SOVIET GOVT. SUBSYSTEMS.   Term Paper ID:24268 Click to get this paper

Essay Subject: Examines goals, success & downfall of autocratic leaders from Lenin through Yeltsin, focusing on their reigns' political & economic subsystem.... More...

10 Pages / 2250 Words 7 sources, 27 Citations, MLA Format $40.00 Return to List of Papers

Paper Abstract: Examines goals, success & downfall of autocratic leaders from Lenin through Yeltsin, focusing on their reigns' political & economic subsystem. Paper Introduction: In 1990, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics officially disbanded. Since 1990, the Soviet Union has passed into a short-lived commonwealth and finally into a region of independent states still in large part influenced by Russian hegemony in economic development, size, and communications. The Soviet Army is disbanded, and occupation troops no longer keep order in Eurasia, but ever-weakening Belarus applied for reunion, and Chechnia found that bombs are still the classic Russian answer to dissidence. The Soviet Union may have passed, but the Soviet system remains. It is not a political system; rather, it is and was an intrinsically Russian system of autocratic rule (Lowenhardt 52-53). Styled Soviet by the Bolsheviks in 1917, it was the natural 20th century evolution of Czarist Russia. Its current Text of the Paper: The entire text of the paper is shown below. However, the text is somewhat scrambled. We want to give you as much information as we possibly can about our papers and essays, but we cannot give them away for free. In the text below you will find that while disordered, many of the phrases are essentially intact. From this text you will be able to get a solid sense of the writing style, the concepts addressed, and the sources used in the research paper. It is a goal that perfectly fits in with anautocratic system of government as well. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1979.Kober, Stanley. Robert V. Fleron, Erik P. Ed. Ed. A Red aristocracy was now firmly entrenched in positionand privilege (Lane 569-57 ); the secret police intently pursued a low-maintenance repression of dissidence. Unlike in the United States, Yeltsin was elected and re-electedas an individual; he owes no political dues to any party affiliation,except that created around his persona. "The August Coup." Soviet Communism from Reform to Collapse. Ed. Daniels. To his credit, despite some half-hearted attempts at violent repression in the Baltic Republics, Gorbachevwas not inclined to the type of systematic and thorough enforcement of hisautocracy that had characterized his predecessors' subsystems. It was a world thatwas entering the Great Depression anyway and was in no position to extend ahelping hand had the inclination been there, which it was not. Ed. The Soviet Union may have passed, but the Soviet system remains. Styled Soviet by theBolsheviks in 1917, it was the natural 2 th century evolution of CzaristRussia. New York: Gruyter, 1984.Hough, Jerry F., and Merle Fainsod. Lexington: Heath, 1995. Ed. The Reincarnation of Russia: Struggling with the Legacy of Communism, 199 -1994. But the general perception wasone of progress domestically (Hough & Fainsod 224-229). "The Revolutionary Promise." Soviet Communism from Reform to Collapse. Daniels. Contemporary Issues in Soviet Foreign Policy from Brezhnev to Gorbachev. Ed. Within a year of assuming power, Lenin's Soviet autocracyjustified itself by attacking another, greater problem: reunification ofthe Russian nation itself. 284-295Sixsmith, Martin. 47-68.Brzezinski, Zbigniew. Lenin's attachment to the Bolshevistcause was always manipulative at best, autocratic at all times (Hough &Fainsod 17-21). As of the last election, Boris Yeltsin performed an interesting andcomplicated juggling act: He succeeded in re-identifying the goals of hissubsystem in such a way that it emerged more powerful than it had for thethree years preceding. Lexington: Heath, 1995. If Khrushchev's subsystem had a transitional character, Brezhnev'ssubsystem of Sovietism took on a caretaker quality (Hough & Fainsod 237-274). Robert V. Unlike in Great Britain, where theprime minister must have a parliamentary majority in order to administerthe laws, Yeltsin's presidency constitutionally exists and administers inseparation from the lawmakers. This was not the tyrannicalautocracy of Stalinism with its terror-filled nights of waiting todisappear; but it was not the reformist subsystem of Khrushchev'sautocracy, whose implications led to the 1956 Hungarian Revolution andother liberal unrest throughout the Soviet empire. Robert V. The years since 199 haveseen a near-revolution, a violent repression, a political amnesty, twoelections, and, at the center, the figure of Boris Yeltsin remaining inpower. The entire Sovietsociety was wracked by Stalin's paranoid and terror-generating uses of thesecret police (Lowenhardt 54-55). As stability among the inner power circle was sought and achieved,it began to look increasingly like the Czarist system supposedly displaced5 years earlier. Hoffman, and Robbin F. This is a near-inherent, structural necessity required by the Russianconstitution, which divorces government leadership from necessaryaffiliation with a popular party and/or parliamentary majority (Lowenhardt144-148). How the Soviet Union Is Governed. Hoffman and Robbin F. Laird, eds. Durham: Duke UP, 1995.Miller, John, and J. Laird, eds. Ed. Meanwhile, the failure of economicreform promised by perestroika caused Gorbachev's subsystem to collapse inon itself, with a little help from a botched coup staged by people from theBrezhnev autocracy (Sixsmith 254-268). a confirmed advocate of Soviet principles whose mandate was to tinkerwith the previous subsystem to alleviate pressure on its problem areas, inthis case the economy in general and a general societal malaise followingthe debacle of Brezhnev's Afghanistan adventurism (Brown 54-57). The Brezhnev autocracy didnot take the speed of modern life into account. Sofar Yeltsin's subsystem has resisted this call for complete change. Stalin's gulags and mass murders are well known in the West.What is less considered is the valid and necessary economic programs thatStalin put into overdrive in order to force Russia into modernity. Khrushchev's subsystem in fact was by definition temporal.Khrushchev would have no role to play once his goals had been achieved.They were, in relatively short order. The Soviet Polity in the Modern Era. As with theCzarist subsystem of Nicholas II, Brezhnev's subsystem was designed formaintaining the status quo, not for evolving more efficient government.The self-collapse of the Brezhnev subsystem was clearly indicated by thefact that the man himself was virtually an invalid for the final years ofhis life, yet the autocrats around Brezhnev did not have the system or thepower to displace him (Zaslavskaya 35-46). In 199 , the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics officiallydisbanded. Russian society is remarkably more open than it was a mere 1 yearsago: the Yeltsin subsystem has always proclaimed democracy to be itspurpose for existence (Morrison 182), but the Russian people recognize theenduring aspect of this new government, that it adheres firmly to theautocratic system of governance. The combined effect ofglasnost and perestroika upon Soviet society was immediate, electrifying,and, for Gorbachev, unforeseen with a vengeance. Lexington: Heath, 1995. Since 199 , the Soviet Union has passed into a short-livedcommonwealth and finally into a region of independent states still in largepart influenced by Russian hegemony in economic development, size, andcommunications. "Social Stratification and Class." The Soviet Polity in the Modern Era. Laird. 69-83.Daniels, Robert V., ed. Half of post-Soviet Russia remains governed by institutions createdduring the various Soviet subsystems, while the other half grapplesunfamiliarly with concepts of economic and social modernization (Lowenhardt152-154). Thereasons are a combination of practical logistics and logical reasoning.Practically speaking, the lesson of Lenin clearly indicates that attemptinga complete sweep of institutional reform will probably plunge the Russiannation into chaos and civil disturbance. Robert V. Erik P. Though he quickly solved the problem--war--that had leveraged hismovement into dominance by making peace with Germany and ending thatdestruction, Lenin's autocratic power-grab alienated other factions and setoff a civil war (Hough & Fainsod 83-1 3). 253-268.Thompson, John M. The Soviet Army is disbanded, and occupation troops nolonger keep order in Eurasia, but ever-weakening Belarus applied forreunion, and Chechnia found that bombs are still the classic Russian answerto dissidence. Black. Glasnost was creating the type of dynamic vitality needed to revivethe economy, but Gorbachev's perestroika reforms were structuralinnovations of the too-little/too-late variety, unable to rectify theeconomic abuses and neglect of the Brezhnev era (Rutland 285-286). New York: Gruyter, 1991.Gorbachev, Mikhail. With Brezhnev's death, followed in short succession by the quick,unexpected deaths of successors Andropov and Chernenko, the autocraticsystem found a new subsystem to champion in the figure of MikhailGorbachev. The Czarist autocracy had survived from thetime of Peter the Great until World War I on the basis of reforms Peter hadinstituted (Thompson 1 7-1 8); but communications were slow then, andchanges in societal conditions slower still. Robert V. Still, by Stalin's death in the early 195 s, his subsystem hadachieved its goals and was now suffering the classic dilemma of politics:if one cannot go forward, one inevitably slips backward. Ostensibly, Gorbachev was a reformer in the Khrushchev mold,i.e. As Russia entered World War I, the Czar's empire stretched to great,insupportable lengths from the Baltic to the Black Sea, from mid-Poland toan island only 5 miles distant from Alaska. Laird. Boulder: Westview, 1994.Zaslavskaya, Tatiana. "The Breakup of the Communist Party." Soviet Communism from Reform to Collapse. 563-6 5.Lowenhardt, John. Gorbachevwas a confirmed autocrat, firmly committed to that form of rule, as hisvirtual exile of Boris Yeltsin from the Communist Party clearly proved. "Soviet Politics: From the Future to the Past?" The Soviet Polity in the Modern Era. New York: Gruyter, 1984. This was the beginning of perestroika, restructuring,and its codependent philosophy, glasnost, openness. That revolution was soon dominated by late-comer Vladimir Lenin, whomaneuvered the Bolsheviks into power. 268-284.Morrison, John. Thesuccess of Stalin's subsystem was the Soviet Union's survival of the Naziinvasion and revival into a national expansion that spread into dominationof Central Europe and even incursion into Western Europe. Thesuccess of glasnost allowed Gorbachev's personal rival, Boris Yeltsin, torise again to prominence outside the Soviet/Party system, a system thatGorbachev himself was whittling down in an effort to bring the economy upto speed (Miller & Black 269-27 ). Rather, asStalin and Churchill both foresaw, the 193 s was a decade of rising threatfrom the dangerous entity of Nazi Germany. Hitler's national base was acompact, industrialized, and literate country; Stalin's was a near-feudal,starving and sprawling combination of frozen tundra, deserts andundeveloped resources. And it is a goal that can evolve,to grow or shrink as the need arises, and not make itself an anachronism byits own ever-elusive success. Needless to say, this situation ofabsurdnaia politika (Lowenhardt 145) virtually requires the Russianpresident to create an autocracy to support himself and his branch ofgovernment. "Economic Crisis and Reform." Soviet Communism from Reform to Collapse. Erik P. L. 172-183.Rutland, Peter. Lexington: Heath, 1995.Fleron, Frederic J., Erik P. Daniels. Gorbachev's subsystem was both achieving and failing to achieve itsgoals. Always lurking beneath the surface was thepotential for hunger-fed revolution, which was a near-memory (Hough &Fainsod 147-156). Russia was unprepared to engage in the industrialized Great War; thenext three years of carnage to her people was as much the fault of Czaristincompetence as it was related to German design (Hough & Fainsod 39-42).The Bolsheviks swept into prominence on the crest of a popular revolutionagainst the hereditary ruler's lack of leadership ability (Thompson 181-186). "Boris Yeltsin." Soviet Communism from Reform to Collapse. Frederic J. The Czarist bureaucracy was given agreater role to play, the secret police was revived as a force ofrepression, and feudal land-binding was reintroduced under the banner ofthe commune. It has also led to an almost-permanent state of constitutionalcrisis, while the Russian congress and president vie with each other forcontrol over almost every aspect of government. Laird. On Stalin's death of possibly naturalcauses, Nikita Khrushchev's raison d'etre was as agricultural reformer andtemporizing influence on the Stalinist excesses. When Stalin came to power in the mid-192 s, geopolitics had virtuallyisolated the Soviet Union from the rest of the world. It was a centralized hegemonyand largely feudal: outside of a few cities, the Industrial Revolutionthat had embraced Western Europe for two centuries was only justpenetrating Russia (Thompson 168-181). Robert V. Lexington: Heath, 1995. Lexington: Heath, 1995. The SovietUnion's agricultural sector was shattered in equal parts by the war and byStalin's consolidation of power at the expense of experienced land-management: the mass executions of kulaks, the Lysenko theory of communistagricultural genetics (Hough & Fainsod 138-142, 182). 794-8 8.Lane, David. "The Old Regime in Crisis." Soviet Communism from Reform to Collapse. The Brezhnev autocracyneeded five years to find its footing: from proxy ideologic wars inVietnam and Africa to firm but unbloody repression of the Velvet Revolutionin Czechoslovakia in 1968. Daniels. Itis not a political system; rather, it is and was an intrinsically Russiansystem of autocratic rule (Lowenhardt 52-53). Soviet Communism from Reform to Collapse. Gorbachev had expected economic reform to be the issue of primaryinterest; instead, the vague and unprice-tagged concept of freedom was theissue immediately seized upon by the Soviet citizenry (Lowenhardt 146-147). Daniels. Russia & the Soviet Union. "The Succession and Reform." Soviet Communism from Reform to Collapse. Still, the new subsystem headed by Boris Yeltsin retains thetypically autocratic characteristics of the Russian system it is rooted in. Roads, communications, and all theother accoutrements of industrialized society were virtually non-existent,countered only by Russia's agricultural standing as a breadbasket and alarge population that counted for something in the geopolitical equation,particularly because the generals strategizing World War I were still usingNapoleonic tactics. Glasnost revealed skeletons to be found in the Soviet closet. The rise of Josef Stalin,therefore, represented two concurrent political goals: a drive to makeRussia a 2 th century industrialized nation, combined with a simultaneousreinforcement of autocratic rule to the point of repressive and destructiveparanoia. Lexington: Heath, 1995. He believed that successful economic reform without therepressions of communication and individualism that had characterizedprevious Sovietism would clearly justify the larger Soviet vision ofsociety (Gorbachev 7 -82). Its goal of normalization quickly achieved, it beganto collapse in upon itself as economic and social problems in the SovietUnion continued to evolve. Daniels. New York: Gruyter, 1991. The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the U.S.Congress insist that all remnants of Sovietism need to be flushed out ofthe Russian system if true economic and social progress is to be made. What changed withthe October Revolution on through the perestroika era of last-standSovietism continuing still today was only the succession of subsystems,each bearing the stamp of a different autocratic leader: Vladimir Lenin,Josef Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev, Leonid Brezhnev, Mikhail Gorbachev, andBoris Yeltsin (Brzezinski 69). "Idealpolitik." Contemporary Issues in Soviet Foreign Policy from Brezhnev to Gorbachev. Just asBrezhnev's earlier autocracy had feared, once the lies were out in theopen, dissidence soon followed, and ever-more demands for greater reformthan Gorbachev proposed soon followed. 69-82.Hoffman, Erik P., and Robbin F. Ed. At the same time, by all accounts, Gorbachev was an idealist (Kober8 1-8 3). The civil war destroyed what wasleft of Russia's economy and inspired an anarchic chaos that lingers inRussia's soul. Its current incarnation as a democratic political system is stillsafely within the autocratic mold of Russian tradition. The purpose of Stalin's brand of Sovietism, then, was to develop thatmass of potential promise or destructiveness, and he did so with aruthlessness that paralleled his own personal consolidation of power. Ed. New York: Gruyter, 1984. Daniels. That footing established, the Brezhnev subsystem of Sovietism hadnothing new to offer. Logically speaking, as Lenin'sexperience also indicates, why should one clear away every Sovietinstitution when those institutions are so obviously Russian in every sensebut name? It was a limitedsuccess: The Soviet Union's delivery system remained unreliable; Westerngrain needed to be imported in bad years. Lenin used every tool of the Czarist organization to reachthis goal (Hough & Fainsod 77-83). Yet, by the time of his death from natural causes, Lenin and his takeon Sovietism had already outlived their usefulness: the civil war wasended, reunification was established, and the country was still in a stateof economic ruin (Hough & Fainsod 133-135). Hoffman, and Robbin F. Khrushchev's agricultural reforms had opened up a line of Westerngrain credits that had to be repaid; the Soviet economy needed to grow inorder to meet its international obligations, obligations that grew with theinternational recessionary waves of the 197 s and early 198 s. Robert V. The cost wasextremely high, but during World War II and immediately after Stalin wasable to blame first Nazi Germany and then, conveniently, the Westernimperialism of its Cold War rivals. Gorbachev and his coterie of autocrats analyzedthe economic trends of the 198 s and concluded that open communications andat least a modicum of free market incentive is necessary for an economy tocompete and grow. Khrushchev, a Ukrainian of goodpeasant stock, plowed his efforts into improving the agricultural sector ofthe Soviet economy, retaining the commune/feudal orientation, but improvingdelivery systems, throwing out communist growing theories, promoting cornas a useful crop and, in general, removing the Stalinist terror that hadinhibited the nation's farmers and society in general. The Czarist system was hereditary; theselatter-day autocrats each had a specific reason behind their ascent topower. Hoffman and Robbin F. Works CitedBrown, Archie. The goal of Russia as a strong, proud nation is nowthe purpose of Yeltsin's subsystem, as properly vague an ambition as befitsthat of any democratic system. Ed. Precisely because his subsystemhad lessened the internal economic pressures and power-play terror ofStalinism, when Khrushchev successively lost face at the United Nations inthe famous shoe-pounding incident and with the Cuban Missile Crisis, hissubsystem collapsed as former supporters deserted the central autocrat.The troika of autocrats that Leonid Brezhnev led to depose Khrushchev had anew purpose: maintenance of the Soviet status quo internally andinternationally. 35-46.----------------------- 12 This was the nascent Soviets' first great popular achievement:identification of their philosophy with the larger goal of Russiannationalism. On the international level, Khrushchev's autocracy was considered alimitation by the other Soviet autocrats. Lexington: Heath, 1995. When that reason ceased to matter as the dominant issue, thatautocrat's subsystem deteriorated or was pushed aside, victim of its ownsuccess in achieving its goal. If this paper is not what you are looking for, you can search again: Search for: or Click here to request an essay written just for you.

Many of our Papers can be Downloaded From This Site!

PLEASE READ THIS, IT IS IMPORTANT!

Office hours are Monday through Friday, from 9 am to 5 pm (PST). You may place orders for custom research over the phone during office hours. E-mail requests can be made to our graduate and undergraduate department any time, and will be reviewed during office hours. You may also contact customer service any time through e-mail, and we will review your message during business hours. A great many papers can be downloaded right from this site, but not all of them. If you would like to know if a particular paper is downloadable, just look in the description for: "Available for Internet Download: Y" or "Available for Internet Download: N" If you wish to purchase a paper which is NOT available for immediate download, you will need to make other shipping arrangements. Also, please be aware that these orders are processed Monday through Friday from 9 am to 5 pm (PST). If you place your order after 4:45pm on Friday, it will not be processed until the following Monday morning. We charge $8 per page for all of our pre-written reports, plus shipping (and tax for California residents). However, the highest cost of any ONE report is $136, or 17 pages. Please, take a moment. Make sure you have chosen the report you want or need BEFORE you complete your order. If you are not sure, allow us to help you. We do not offer refunds or exchanges, so it is important for you to let us answer your questions during office hours. Reports which are e-mailed or downloaded are in Microsoft Word format. We are making more reports available for e-mail delivery faster than we can update our listings. Please call to check on the status of particular reports. There are many other shipping options which are listed on the Checkout page.