[xxiii] The Soviets also demanded "the end of controls on the export ofstrategic goods to Communist countries. W. Eisenhower: Soldier and President. Most governments were highly favorable to our Open Skies proposal,as evidenced by a December 16, 1955, General Assembly resolution which,adopted by a vote of 56-7, urged early implementation of: 'Such confidence-building measures as the plan of Mr. Eisenhower, President of the UnitedStates of America, for exchanging military blueprints and mutual aerialinspection, and the plan of Mr. Bulganin, Prime Minister of the Union ofSoviet Socialist Republics, for establishing control posts at strategiccentres."[xviii] One major success that is credited to the Geneva Conference of 1955was the Austria State Treaty, on which agreement was reached at the foreignministers conference that preceded the summit meeting of the GenevaConference of 1955. President Eisenhower continuedto maintain that he would not attend a summit without the prospect of somedegree of success. The Soviet Unionoffered terms economically advantageous to itself. But it assumed that even in the day of 'push-buttonwarfare' a modern nation would find it impossible to prepare a massivesurprise attack without a stepping-up of military activity sufficient to benoticeable from the air. [ii]O. "Crisis Prevention and the Austrian State Treaty." International Organization 41 (1987): 27-6 .Luchak, J. [vii]Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 354. The hiatusin Soviet leadership that had followed the death of the old dictator inMarch 1953 now ended, and the quietness of the Geneva scene did not meanthat the world was a quiet place."[xi] The plans for the summit conference were thrown into confusion whenPresident Eisenhower suffered a heart attack a month prior to themeeting.[xii] As things worked out, the President attended the summit andwas an active participant. W.Norton & Company, 1981), 291. As the President and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles were in themidst of preparations for a conference with Prime Minister Anthony Eden ofthe United Kingdom, it was decided that the Americans would attempt todevelop a consensus with the British on the major issues that likely wouldbe dealt with at a summit conference. They repeated again and again theplan which Molotov had put forward for a security pact to replace NATO inEurope; at the end of the San Francisco meeting in June, indeed, Molotovhad declared once again that the reunification of Germany depended on theestablishment of the kind of European collective security system proposedby the Soviet Union. Mandate For Change: 1953-1956. Larson, "Crisis Prevention and the Austrian StateTreaty," International Organization 41 (1987): 27. W. The result of all these hard-faced and well-wornSoviet themes was to make nonsense in Dulles's mind of the claim fromMoscow that times had really changed, and that it was now up to the West tomake 'concessions' before any further steps towards agreement could betaken."[xxiv] Future Impact of the Conference Outcomes Goode-Adams described "five broad results" of the Geneva Conference of1955 that held a potential for future impact.[xxv] The most immediate wasthat "the conference had, temporarily at least, caused the danger of war torecede, by eliminating a certain bitterness in the relations between theSoviet Union and the Western powers."[xxvi] Following the conference,Secretary of State Dulles commented that "relations with Soviet Russia werenow 'less brittle.' There was in fact an indefinable something which cameto be known as the 'Geneva atmosphere.' While Dulles welcomed this if itwas likely to lead to anything else, he also felt it was a danger, in thesense that Western public opinion might take it as a sign that something ofsubstance had changed. [xi]R. [xxxii]A. With Austria's DanubeRiver Valley a potential route of Soviet invasion into Western Europe, NATOhas been very concerned about Austria's defense. [xxv]Goold-Adams, 183. D. The neutrality and geographical position of Austria has been aproblem for the United States and NATO since World War II. W. E. He believed,first, that it was safer to stand right up to the Russians, so that therecould be no uncertainty in their minds about what might happen if theymoved forward; and, secondly, that any withdrawal of American forces mightend by precipitating a chain reaction in American opinion, so that it endedwith a major withdrawal across the Atlantic."[xxii] The Soviets made their demands clear from the beginning. Participants in the Conference The summit meeting that was held as the Geneva Conference of 1955cannot be separated from the foreign ministers conference that preceded thesummit. This statement did not seemto me to square well with Harold's previously expressed anxiety about anuclear attack on Britain."[vii] Meanwhile, West German Chancellor Adenauer was "beginning to favor afive-year 'standoff,' an agreement between East and West that the statusquo between the two Germanys would not be disturbed. The Prime Minister reported that there seemed to be renewedSoviet interest in test ban ideas, particularly in a spot-check system ofinspection. The foreign ministers conference was required by PresidentEisenhower to provide an indication of some promise of success for asubsequent summit meeting before he would agree to participate in a summit. Endnotes BibliographyAmbrose, S. "The pointwas that, while both sides knew that Germany was the central issue, theRussians were determined to make propaganda, if they could, out of theirstand on disarmament. It dividesNATO's defense into northern and southern fronts. John Foster Dulles: A Reappraisal. He was also willingto discuss-although he made stipulations which practically negated theoffer-the possibility of limitation on armaments in specific areas withinGermany. The Geneva Summit Conferencewas the direct outgrowth of the foreign ministers conference that had beenheld earlier.[i] As the foreign ministers conference was so essential tothe summit meeting, and as the foreign ministers conference itself produceda major successful outcome in the form of the Austria State Treaty, theGeneva Conference of 1955 is reviewed in this research as a combination ofboth meetings.[ii] The thesis of this examination is that, while the Geneva Conference of1955 was not successful in all outcomes for either the Western allies orthe Soviet Union, the atmosphere created by the meeting subdued thehostilities between the two camps sufficiently to moderate the tenor of theCold War. The Eisenhower Diaries. [xxix]Goold-Adams, 184. [xxxiii]D. He admittedthat we could not prevent Khrushchev from strutting across the stage andmaking grandiloquent speeches; but we could avoid the impression thatwhenever he sounded conciliatory we would rejoice, and whenever he soundedthreatening we would become 'fearful as though he were the Lord ofCreation.'"[vi] Foreign Secretary Harold Macmillan of the United Kingdom reported thaton a recent meeting with Soviet Premier Khruschev that the Soviets appearedto be moving away from a tactic of "unilateral action to one ofnegotiation. Rathkolb, "Austria and European Integration After World War II,"Contemporary Austrian Studies 1 (1993), 42-61. (Ed.). Somewhat flabbergasting, in view of his earlier bombast, wasKhrushchev's statement to Macmillan that the May 27 deadline on Berlin wasin no sense an ultimatum. The President stated later, however, that,without question, "following the Geneva conference in the summer of 1955the United States held the initiative in winning the good opinion of theworld. As always there was our hope that the success ofsuch a first step might develop mutual confidence for futureprogress."[xiii] The Open Skies proposal was criticized by the Sovietsbecause, "they said, it covered only the territories of our two homelandsand would fail to cover territory where United States forces were stationedoverseas (ignoring, of course, the forces that the Soviets were maintainingin the European satellite nations)."[xiv] At the Geneva Conference of 1955, Secretary of State Dulles was "in aminority in being quite certain in his own mind that nothing could be doneabout Germany, while at the same time the disarmament question wasgenuinely less pressing for the West, since the United States stillretained its nuclear superiority. [vi]Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 353. [v]Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 351. I was disturbed to hear a highly respected British friend ofmine quoted as saying 'Britain will not be atomized over the stamping ofpapers,' indicating to me a lack of appreciation of the implications ofseeming trivialities. It further appeared that Adenauer was relaxing somewhat in therigidity of his refusal to deal with the East Germans, a change which, hehastened to add, was not to be confused with de facto recognition."[viii] An important issue that divided the Americans and the British in early-1955 was the question of the summit itself. Other Western leaders, who were more desirous of a summitconference, however, interpreted the President's statement to indicate thathe would attend a summit subsequent to a forthcoming foreign ministersconference, regardless of the outcome of the foreign ministers conference. Addressed inthis examinations are (1) the motivations for the meeting, (2) theparticipants in the conference, (3) the issues dealt with by theparticipants while at the conference, (4) the outcomes of the conference,(5) the future impact of the conference outcomes, and (6) a concludingassessment of the success of the conference. sentiment in Britain for a summit meeting wasstrong. Britain acquiesced butthe United States demurred because the Defense and the State Departmentsdisagreed. [xxvi]Goold-Adams, 184. The British and the Americans eventually agreed to "propose a foreignministers' meeting on a specific date and then to state the purpose of theforeign ministers' meeting, following which these words would be used: 'Onthis understanding and as' soon as developments justify the holding of asummit meeting. Security." Parameters 18 (1988), 87-95.McDonald, J. The agenda, asfinally accepted, went in this order: reunification of Germany and Europeansecurity, linked together; then disarmament; and, finally, development ofcontacts between East and West."[xvi] Outcomes of the Conference Even in the wake of the Austria State Treaty, President Eisenhower didnot expect great things to emerge from the Geneva Conference of 1955.[xvii] The results were somewhat better than the President has anticipated, butonly somewhat. The Geneva Conference of 1955-Motivations, Outcomes, & Implications Introduction This research examines the Geneva Conference of 1955. Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier and President (New York: Simonand Schuster, 199 ), 39 . The 1955 Austrian State Treaty is themost successful neutralization agreement of the postwar period; it alsocontributed to global crisis prevention by making possible the first summitand detente of the Cold War."[xxxiii] The Soviets favored an Austrian State Treaty based on neutralization,expecting that this would serve as a precedent for the neutralization ofGermany, which would lead to the withdrawal of Western troops from Germanyand enable a neutral and united Germany to be linked to the Soviet camp.Chancellor Adenauer of the Federal Republic of Germany refused even tocontemplate the neutralization of Germany, however, as did the Westernpowers. Cronin, "East-West Negotiations Over Austria in 1949:Turning-Point in the Cold War," Journal of Contemporary History (GreatBritain) 24 (1983), 125. "East-West Negotiations Over Austria in 1949: Turning-Point in the Cold War." Journal of Contemporary History (Great Britain) 24 (1983), 125-141.Eisenhower, D. The Eisenhower Diaries (New York: W. Norton & Company, 1981.Gehler, M. [xxi]Goold-Adams, 181. E. "It was they who were made to appear to have no counteroffer tomake to President Eisenhower's dramatic aerial inspection proposals, to SirAnthony Eden's outline of a system of armaments inspection in CentralEurope, or to M. The position of the United Stateswas that the Berlin problem could be solved only within the context ofGerman unification. "State Treaty and Neutrality: The Austrian Solution in 1955 as a Model for Germany?" Contemporary Austrian Studies 3 (1995) 3: 33-78.Goold-Adams, R. New York: Simon and Schuster, 199 .Cronin, A. Eisenhower, Waging Peace: 1965-1961. Selwyn Lloyd (British Deputy Foreign Secretary)believed that the Soviet bosses would like to ease the burdens which theirmilitary establishment made on their own economy and that the Sovietgovernment had no intention of going to war. young men."[ix]President Eisenhower offered the counter argument that he would not beassociated with a summit likely to produce a Chamberlain-like outcome thatoccurred prior to the Second World War. According to Goold-Adams, the Soviets had hoped to persuade the Germans, in the wake of theAustria State Treaty, to accept that "the best hope for reunification wasto unite on the Soviet side. [xx]Goold-Adams, 182. [xviii]Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 47 . At the same time they worked tenaciously for Westernrecognition of Eastern Germany, and to prevent any progress whatever beingmade on the Western proposals for German reunification by means of freeelections. We promptly agreed on the language of a note to &dispatched to the Soviets," according to President Eisenhower.[x] Soviet Premier Khrushchev, on 3 March 1955, accepted the Westernproposal for foreign ministers conference to begin on 11 May 1955.Although the foreign ministers meeting was set and a summit meeting was adistinct possibility, the Soviets and the Western allies continued toharass the other side over the next few months, in spite of the risk thatsuch actions could derail either or both the foreign ministers conferenceand the summit meeting. [xxxiv]M. 'If appeasementand partial surrender are to be our attitude,' Foster said, 'we had bettersave our money.' In some parts of the world-notably Asia, Africa, andLatin America-people were watching closely to see whether they thought theSoviet Union or the Western allies would be the more powerful. President Eisenhower's Open Skies proposal was not accepted at theGeneva Conference of 1955. [x]Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 355. W. [xvii]D. The Austrian government underthe Socialist Party used this prohibition to block military modernizationfrom 197 to 1983, despite little external opposition. [xxx]Goold-Adams, 185. The findings of thisexamination substantiated the thesis of the research. New York: Appleton- Century-Crofts, Inc., 1962.Larson, D. After an era of talk about massive retaliationand military pacts, Eisenhower personally did manage to put himself acrossin his chosen role as the man of peace, and to change the image of theUnited States in the eyes of the world. A change ofgovernment, however, permitted modernization to begin in the mid-198 s.[xxxv] Conclusion: Assessment of the Success of the Conference The thesis of this examination was that, while the Geneva Conferenceof 1955 was not successful in all outcomes for either the Western allies orthe Soviet Union, the atmosphere created by the meeting subdued thehostilities between the two camps sufficiently to moderate the tenor of theCold War. "Although the treaty boundAustria to neutrality, it restored the frontiers of January 1, 1938, andpromised free navigation of the Danube, the only other importantrestriction being that the Austrians also accepted a total prohibition ofany repetition of the Anschluss with Germany."[xix] With respect to German reunification and European security, theoutcomes of the Geneva Conference of 1955 were less successful. D. Assuming developments that [would justify a summer meeting atthe summit, the United States would be ready to participate in that furthereffort."[iii] Later, the President was to observe that what he intended tobe conveyed by the statement was that he had no intentions of meetingpersonally with the Soviets unless there was some promise of success forthe meeting. Unfortunately, the 1955Austria State Treaty placed restrictions on the weapons allowed to theAustrian military, particularly missiles. In this respect, Sir Anthony Edenalready held the view in 1955 that the power of the West had probably justabout passed its peak, and subsequent events have proved him right."[xv] The Geneva Summit Conference of 1955 "took the form of a struggle overthe agenda, as so many conferences with the Russians do. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1963.Eisenhower, D. H. (Garden City, New York:Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1965), 35 . Herein lay one source of rift betweenAdenauer and the British."[v] The United States also expected to discuss with the British the issuesof European security and nuclear test negotiations. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1965.Ferrell, R. But fortunately the people of Western Germanyhave understood what this means, and, in spite of the undoubted sense ofletdown which followed the Geneva failure of all shades of opinion, apartfrom the small Communist party in the Federal Republic, have remained trueto the West."[xxx] The fifth significant outcome of the Geneva Summit of 1955 that wasidentified by Goold-Adams was that "Bulganin and Khrushchev provisionallyaccepted an invitation from Eden to visit London the following spring.This was to be the first of their major sorties into the Western world,and, while Khrushchev's visit to the United States was still four yearsoff, in its own way the projected visit to London did a good deal tounderline the slackening of tension."[xxxi] Between June and December 1943 the four occupying powers in Austriadiscussed the possibility of a peace treaty for Austria. Luchak, "Austria and U.S. W. Security," Parameters 18 (1988),87. Atthis time, the British supported a so-called "thinning-out" of forces plan,which was not endorsed by the United States According to the President, Secretary of State Dulles, during themeeting with the British prior to the Geneva Conference, "made a forcefulplea that we avoid giving the people of the world the impression that wewere frightened of the Soviets or that the Soviets were in the 'driver'sseat.' Foster asked wryly why we spent $4 billion a year or more tocreate deterrent and defensive power if, whenever the Soviets threatenedus, our only answer would be to buy peace by compromise. [xxxv]J. Of this proposal, thePresident later stated that "aerial inspection would be of little value initself as a means of discovering where any nation stored its stockpile ofnuclear weapons. Khrushchev desired to move his country awayfrom the medieval behavior that had marked Stalin's dictator shift, but hewas a patriot and wanted to keep the Soviet Union at least abreast of theUnited States-and if opportunity offered he would push ahead. D. "Thus, in advance, he refused toaccede to any arrangements whatsoever that might be made with the EastGermans, despite the fact that some of these could appear to the otherWestern allies to be logical. The significance of East Prussia was partly that the eastern section ofthe country had been formally annexed by the Soviet Union, and hence towithdraw there would be to withdraw within the borders of Russia-and noone, after all, could expect more than that. W., Jr. The"Americans must return across the Atlantic and evacuate their overseasbases, while the Soviet forces would withdraw no further than East Prussia. Julius Raab,Chancellor of Austria, believed that the two cases of Austria and Germanywere not comparable.[xxxiv] For the United States, however, the Austria State Treaty posed someproblems. ... Goold-Adams, John Foster Dulles: A Reappraisal (New York:Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1962), 179. [xvi]Goold-Adams, 182. Motivations For the Meeting Early in 1955, President Dwight Eisenhower of the United States saidin a public statement that: "It is my hope that thereby all of us can reachagreement with the Soviets on an early meeting at the level of foreignministers. Indeed, he was so successful thatthe uconscionable Senator McCarthy, down but not out, asked in the Senatewhether he did not detect 'appeasement in the air.'"[xxviii] The third outcome of the Geneva Conference of 1955 was thereinforcement of the global image of the Soviet Union as an inflexiblepower. [xiv]Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 47 . 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