"LIMITS OF COERCIVE DIPLOMACY, THE" (ALEXANDER GEORGE & WILLIAM SIMONS).   Term Paper ID:22580 Click to get this paper

Essay Subject: Examines concept's purpose, eight factors leading to success or failure, application in Southeast Asia & Cuba.... More...

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Paper Abstract: Examines concept's purpose, eight factors leading to success or failure, application in Southeast Asia & Cuba. Paper Introduction: This research examines the concept of coercive diplomacy as developed by Alexander George and William Simons in their seminal work, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (1994). The concept of coercive diplomacy will first be defined, followed by an analysis of the several different factors which affect the outcome of such a strategy. Finally, some of the most important factors will be highlighted that contributed to the successful conclusion of diplomatic actions in Laos and Cuba. Coercive diplomacy is defined as a defensive diplomatic strategy that is employed in the international arena to deal with the efforts of an adversary to change a status quo situation in his own favor. Coercive diplomacy is distinct from deterrence theory in that coercive diplomacy is a response to a hostile action already taken while deterrence attempts to Text of the Paper: The entire text of the paper is shown below. However, the text is somewhat scrambled. We want to give you as much information as we possibly can about our papers and essays, but we cannot give them away for free. In the text below you will find that while disordered, many of the phrases are essentially intact. From this text you will be able to get a solid sense of the writing style, the concepts addressed, and the sources used in the research paper. At least eight general factors have been identified as contributingto the success or failure of coercive diplomacy. Coercive diplomacy is defined as a defensive diplomatic strategy thatis employed in the international arena to deal with the efforts of anadversary to change a status quo situation in his own favor. Clearly, the greater the crisis between twonations, the higher the stakes of the threat that must be employed to makecoercive diplomacy effective. When ambiguity cloudsthe objectives, it is far easier to believe the home country may bebluffing. In those situations when the limited use offorce gets out of hand and full-scale war breaks out, coercive diplomacyhas failed and the international crisis has escalated to war. Coercive diplomacy relies on at least the threat of military action,but it is nevertheless an alternative to the outright use of force. objectives far beyond theactual crisis. And the last and most dramatic (Type C) is the employmentof coercive diplomacy to fundamentally restructure the form of governmentwithin an adversarial nation. Instead, nations can use economic threats, such as aneconomic embargo, or any other threatened action designed to extract aprice from the adversary. The Pentagon, especially, advocated tying the missile issueto the complete eradication of Cuba's popular dictator, Fidel Castro. These are America'sconflicts with Laos in 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis in the followingyear. Coercive diplomacy is also distinct from normalforms of diplomacy in that the former implies a coercive element ofperceived or actual threats while normal diplomacy consists ofinternational negotiations minus any coercive component. Clarity of objective assists policymakers in the homecountry in analyzing the real costs of the aggression from an adversary andto formulate a realistic set of counter measures. The single most important factor is "clarity of objective." This is adouble-edged sword. This research examines the concept of coercive diplomacy as developedby Alexander George and William Simons in their seminal work, The Limits ofCoercive Diplomacy (1994). Several administration officials aswell as the Pentagon favored extending U.S. George and Simons highlight two conflict situations out ofseven in which coercive diplomacy clearly paid off. In such a situation, however, onlyenough force is applied to make the threat credible and to get theadversary to return to the negotiating table. Decisive and firm leadership is the pillarthat supports clarity in policymaking. The decisions of nations can be affected by domesticfactors as well as international needs. The result was a de-emphasis of the conflict in Laos and the nationwas left relatively neutral by the communists. President Kennedy's leadership inthe Cuban missile crisis highlights the role of this factor in contributingto the success of coercive diplomacy. interests were in the region, the Pathet Lao feltless threatened and their motivation to conquer Laos substantially eroded.The United States no longer appeared as though we were going to invade Laosourselves and, instead, cast our objectives in very clear and believableterms. Clarity of objective was an essential component in both the Laos andCuban crises. For example, in a tradewar between Japan and the United States, it is important to keepperspective of the conflict and the retaliatory threats within realisticboundaries so that it is not escalated into a more damaging conflict. As with any dilemma in the international sphere, the relationsbetween two or more nations is an exceedingly complex dynamic, of which notwo international crises are the same. The concept of coercive diplomacy will first bedefined, followed by an analysis of the several different factors whichaffect the outcome of such a strategy. (1994). The picture in the Cuban missile crisis was even clearer. Commitment meansdisplaying strong and decisive leadership firmly committed not just to thestated objectives but also to carrying out the issued threat. Serbianaggression went on unnecessarily for the last two years largely because thecivilian-controlled United Nations repeatedly backed down on theirobjectives and their threats. A seemingly unlimited number offactors make each international crisis unique. Finally, some of the most importantfactors will be highlighted that contributed to the successful conclusionof diplomatic actions in Laos and Cuba. The eight conditions differ in importancedepending on the situation, but several of these criteria have consistentlyproven of critical importance to the fate of diplomatic efforts. Coercivediplomacy is distinct from deterrence theory in that coercive diplomacy isa response to a hostile action already taken while deterrence attempts toprevent a hostile action. And the higher the stakes of the threat, thegreater the risk that the diplomatic efforts will breakdown into armedconflict. imperialism and drawn theuncompromising opposition of the Soviet Union (and perhaps much of the restof the world). The second (Type B) is the use of coerciveand diplomatic measures to persuade an opponent to reverse the gains of ahostile action. As such, coercive diplomacyis context dependent. hadthe United States pursued such a grandiose goal, it would have beeninterpreted as nothing short of U.S. References George, A., & Simons, W. By lowering U.S. It was notuntil the military-controlled NATO forces assumed leadership in theconflict away from the United Nations, and promptly carried out its threatsof bombing until the Serbs withdrew from the conflict zone. Itseeks to persuade an opponent to cease hostile actions prior to armedconflict--although coercive diplomatic measures can continue to be takeeven in the course of armed conflict. The developments of any particular crisis can beaffected by cultural factors, historical factors, economic factors,political factors and even personal factors in which leadershippersonalities collide. Obviously, the more ambitious the goal of thenation employing coercive diplomacy, the greater the risk that it entails. that theaggression will end, and then continuing the aggression anyway. Americanobjectives in that situation were limited, specific and concrete. The limits of coercive diplomacy.Boulder: Westview Press. The coercive element of coercive diplomacy need not be the threat ofarmed conflict. The first (Type A) is the use of a mix of threats anddiplomatic channels to persuade an opponent to stop short of the finalobjectives of a hostile action. Had the opposingnations not been so evenly matched, a weaker adversary would have pulledout of the crisis long before Khrushchev finally gave in. WhenPresident Kennedy stepped into office, he substantially modified U.S.objectives in Laos to more realistic levels of establishment of a ceasefire and creation of a neutral Laos. Even though Castro attempted topicture American objectives as an invasion of Cuban sovereignty and thusencourage active Soviet involvement, the strong leadership of PresidentKennedy kept the conflict in proper perspective. A second critical factor--which goes hand-in-hand with clarity ofobjective--is strong leadership. Theclarity of American objectives--removed the missiles from Cuba--kept theconflict in focus and everyone felt quite assured what the consequenceswould be of ignoring the threat. Thus, it is very difficult, if notimpossible, to compose a generic model of when and when not coercivediplomacy will work. Serb leaders learned quickly that the UnitedNations could be rendered impotent simply by promising the U.N. This is known as "exemplary"or "symbolic" use of force. In Laos, President Eisenhower had over-stated Americaninterests in that nation by proclaiming that American foreign policy was totransform Laos into a "bastion of freedom." Yet, Eisenhower was not willingto commit the necessary forces to achieve such a grandiose objective. However, that does not mean some generalities cannot be derived fromexperience. Even though both sides were clear thatforce was about to be exercised, the conflict reached extremely dangerousproportions because of other factors--namely, the symmetry of militaryforces between the United States and the Soviet Union. Onthe other edge of this sword, clarity of objectives helps convince theadversary that the home country has thought the issue through carefully andwill likely carry out any retaliatory threats issued. (There are, of course,many other factors that have been identified contributing to the success orfailure of any particular crisis situation.) These eight factors include:clarity of objective; strength of motivation; asymmetry of motivation;sense of urgency; strong leadership; adequate domestic and internationalsupport; unacceptability of threatened escalation; and clarity concerningthe precise terms of settlement. There are three major types of coercive diplomacy defined bydifferent objectives. Kennedy steered his administration into pursuing the limitedoption of removing the missiles only. The NATOcommitment to its stated objectives, and NATO's convincing display that itwill indeed carry out its threats if the objectives are thwarted, finallybrought the Serbian leadership back to the negotiating table and ended theconflict. The ideal of coercive diplomacy is toachieve diplomatic objectives with only the threat of dire consequences forthe adversary, but it is often the case that, in order to make the threatscredible, genuine force must be applied. What appears to be a third critical factor in the success of coercivediplomacy--which is not listed by George and Simons--is a combination ofclarity of objective and strong leadership into what shall be called"commitment." The recent conflict in Bosnia highlights the importance ofcommitment in resolving international conflicts. objectives inconformity with what U.S. If this paper is not what you are looking for, you can search again: Search for: or Click here to request an essay written just for you.

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