IRELAND'S BLOODY SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1920.   Term Paper ID:21052 Click to get this paper

Essay Subject: Background, events, politics of assassination of British officers by Irish Republican Army, reprisal of Black & Tans & aftermath.... More...

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Paper Abstract: Background, events, politics of assassination of British officers by Irish Republican Army, reprisal of Black & Tans & aftermath. Paper Introduction: Bloody Sunday, November 21, 1920 This paper will discuss the events of November 21, 1920, in Dublin, Ireland, popularly known as "Bloody Sunday." The first part of the paper will describe what happened on that day: the assassination of British officers by the Irish Republican Army and the reprisal of the Black and Tans that afternoon. The second part of the paper will examine the political background to the events and the general political goals of the IRA in carrying out the attacks. The third part of the paper will discuss the strategic implications of the attack, including whether the attack accomplished both its tactical and strategic goals. On November 17, 1920, Dick McKee, a commandant of the Dublin Brigade of the Volunteers (or Irish Republican Army), and his second-in-command, Peadar Clancy, were ordered by Michael Collins to prepare an op Text of the Paper: The entire text of the paper is shown below. However, the text is somewhat scrambled. We want to give you as much information as we possibly can about our papers and essays, but we cannot give them away for free. In the text below you will find that while disordered, many of the phrases are essentially intact. From this text you will be able to get a solid sense of the writing style, the concepts addressed, and the sources used in the research paper. After 1914, the British lost theiredge in intelligence in Ireland as the IRA gained support amongst thepopulation. Indianapolis: Bobbs- Merrill Co., 1975.Townshend, Charles. In the afternoon, adetachment of Black and Tans (RIC recruits from Britain) went to the CrokePark Sports Ground, ostensibly to search for weapons among the crowdgathered for a football match. IRAintelligence discovered the existence of this group soon after its arrivalin the Summer of 192 and christened it the "Cairo Gang," since it hadallegedly been formed in Cairo. The British military began treating the situation as equivalentto war, proclaiming martial law in the southwest region and orderingpersonnel to be quartered in barracks.[17] Members of the police unitsbegan venting their frustrations through indiscriminate acts of violenceperpetrated on the population at large.[18] The civilian government wasforced into the realization that the struggle with the IRA was not going tobe simple and short-lived. After this failure,the remaining leaders changed their tactics and formulated a recipe formodern guerrilla warfare. McKee and Clancy, however, were captured by policethe night before the operation and Collins was unable to determine whetherthey had been forced to talk. In addition, therewas growing evidence that the success of the Cairo Gang was having adeleterious effect on popular support for the IRA. Several of the intended targets were not found; one's mistresswas beaten when the gunmen could not find him. When IRA units gathered for large attack, they werefrequently disguised as members of a crowd gathering for some sportingevent; 12 men travelled to Dublin for the Bloody Sunday attack under thecover of attending a hurling match.[9] The Bloody Sunday assassinations were not intended to be part of amajor political statement. ----------------------- [1]Ulick O'Connor, The Troubles: Ireland: 1912-1922 (Indianapolis:Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1975), 16 ; Calton Younger, Ireland's Civil War (NewYork: Taplinger Publishing Co., 1969), 114. At 38 Upper Mount Street,Lieutenants Aimes and Bennett of the Royal Army were pulled out of theirbeds, stood next to each other, and shot. Consequently, the power of the IRA grewbetween 1914 and 192 , by which time the IRA had already won the "heartsand minds" of the Irish people.[7] By 1919, the leaders of the underground movement felt confidentenough of their power to launch the war of independence and declare theestablishment of the Irish Republic. BibliographyBowden Tom. [11]O'Connor, 157-58. The failure of the 1916 uprising actually provided IRA leaderssuch as Michael Collins the opportunity to construct an impressiveintelligence network from scratch. Collins, however, remained in effectivecommand of the operations and the intelligence branch.[8] The IRA had originally been intended to be a national force under acentral command. "The Irish Republican Army and the Development of Guerrilla Warfare, 1916-1921." The English Historical Review 94 (April 1979): 318-45.Younger, Calton. Virtually all operations were planned and carried out by localunits. Collins put much effort into removingspies and informers from the network, executing them as they werediscovered. [8]Ibid., 67-69. Those who plannedand launched the rebellion thought that the Dublin uprising wouldprecipitate a larger-scale revolt in the countryside, causing an overthrowof British rule. New York: Coward-McCann, 196 .O'Connor, Ulick. Political Violence in Ireland: Government and Resistance since 1848. Theflames of Irish nationalism had never been extinguished during thecenturies of English occupation but they had begun to burn particularlybrightly in the last decades of the Nineteenth Century. The IrishRepublican Brotherhood (IRB) was formed in the 185 s; its sworn intentionwas to overthrow British rule in Ireland and establish an Irish Republic.The IRB differed from other rebel groups which had periodically emerged inIrish history in that it had a sounder foundation and more definitestructure. University: University of Alabama Press, 198 .Holt, Edgar. The British authorities lost their will to govern ina normal sense as the IRA directed attacks against the courts, the police,the magistracy, and local authorities. Mosse, 57-77. All segmentsof the British government were shocked enough to reassess the situation inIreland. These secret negotiations continued in spite of theattack and eventually led to the pull-out of British authority fromsouthern Ireland. The secret service operations in Irelandceased to be a threat to the IRA and Collins' intelligence network inDublin survived.[15] On the other hand, Collins' intelligence network wasnot restored to its former glory either. Three weeks later, the IRAstaged another large ambush at Kilmichael; that evening, enraged anddrunken police went on a rampage in the town of Cork, looting and burningthe business district.[4] Bloody Sunday was a part of the War of Independence in Ireland. [1 ]Bowden, 7 -71; O'Connor, 159. While the British public was incensed at thebrazenness and magnitude of the attack, many within Parliament and theCabinet began quietly urging stepped-up efforts to find a negotiatedsolution to the Irish problem. Its organization was originally modelled after that ofthe British Royal Army and training came from Royal Army manuals. He had his own spies and informers placed in virtually allmajor governmental institutions; many of the British officers assassinatedon Bloody Sunday were fingered by staff members of the hotels and boardinghouses where they were staying.[1 ] In an effort to remedy the situation, the British government formed aspecial intelligence unit to operate in Ireland. By 1919, the quality of local IRA units was dependent upon thequality of local leadership, as most units were self-trained and self-financed. Ireland's Civil War. This weakness was pointed out by the success ofthe Cairo Gang immediately after it began operating in Ireland. George L. Even before the attack, the Britishgovernment had been conducting secret negotiations with the IRA concerningpeace in the country. Collins and his men were soon engaged in aviolent struggle with the Cairo Gang, which began assassinating Sinn Fein(the political arm of the IRA) members in an effort to flush important IRAleaders to the surface. Protest in Arms: The Irish Troubles 1916-1923. Taking a chance, he issued orders early onthe morning of the 21st to carefully selected members of the Dublin Brigadeto carry out the planned operation.[1] At exactly 9: A.M., groups of IRA gunmen paid visits to hotel andboarding house rooms throughout Dublin. [4]Edgar Holt, Protest in Arms: The Irish Troubles 1916-1923 (NewYork: Coward-McCann, 196 ), 232. [9]Ibid., 69-73; Townshend, 321-22. Weapons were, for the most part, furnished by raids on police andmilitary posts. The authorities said that they had beenkilled while trying to escape; friends who claimed the bodies asserted thatboth had been badly beaten and shot at close range. As a result, local unitsdid not put enough time and effort into the daily grind of collecting andprocessing information. This secret service unit had been carrying on its ownassassination campaign against the IRA for nearly four months and the IRAunit under the command of Michael Collins was being severely damaged. TheBloody Sunday attack crippled the secret service unit and ended the erosionof IRA intelligence in Dublin. They were a reaction to a clandestine Britishoffensive aimed at crippling the IRA. Mosse (London: SAGEPublications, 1975), 66-67. [6]Charles Townshend, "The Irish Republican Army and the Developmentof Guerrilla Warfare, 1916-1921," The English Historical Review 94 (April1979): 32 -21. There wasno such thing as a centralized training program for the IRA intelligenceagents; the quality of each individual network was dependent upon theabilities of a few self-taught individuals in each locality. twelve suspected British officers and twoAuxiliaries of the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) lay dead.[2] News of the killings spread quickly throughout Dublin and thegovernment forces were quick to take their revenge. The Birth of the Irish Free State 1921-1923. The new strategy emphasized terror, relying uponambushes and raids to wear down the British authorities and cause them togive up on Ireland. Some were shot as they answered their doors, others refused toanswer and were shot in bed. [19]O'Connor, 165; Younger, 115-22. London: SAGE Publications, 1975.Curran, Joseph M. The attack was to be carried out on Sundaymorning, November 21. Sensing that some of his men were growingnervous with the killing, the leader of the gunmen led the last fourBritish officers down to the cellar, asked them their names, and shot themin the sides of their heads. Despite the reputation of the IRAintelligence networks, they were not professional organizations. New York: Taplinger Publishing Co., 1969. Needless to say, this did not happen and most of theleaders of the rebellion were captured and executed. AlthoughCollins came up with a much longer list of suspected British secret serviceagents, the leadership of the IRA would not approve the killing of allnames on the list because Collins could not provide enough evidence thatall were actually agents.[16] The Bloody Sunday operation had an effect on the British which wasmuch farther reaching than had been anticipated by the IRA. Fourteen gunmen were sentto 28 Pembroke Street to take care of the large number of officers stayingthere. As with allIRA operations, intelligence was the responsibility of local units whoreally answered to no higher central authority. The IRB eventually formed the core of the IRA and carried outmost of the actions; most of the leaders of the IRA, such as MichaelCollins, were members of the IRB.[5] The first attempt of the IRA, or Volunteers, to overthrow Britishrule in Ireland occurred in the Spring of 1916 and ended in disaster. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983.--------. In the meantime, the British government in Ireland wasparalyzed as both sides carried out terror attacks.[19] In conclusion, the Dublin Brigade of the IRA carried out theassassinations of 12 British officers in Dublin on the morning of November21 in order to cripple the secret service unit to which the officersreportedly belonged. George L. The third part of the paper will discussthe strategic implications of the attack, including whether the attackaccomplished both its tactical and strategic goals. Dick McKee and PeadarClancy were dead by nightfall. The members of this unitwere given permission to use whatever methods they deemed necessary togather information on the leaders of the IRA and neutralize them. Thisquickly became impractical, however, and control passed to localleadership. [17]Townshend, Political Violence in Ireland, 354. This new campaign of violence began in the earlymonths of 1919.[6] After 1914, the British-controlled government in Ireland was solelyconcerned with maintaining some semblance of order, rather than defeatingthe Irish rebellion. As these entities abandoned theirgoverning responsibilities, elements of the underground took them up.Throughout Ireland, the Dail Eireann (underground legislature) assumed manycivic responsibilities and the IRA found itself responsible for "policing"the country and maintaining order. He then told the rest of the gunmen todisperse. [12]Bowden, 58. At some point, however, one member of thedetachment began firing a machine gun into the crowd and others joined in.When the shooting stopped, twelve civilians lay dead and seventy werewounded; unlike the morning's killings, those at Croke Park received littleattention in England.[3] Just as the violence did not start with BloodySunday, it did not end either with it either. [18]Joseph M Curran, The Birth of the Irish Free State 1921-1923(University: University of Alabama Press, 198 ), 37. [5]Tom Bowden, "The Irish Underground and the War of Independence 1919-21," in Police Forces in History, ed. [7]Bowden, 6 -66. [16]Townshend, Political Violence in Ireland: Government andResistance since 1848 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 338; Younger, 113-14. [15]Bowden, 58. The second part of the paper will examine thepolitical background to the events and the general political goals of theIRA in carrying out the attacks. Admitted by a maid, they proceeded to the rooms and began theirbusiness. Collins was probably the most powerfulmember of the IRA at that time and had established a very effectiveintelligence network in Dublin. [13]Holt, 227. The Troubles: Ireland: 1912-1922. The attack also shocked the Britishauthorities in Ireland and Britain to such an extent that many within thegovernments realized that a war against the IRA would be a long and bloodyone and that the best solution might be British withdrawal from Ireland.Consequently, the attack did not damage the secret negotiations between theBritish government and the IRA and these negotiations eventually led toBritish withdrawal from southern Ireland. [3]Ibid., 164. Bloody Sunday, November 21, 192 This paper will discuss the events of November 21, 192 , in Dublin,Ireland, popularly known as "Bloody Sunday." The first part of the paperwill describe what happened on that day: the assassination of Britishofficers by the Irish Republican Army and the reprisal of the Black andTans that afternoon. Within a few months of their arrival, the CairoGang had collected enough information to place Collins' operation injeopardy.[11] As the Cairo Gang moved closer to permanently damaging the IRAintelligence network in Dublin, Collins decided that the British unit wouldhave to be eliminated before his network was crippled. Secret service agents became more careful of where and how theylived, since those who were killed had been careless of protecting theiridentities.[14] The most immediate effect of the killings was to permanently set backBritish intelligence efforts. On November 17, 192 , Dick McKee, a commandant of the Dublin Brigadeof the Volunteers (or Irish Republican Army), and his second-in-command,Peadar Clancy, were ordered by Michael Collins to prepare an operationwhich would eliminate a group of British Army officers who were said to bepart of a secret service unit carrying out an effective counterinsurgencycampaign against the IRA in Dublin. [2]O'Connor, 161-63. Collins came to dominate the SupremeCouncil of the IRB, although control of the IRA eventually passed to theGeneral Headquarters (GHQ) Staff. Armed men broke open the door and shot himdead in front of his wife, who was still in bed. "The Irish Underground and the War of Independence 1919-21." In Police Forces in History, ed. Severely damaged during the 1916uprising, the underground was reconstructed by Michael Collins, through hiscontacts in the IRB, and Cathal Brugha, though the larger body ofvolunteers, between 1916 and 1919. The killings by bothsides were causing many to wish for an end to the violence, regardless ofwho ended up governing Ireland. These records did not indicate how many of these men weremembers of the clandestine secret service group known as the Cairo Gang.That most probably were secret agents was confirmed by General FrankCrozier (commander of the RIC Auxiliaries) when he said that "Collins hasdone in most of the secret service people."[13] The killings shocked the British people, who were told that the deadwere Army officers carrying out normal service duties; few were aware untilyears later that some of these duties included political assassinations.Early in 1921, all British military personnel in Ireland were finallyrequired to live in barracks, where they could be better protected againstambush. TheEaster Rebellion, as it became known, consisted of the seizure of a fewlarge buildings in Dublin and an attempt to defend them. At 92 Baggott Street, CaptainNewbury heard a commotion, got out of bed to lock the door to his room, andbegan climbing out the window. Consequently, the operation was designedto eliminate the threat to Collins' organization and to warn the Irish thatthere could only be peace in Ireland after the IRA drove the Britishout.[12] Of the fourteen men killed by the IRA on the morning of November 21,official British records indicated that seven were active army officers,three were ex-officers, two were members of the RIC, and two werecivilians. [14]Ibid., 229; Younger, 114. When the operation wascompleted by 9:3 A.M. If this paper is not what you are looking for, you can search again: Search for: or Click here to request an essay written just for you.

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