TURKISH NEUTRALITY IN WWII.   Term Paper ID:21029 Click to get this paper

Essay Subject: Geopolitical background, leadership, foreign relations, weak military, authoritarianism, treaties with Allies & Germany, opportunism, trade.... More...

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Paper Abstract: Geopolitical background, leadership, foreign relations, weak military, authoritarianism, treaties with Allies & Germany, opportunism, trade. Paper Introduction: Turkey and Neutrality during the Second World War This paper will discuss Turkey during the Second World War, focusing upon how Turkish leaders kept their country neutral. The first part of the paper will present a background of Turkey's geopolitical position in the middle of the Twentieth Century; the second part of the paper will examine the role played by Turkey in the Second World War. Centrally located in the Near East and controlling the only waterway connecting the Black Sea with the Mediterranean Sea, Turkey was both an asset and an obstacle in the Allied and Axis strategic plans. At the beginning of the war the Turkish government maintained diplomatic relations with both sides, asserting its position as being strictly neutral. Both sides wanted control of the Straits and a presence in the Balkans. The British Text of the Paper: The entire text of the paper is shown below. However, the text is somewhat scrambled. We want to give you as much information as we possibly can about our papers and essays, but we cannot give them away for free. In the text below you will find that while disordered, many of the phrases are essentially intact. From this text you will be able to get a solid sense of the writing style, the concepts addressed, and the sources used in the research paper. An overwhelming Allied victory would leave a vacuumin Europe and result in Soviet hegemony over eastern Europe and theBalkans. Even though Turkey was located on the southernflank of the Soviet Union, the German leaders were never willing toforcibly occupy the country. Turkey and the World. Fifth, as a small independent power, Turkey had to let othernations know that it was prepared to fight for the defense of its rightsand territory, but that it would fight only in defense of these things.Finally, practical politics involved hard bargaining in the case of a smallpower; such bargaining was considered one of the highest forms ofpatriotism in Turkey.[2] Pragmatic politics and the playing of one power off another weretraditional tenets of Turkish foreign policy. The Americans wanted to launch aninvasion into France as early as possible and figured that a Balkanoperation would draw vast quantities of equipment and supplies from such aninvasion. Turkishnegotiators wanted assurances that Germany would not violate theterritorial integrity of Turkey; German negotiators at the very leastwanted Turkey to remain strictly neutral. By January of 1945, Turkeywas openly allowing supplies to be shipped to the Soviet Union through theStraits. [6]Deringil, 13-24; Edward Weisband, Turkish Foreign Policy 1943-1945:Small State Diplomacy and Great Power Politics (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1973), 95-1 . Inonu again repeated the demand that the Turkish armybe equipped "beyond the possibility of disaster." After meeting withTurkish military leaders, British military leaders agreed that the TurkishArmy was completely unprepared for and incapable of offensive warfare.Annoyed with the Turkish obduracy concerning participation in the war, theAllies cut off Lend-Lease supplies to Turkey in March of 1944, citing thefailure of the Turks to comply with the Anglo-Turkish treaty of 1939.Churchill finally gave up on the possibility of a Balkans operation afterbeing stymied by American and Turkish reluctance.[24] These pressures were finally enough to convince President Inonu thatrelations between Turkey and the Allies had to be patched up. The first part of thepaper will present a background of Turkey's geopolitical position in themiddle of the Twentieth Century; the second part of the paper will examinethe role played by Turkey in the Second World War. Undeveloped andeconomically weak in spite of the promises of the revolution, Turkey neverattained economic self-sufficiency and needed substantial foreignassistance; this came primarily from Germany. Macfie, "The Turkish Straits in the Second World War, 1939-45," Middle Eastern Studies 25 (April 1989): 238. Although large and well motivated, the Turkish Armywas not ready for mechanized warfare in 1939. New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., 1989.Vali, Ferenc A. Washington D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1959.Lewis, Geoffrey. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963.Rubin, Barry. Hethought that Turkey could provide a staging platform for an Anglo-Americaninvasion of the Balkans, which would threaten Germany's southern flank inthe east. Consequently, the Turkish leadership began seeking a way toinduce a negotiated peace between the Axis and the Allies.[19] Britain, on the other hand, wanted Turkey to enter the war on theside of the Allies as soon as possible. Centrally located in the Near East and controlling the only waterwayconnecting the Black Sea with the Mediterranean Sea, Turkey was both anasset and an obstacle in the Allied and Axis strategic plans.[1] At thebeginning of the war the Turkish government maintained diplomatic relationswith both sides, asserting its position as being strictly neutral. First, Turkey's exceptionalgeopolitical location afforded it an influential voice in world politicsand attracted strong friends. Turkey quickly declared its neutrality in the conflict,silently cheering the German attack on Turkey's most troublesome neighbor.German pressure on Turkey increased, as the German leadership wished forthe closure of the Straits to all Allied shipping. [12]Macfie, 24 . Turkey. The Sovietsneeded access to the Mediterranean through the Straits in order to keep asteady flow of supplies from the West, while the Germans, needed a securesouthern flank in the east. As Europe moved towards asecond war, the Turkish government saw no reason to get involved in aconflict which could not benefit Turkey.[4] In the Twentieth Century, Turkey's closest relationship was with theSoviet Union, although close did not necessarily mean friendly.Geographically, the Soviet Union was the nearest great power and it wasnecessary for Turkish government to devote most of its attention to therelationship with the Soviets. The Germans solved their problems withthe Soviet Union, for a time, by signing a non-aggression pact with theSoviets in August of 1939, ensuring that the Soviets would not link up withBritain and France in the Black Sea. [7]Deringil, 31-39. A small German contingent was sentto North Africa in order to prevent the loss of Libya to the British, whilea larger contingent was sent to the Balkans to complete a botched Italianinvasion of Greece. Neither the American nor the Soviet leaders, however, wereenthusiastic about this proposal. [14]Macfie, 24 -41. [21]Kilic, 1 -1 2. [16]Kilic, 89; Ferenc A. All interests in foreignadventures were given up and a cautious foreign policy was developed. Although the Turkish leaders said thatthey feared Soviet action, they really feared hostilities with Germany.The Italian entry into the war and the French collapse upset the balance ofpower in the Mediterranean and presented the Turkish government with theunwelcome prospect of overwhelming Axis power in the region. Most important was the fact thatTurkish neutrality maintained the status quo in the Near and Middle East.British power there remained intact and a neutral Turkey effectively ruledout an Italian attack on the British position in Palestine, Egypt, and Iraqby way of the Dodecanese Islands.[14] German leaders paid little attentionto these drawbacks, however, even when Italy became embroiled in problemsboth in North Africa and the Balkans. Bothsides wanted control of the Straits and a presence in the Balkans. Yet, through skillful, and sometimesdeceitful, diplomacy, the Ottomans were generally able to keep their empireintact.[3] When they did ally themselves with one side in a European war,the First World War, they lost their empire. In turn, the Soviets began demandingthat Turkey sign a bilateral protocol prohibiting the warships of non-BlackSea powers from passing through the Straits and effectively giving theSoviet Union control over Turkish decisions concerning the Straits. Similarly, the Turkish leaders realized that they had to secure aposition in the postwar world for Turkey without presently antagonizingGermany, which maintained forces well within striking distance ofTurkey.[18] Although the Turkish leaders wanted to slowly cement their ties withthe Allies, they could not look past the fact that a basically antagonisticrelationship had developed between Turkey and the Soviet Union. Unarmed Turkish merchant ships weresunk in the Black Sea by Soviet submarines and mines. [8]Deringil, 41-51; Weisband, 46-5 . In return,Germany bought 75% of Turkey's new wool, 7 % of its new cotton, and 7 % ofits chrome. Istanbul Intrigues. Its leaders wereable to maintain a strictly neutral stance until the last months of thewar, protecting their country from the destruction which was visited uponmost of the rest of Europe. Although the Montreux Convention, signed in1936, required that the Straits be kept open to ships of all nations whenTurkey was not a belligerent in a war, Germany wanted the Straits wereclosed to all western shipping. These factors made it very difficult for Turkey to diversify itstrade.[6] Further dictating the need for neutrality was the basic weakness ofthe Turkish military. In the 193 s, he began moving moretowards a friendship with Great Britain and France in order to balance theincreasing naval power of fascist Italy and build a Turkish bridge betweeneastern and western Europe. [18]Deringil, 96; Weisband, 119. The Adana talks clarifiedTurkish positions but did not result in any concrete decisions.[21] Although the Adana talks did not convince the Turkish leadership toenter the war, Allied-Turkish collaboration increased substantiallythroughout 1943. The intelligence services of both the United States andBritain operated in Turkey with the tacit approval of the Turkishgovernment.[22] While the Royal Air Force was not allowed to operate fromTurkish bases, the Turkish military gave some assistance to a failedoperation against the Dodecanese Islands.[23] Tensions between the Allies and Turkey came to a head in late 1943and early 1944. In addition, German occupation ofeven parts of Turkey would provide an excuse for the Soviets to "liberate"Turkey and destroy Turkish independence after the war. Throughout 1941 and thefirst half of 1942, it appeared that the Axis powers would actually win thewar and that it would be unwise for Turkey to be receptive to Alliedovertures. The Turkish government said that war had been declared so thatTurkey could play a constructive part in the postwar peace. Bridge Across the Bosporus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey. On August 2, 1944, Turkey formally broke offdiplomatic and economic relations with Germany. Praeger, 1965.Macfie, A. As the tide of battle turned against the Axisin 1942, the Allies became increasingly insistent that Turkey declare waron Germany but the Turkish government knew that the Allies could notprevent a German strike into Turkey. On June 15,Foreign Minister Menemencioglu resigned under pressure, eliminating whatmany in the Allied camp perceived to be the main pro-Axis force in theTurkish government. Thisforeign policy was based upon six premises. The Turkish Navy was virtually nonexistent.[7] Thisweakness was used as a bargaining chip by the Turkish government, demandingequipment and training for its army in return for a declaration of war. The collapse of Italy removed a major source of worry forthe Turks and they allowed the Allies to use some Turkish bases for minoroperations. [11]Weisband, 65. Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War: An Active Neutrality. Second, this exceptional position alsoworked as a disadvantage because it led to confrontations with major powersand attracted the unwanted attentions of potential "protectors." Third, asa small country at a crossroads, Turkey had to maintain freedom ofmovement, avoiding power blocks and diluting power among as many differentnations as possible. "The Turkish Straits in the Second World War, 1939-45." Middle Eastern Studies 25 (April 1989): 238-48.Robinson, Richard D. After the First World War, Ataturkenvisioned Turkey as a bridge between the western democracies and thecommunist Soviet Union. Despite thisvulnerability, Turkish leaders never yielded to pressure from either sideand made each side pay a substantial price for Turkey's continuingresistance to the demands of the other.[26] In conclusion, Turkey took advantage of its strategic position in theSecond World War in order to offset its vulnerabilities. The Turkish government was authoritarian in nature, with powerresting in the person of the president. On the whole, theTurkish Army at best was prepared to fight the First World War, and itsleaders knew this. The treaty did not destroy the existing treaty betweenTurkey and Britain and British leaders in London made no move to punishTurkey.[16] The real German intention behind the treaty was the security of thesouthern flank of the Soviet Union. [26]Deringil, 184-86. Certain incidents in 1942 further soured the Turkish leaders onthe Allies, particularly the Soviets. This worrywas partially alleviated, however, when the British destroyed much of theFrench Mediterranean fleet in the Summer of 194 ; this action helped keepTurkey from joining the Axis.[13] While Turkey may have discovered some very convincing reasons forremaining neutral by the Summer of 194 , Germany was beginning to find somenegative aspects of Turkish neutrality. At the same time, Turkish soldiers never received the trainingnecessary to operate modern equipment in modern warfare. In 1939, Germany supplied78% of Turkish wool yarns and tissues, 69.7% of the iron and steel, 61% ofthe machinery and apparatus, and 55.4% of the chemicals. The First Turkish Republic: A Case Study in National Development. The final version of the treaty which was signed onJune 18, 1941, simply committed the two countries to respecting eachother's territorial sovereignty and promising not to take military actionagainst each other. InDecember, President Inonu went to the Cairo Conference to talk with all ofthe Allied leaders. Turkey and Neutrality during the Second World War This paper will discuss Turkey during the Second World War, focusingupon how Turkish leaders kept their country neutral. Turkish Foreign Policy 1943-1945: Small State Diplomacy and Great Power Politics. On the other hand, Ataturk did not trust theSoviets, just as the Ottomans did not trust the Russians; he simply saw theneed for balancing the power in Europe in order to preserve Turkey'sindependence and territorial integrity. All three parties concluded declarations ofnon-aggression by June of 1939, forcing Germany to consider seizing theDardanelles in the event of war.[9] Unhappy with these declarations, the Germans briefly threatened tostop exporting supplies to Turkey. ----------------------- [1]Richard D. In reward forthe war declaration, Turkey was invited to participate in the San Franciscoconference for the organization of the U.N.[25] Turkey has long been criticized for playing an opportunistic role inthe Second World War, entering the war after it had already been won andpartaking in the victory spoils. In November 1943, Foreign Minister Menemencioglu declaredto British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden that Turkey had decided inprinciple to enter the war on the side of the Allies but that Turkey mustfirst receive adequate provisions for a defense against a German attack andthat a scheme for cooperation in the Balkans must be arranged. [19]Deringil, 137-4 ; Macfie, 243. [2 ]Macfie, 244. L. [9]A. [1 ]Altemur Kilic, Turkey and the World (Washington D.C.: PublicAffairs Press, 1959), 77-79. At this conference, both Stalin and Rooseveltexpressed the opinion that Turkish entry into the war would be unwelcome ifTurkish demands for supplies and equipment were so steep as to preempt theinvasion of France. After Ataturk died in 1938, IsmetInonu took power as president. [5]Deringil, 71-73; Robinson, 17 ; Geoffrey Lewis, Turkey, 3d ed. Almost all Turkish exports were agricultural raw materialswhich Great Britain and France could get more cheaply from their coloniesand other long-standing partners (such as Egypt and the United States);consequently, one-half of all Turkish exports went to Germany in 1939. Four days after the treaty was signed,Germany invaded the Soviet Union, beginning the largest military campaignin human history. Prime Minister Winston Churchillsaw an Allied Turkey as a way of shortening the war with Germany. Robinson, The First Turkish Republic: A Case Study inNational Development (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), 164-65 [2]Selim Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War:An Active Neutrality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 3-4. A plot to killGerman Ambassador von Papen in Ankara backfired when the assassin wasaccidentally blown up by his own bomb in February; a subsequentinvestigation revealed that the plot had been hatched by the Soviets in aneffort to create an incident between Turkey and Germany.[17] Even as Turkish-German trade grew in scope, however, military eventsbegan indicating the possibility, then probability, of a German defeat. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973. [17]Kilic, 95; Barry Rubin, Istanbul Intrigues (New York: McGraw-HillPublishing Co., 1989), 1-16. Fourth, because Turkey was a small nation and powerhas always been the overriding consideration in the international system,practical politics was more important than idealism, promises, andsentiment. Inonu took a specialinterest in foreign policy and had the ultimate power over its direction.He was influenced greatly, however, by Foreign Minister NumanMenemencioglu, who was often described as the moving force behind theTurkish foreign policy. This latter action again should have triggered theprovisions of the treaty between Britain and Turkey, but the Turkishgovernment again cited the possibility of war with the Soviet Union. BibliographyDeringil, Selim. Atthe beginning of 1943, the British and now American leaders suddenly foundthemselves confronting issues concerning the end of the war and the postwarperiod. The twocountries were deeply suspicious of each other and the Turkish leadersrightly feared that Soviet leader Joseph Stalin had designs on Turkey.Turkish leaders had long feared the domination of the Balkans by a singlepower or power bloc; such domination would threaten the independence andsovereignty of Turkey. Inonuexpressed Turkish fears concerning a German attack and said that Turkeycould not enter the war until its military was completely prepared to meetany German aggression. Equipment was not up to thestandards of any of the major powers because all the arms-producingcountries had paid the most attention to arming their own military forces;thus, Turkey never received any large quantities of modern equipment fromGermany. When Italy invaded Albania in 1939, Turkish leaders felt threatenedenough to open negotiations with Great Britain and France in order tosecure some sort of treaty. Vali, Bridge Across the Bosporus: The ForeignPolicy of Turkey (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), 31. 3d ed. Inany case, by June of 1941 Turkey was virtually isolated by the Axis and theSoviet Union; the only Allied-controlled territory bordering Turkey wasIraq to the southeast.[15] Realizing Turkey's predicament, Turkish leaders began negotiating anon-aggression treaty with Germany in the Spring of 1941. Consequently,Turkey avoided entering the war until February of 1945, two months prior tothe German surrender. WhenGermany reneged on the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact and invaded theSoviet Union in June of 1941, Turkey became very important. The Ottoman Empireconstantly found itself in conflict with the Catholic/Protestant west andthe Orthodox Russian empire, both of whom directed diplomatic and militaryattacks against the Muslim Ottomans. New York: Frederick A. [23]Kilic, 1 3. [15]Deringil, 1 9-117. The German advance in the Soviet Union wasstopped at Stalingrad in the Autumn of 1942; less than six months later, anentire German army was surrounded in the city and forced to surrender. Turkey's problem with this was that Italy was beginningto make aggressive moves in the Mediterranean and Africa during the late193 s. The Soviets also wanted an invasion of Europe but knew that aBalkan invasion would establish a western Allied influence in easternEurope; Stalin's aim was to establish a Soviet postwar empire in theregion.[2 ] In January of 1943, President Inonu and Prime Minister Churchill metin Adana to discuss the possible entry of Turkey into the war. Turkey, therefore, needed considerable amounts ofmilitary equipment and supplies before it could consider entering the war.Inonu also stated that Turkey's only considerations in entering the warcould be its own self-interests; Turkish leaders would not sacrificeTurkish lives for the sake of Allied war aims. Finally, on February 23, 1945, Turkey declared war on Germany andJapan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.Kilic, Altemur. One of the more adventuresomegoals of the Germans was to obtain Turkey's permission to secretly funnelarms through Turkey to Arab rebels in Iraq, but the Turkish leaders wouldnot agree to this. [4]Deringil, 5. After the establishment of the Republic by Ataturk in 1922, theoverriding concern of the Turkish government became the survival andcontinuity of a sovereign and independent Turkey. [13]Deringil, 1 2-1 9. InAugust of 1942 the advance of Axis forces in North Africa was stopped byBritish forces in Egypt; by the end of the year, all of the Germans andItalians in North Africa were holed up in Tunisia, trying to preserve anescape route back to Europe. Inonu delegated considerable decision-making powerto Menemencioglu and most of the diplomatic maneuvering during the earlyyears of the war was devised by him.[8] Fascist Germany and the communist Soviet Union were natural enemiesand each feared the other. TheBritish and French wanted to exclude the Axis from the oil fields of theMiddle East, while the Axis wanted to funnel supplies to Arab rebels. Turkey and Germany had a specialrelationship because they had been allies during the First World War andTurkey was still economically dependent upon Germany. This criticism tends to neglect theparticularly vulnerable position occupied by Turkey. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971.Weisband, Edward. Inaddition, Germany was willing to pay inflated prices for the Turkishexports. [24]Kilic, 1 4-1 8; Weisband, 167-215. As with Ataturk, Inonu was the absoluteruler of an assembly which had absolute power. The Nazi leaders wanted this supply routeto the Soviet Union shut off and the Soviet Black Sea fleet cut off fromthe Mediterranean. TheTurkish government rejected these demands and continued to pursue talkswith Britain and France for a more permanent treaty.[1 ] In spite of pressures from Germany and the Soviet Union, Turkeyconcluded such a treaty with Britain and France in October of 1939, onemonth after Germany invaded Poland. (NewYork: Praeger, 1965), 116. [22]Rubin, 163-2 1. L. At that point,there seemed to be little chance of the Allies (namely Britain) defeatingGermany in the war; there seemed every chance, however, of Germanyoverrunning Turkey if hostilities erupted between the two countries.Consequently, Turkey refused to enter the war in June when Italy declaredwar on Britain and France, citing the provision in the Anglo-French-Turkishtreaty excusing Turkey from taking any action which could lead tohostilities with the Soviet Union. The hostility of the west towards the Soviets,however, turned out to be too great and so Ataturk was forced to cool thefriendship with the Soviets in order the address the greater problem ofItaly.[5] Although Ataturk and his successor, President Ismet Inonu, feared thegrowing power and aggressiveness of Italy, they could not outright opposeItaly since it was allied with Germany. [25]Kilic, 1 8-1 9; Weisband, 23 -294. [3]Robinson, 168-69. This treaty stated that Turkey wouldcome to the assistance of Britain and France in the event that aggressionby another power led to war in the Mediterranean in which both Britain andFrance were involved or if they became involved in hostilities in defenseof Greece or Romania; Britain and France would come to the aid of Turkey ifit were attacked. One provision, however, stated that nothing in thetreaty could oblige Turkey to take action if this action would lead to warwith the Soviet Union.[11] Although this pact seemed to place Turkey inthe Allied camp, both Germany and the Soviet Union maintained pressure onTurkey to remain strictly neutral; Germany also restrained Italy fromtaking actions which would antagonize Turkey.[12] The Turkish government was given a tremendous incentive to remainneutral in June of 194 when Germany conquered France. The Turkish leaders were also able avoid adirect confrontation with the Soviet Union and prevented the Allies fromturning Turkey into part of a Balkan battleground. If this paper is not what you are looking for, you can search again: Search for: or Click here to request an essay written just for you.

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