SINGAPORE IN WWII.   Term Paper ID:21721 Click to get this paper

Essay Subject: Compares military & security objectives & motivations of British, Amer. & Japanese strategies & outcome.... More...

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Paper Abstract: Compares military & security objectives & motivations of British, Amer. & Japanese strategies & outcome. Paper Introduction: The warrior-philosopher Sun Tzu's maxim that, "if you cannot be strong, and yet cannot be weak, this will result in your defeat" (21) best characterizes Singapore's rise and fall during World War II. Having suffered through protracted periods of colonial imperialism, the island of Singapore off the Malay Peninsula had long served in its precarious capacity as pawn to the empire builders ranging from Czarist Russia to Britain to Japan (Watson 82). In the years leading to the British capitulation of the Singapore Naval Base in 1942, Singapore meant different things to different nations. The stark disparity of objectives among the major Far East Asian players would become apparent during World War II. The Far East players consisted of Britain, the United States and Japan. To Britain, Singapore was a symbol of its Victorian Text of the Paper: The entire text of the paper is shown below. However, the text is somewhat scrambled. We want to give you as much information as we possibly can about our papers and essays, but we cannot give them away for free. In the text below you will find that while disordered, many of the phrases are essentially intact. From this text you will be able to get a solid sense of the writing style, the concepts addressed, and the sources used in the research paper. A series of strategicbunglings and disasters culminated in the humiliating fall of Singapore(McIntyre 2 8-9). With 44 ships and a troop strength of about 88,6 men on hand forthe defense of Singapore, defender numbers looked better than those ofJapanese aggressors - but that was on paper. In reality, 37, were ill-trained, ill-equipped Indians, while another 16,8 were Malayan"volunteers" (McIntyre 195). The stark disparity of objectives among themajor Far East Asian players would become apparent during World War II. Asiatic fleetin Singapore during 194 , Roosevelt was embroiled in a presidentialelection year for an unprecedented third term in office. Anydabbling in Asia would be unpopular, so not even one U.S. Undera cover of extremely heavy artillery bombardment artillery, Japanese troopslanded at Singora Beach (McIntyre 2 8). First proposed in 1919, initial plans called for construction of anaval base in preparation for hypothetical wars with the U.S. Over 1 tanks gave Japan the clearadvantage on land, and the British failed to prevent Japanese troops fromlanding and then advancing. Singapore was chosensince, although the area was too far for an easy attack on or by Japan, itcould protect both the critical Australian and Indian trade routes(McIntyre 6-7). Afterwards, the American warship construction program for aresurrected U.S. The shipyard and docks ofthe original base still exist to handle massive British and Americanwarships, as well as the largest Japanese oil tankers. The Far East players consisted of Britain, the United States andJapan. Japan had allied itself with Britain in World War I, but muchhad changed in the aftermath of a Versailles charged with "Yellow Peril"racist rhetoric (McIntyre 223). While the Singapore garrisons frantically prepared defenses for aweek, Japanese aircraft and artillery cleared the way for the assault.Japan's attack on the island of Singapore began on February 8, 1942. would look for an opportunity to launch amassive, all-out strike against the enemy at the earliest possible moment.Therefore, the U.S. Vacillating and ineffective bureaucratic British policies underChamberlain and Churchill abounded between the Wars. The Republic of Singapore was formally granted its independence fromMalaysia in 1965. To Britain, Singapore was a symbol of its Victorian heyday as thepreeminent world super-power of the 19th century. Hitler hadalready urged Japan to take aggressive measures in Singapore, which hebelieved would bring about the final collapse of Britain (Morton 62). Consequently, America's most valuable possession in the Far East,the Philippines, was written off as indefensible (Morton 87). American military strategists had correctly judged that Singapore wasbut a single point in a vast strategic network. The Japanese set up bases in Southern IndoChina and Thailand. Defense leaders AdmiralStark, Chief of Naval Operations, and General Marshall, Head of the JointChiefs of Staff, also doubted Singapore's strategic value and the long-termdefense of the island. The War in the Pacific. Following World War One, the only rival navies were allies, theUnited States and Japan. partial assistance would not beenough to sustain Singapore in the event of an invasion and the Americanbattleships would be lost. Japanese Objectives Japan's vision for the New World Order was crystal clear. However, after the painfuldestruction of Pearl Harbor, and the breathtakingly swift collapse ofSingapore, Americans also realized that only an offensive stance could winthe war against Japan. America was also more ready to sustain heavy casualties in the earlygoing than to disperse its forces or maintain a defensive posture (Morton88). Boston: Shambhala Publications, 1991.Watson, Mark S. Hedid not relish the grim prospect of the United States facing a victoriousAxis Alliance alone. Japan must strike fast (McIntyre 191). The War Department. They considered Singapore to be a British self-interest, in the manner than the U.S. Budget cuts and work slow downs werede rigueur (McIntyre 57). WhileChurchill made repeated requests for the presence of the U.S. British ObjectivesAccustomed to wars fought by adversaries on the European continent, andinfluenced by its insular position geographically, Britain relied mainly onsea and air power. Having been left out of the feeding frenzythat ensued upon the vanquished, and despite its Anglo-Japanese Alliancewith Britain, Japan embarked on an aggressive plan to gain control of FarEast Asia. In general, British strategy consisted of: victory with minimalrisk and minimal losses; superior naval might; and avoidance of large-scalecontinental operations (Morton 87-88). The British Command had little use for the massiveground forces that would play a major part in both the Atlantic and Pacifictheaters. In theBritish view, Singapore was critical to the defense of India, Australia andNew Zealand. America did not relish the idea of facing Japanwith a weakened Navy. was willing to risk losing the Philippines in the shortterm. fleet would be employed offensively todirect Japanese strength away from Malaysia and thus support the MalayBarrier (Morton 15 ). Such strategies would be sorelytested in the war to come. An hour before the attack on Pearl Harbor, Japan began itsoffensive on Malaya (McIntyre 192). The United States, whilea close ally of Britain, had little interest in preserving ancient history,since it was bent on its own course of expansionist policy and globalinfluence. would be anally in any war involving Japan. Washington D.C.: Department ofthe Army, 1962.Tzu, Sun. For its part, Japan had correctly anticipated thata galvanized United States would be a far more formidable opponent thanBritain. squadron could besent to Singapore without political repercussions (Watson 117). Singapore was seen as little more than an insurance policy(McIntyre 53). Unwilling to invest in aprotracted conflict, the U.S. Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 195 .----------------------- 1 During that time, Singapore prospered asa port providing work for Chinese, Indians Australians and British. The fall of Singapore just six days after Japan's initial invasionalso foreshadowed the fall of both Java and Sumatra which were consideredindispensable in the defense of Australia and New Zealand (Morton 241-242). The plan was simple. This lack of air superiority would bedecisive in 1942 (McIntyre 69). Meanwhile, British Chiefs of Staff, caught inthe crosscurrents of changing technology and naval disarmament, debated fora decade the merits of artillery or aircraft defenses (McIntyre 85). Stark believed that Germany was the primary adversary and that Japancould be dealt with in time (Watson 118). Both men feared such an action would incur the military wrath of theJapanese against the U.S. Havingsuffered through protracted periods of colonial imperialism, the island ofSingapore off the Malay Peninsula had long served in its precariouscapacity as pawn to the empire builders ranging from Czarist Russia toBritain to Japan (Watson 82). Singapore was centrally located at the crossroads of British Empiretrade routes in the 19th century. Stark believed that it behooved the Americans towait, as they gained strength, but not so long that the Britain fell. Upon quitting both the League of Nations and the Naval Treaty system,Japan found itself simultaneously at last able to build a navy to rival theAmericans, while feeling surrounded by the prevailing super powers(McIntyre 189). Japan would have to workfast for its nano-second of naval supremacy in the East. The Rise and Fall of the Singapore Naval Base.Great Britain: Archon, 1979.Morton, Louis. Foreseeing the lossof Singapore and unwilling to risk its warships in a hopeless cause, theNaval Chief wished that the U.S. Theremaining 35, British and Australian troops would be facing an army of6 , highly-trained Japanese. Onlywhen Japan moved into Saigon and Cam Rahn Bay in July of 1941 did the U.S.finally become alarmed. That Britain suffered a crushing and humiliating defeat because ofcomplacent and indecisive policies is clear. Meanwhile, Japan moved into southernIndoChina, while placing growing pressure on Thailand (McIntyre 165).British Prime Minister Churchill took it on faith that the U.S. was finally in the same boatthe British. As a major part of the British Commonwealth DeterrentDefense, the Singapore Naval Base would be built to service the BritishMain Fleet. With defeat went the last vestiges of 19th Century Imperialism. WhileSingapore was fundamental to maintaining Empire security, U.S. Navy would give it the edge. In 1942, Japan Navy would be at the height ofits power. Withdrawal of Japanese forces from these twooccupied areas was the condition for a resumption of trade with the U.S.On its limited oil, Japanese naval strength was rapidly approachingcritical mass. This conclusion proved to be false. The British Commonwealth handed over the naval base tothe Singapore government in 1968, and the island has become a center ofpragmatic capitalism and limited human rights. British rearmament began in the mid-193 s following abuild-up by the German Navy, and the scaled-back Singapore Naval Baseopened in 1939, on the eve of the Second World War in the Pacific Theater.With the fall of ally France and the invasion of Italy on Ethiopia, theBritish high command faced a situation that exceeded their militarystrategists' worst nightmares. Requiring 2 years tocomplete, the construction on the Base was delayed because the governmenthad trouble bank-rolling the project. maintained interest in thePhilippines (Morton 88). The Collision of Strategies Even as Japan's offensive strike unfolded negotiations with the U.S.continued. Stark argued that U.S. Along withKorea, and the newly renamed Manchukuo (formerly Manchuria), Japan and itssatellites would be centers for industry, technology and finance.Meanwhile, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, China, India, Siberia andSoutheast Asia would furnish raw materials. The American position was propelled by the promise of raw materialsof the Far East and the overt desire to avoid antagonizing Japan (McIntyre1 3). There were also other considerations. American Objectives In the face of ever-increasing reliance on American economic andindustrial assistance, British needed to share military intelligenceinformation with the United States. Air power was nearly neglectedin the early planning of the base. Although the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) considered Singaporeto be the most vulnerable of all potential sites, both Chamberlain andChurchill held a common belief that prospects for war in the Far East wereremote, since Japan would never dare to test the powerful British navy(McIntyre 46). Churchill called for joint Anglo-American planning and possible cooperation in Asia (Watson 114). Thus the threat to Americaninterest in the Pacific was of secondary importance. Essentially, 6 percent of the Singaporedefenses consisted of poorly prepared foreign soldiers and volunteers. and had the foresight to gain time by maintainingpeace with Japan as long was possible, while continuing to assist Britain(Watson 117). The priority given to reinforcing the Middle East and Russia overSingapore, resulted in sparse food, water, and ammunition supplies. policyboiled down to a belief that, as important as the Island was in the FarEast, America was not prepared to support Singapore at the expense ofsecurity in the Atlantic and Mediterranean regions. However, American interest in Asia, while substantial, was notas deep as Britain's. The Fall was destined to be Britain's worst loss sincethe loss of the American colonies, since the island was an illusion thatBritain's Victorian era world dominance and supremacy at sea remainedintact. at PearlHarbor and the Japanese home bases (McIntyre 2). Of all of the cost and location debates, the controversyover Guns versus Air proved the most costly. As aCrown colony, Singapore's decidedly undemocratic government maintained amodest role in imperial defense (McIntyre 9). Having been attacked and thusirrevocably into military conflict, the U.S. Results were swift and decisive. Although America recognized the political, economic, and symbolicimportance of Singapore, it did not want to become embroiled in theunderwriting of Britain's Eastern defense system. At the same time,world recognition of the new Japanese world order for Asia would have tocome before oil supplies ran dry and the Navy's relative strength wasdiminished (McIntyre 189). Works CitedMcIntyre, William D. The bitterness ofWorld War I and the Great Depression had made the nation xenophobic. If the defense of Singapore was of utmost importance to Britishstrategy, American interests dictated a far different position. Without a base east of Malta, Britain founditself in the awkward position of matching the naval strength of its twomajor partners. Saving Asia from communism andwestern imperialism would be Japan's moral justification. Withthese quickly gone, General Percival of the British Command formallysurrendered on the 15th of February, 1941 (McIntyre 196). Rerouting ships assigned to protect the British Islesagainst the Germans was also deemed by Stark to be shortsighted (Watson393). With its field work failing miserably, thevarious defense lines that had been constructed around Johore could not benot held. In the years leading to the Britishcapitulation of the Singapore Naval Base in 1942, Singapore meant differentthings to different nations. The Art of War. America drew security in itsoverwhelming natural and material resources. For this reason, British focus shifted to Singapore and thedistant Pacific Ocean (McIntyre 19-21). Only in the 193 s did work begin anew when the threat of asimultaneous war with Japan, Italy and Germany loomed large on the horizon(McIntyre 132). The warrior-philosopher Sun Tzu's maxim that, "if you cannot bestrong, and yet cannot be weak, this will result in your defeat" (21) bestcharacterizes Singapore's rise and fall during World War II. The need for oil to support its grand schemes wasdesperate; Japan would have to take the oil-rich Netherlands East Indies.However, this objective could only come after Singapore was captured, sincean Anglo-American force almost certainly would be assembled there to strikeback. If this paper is not what you are looking for, you can search again: Search for: or Click here to request an essay written just for you.

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