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Essay Subject: Uncertainties & obstacles in context of turbulent Soviet politics under Mikhail Gorbachev. Strategic balance, mistrust, negotiations, MX missle, Ronald Reagan policies.... More...

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Paper Abstract: Uncertainties & obstacles in context of turbulent Soviet politics under Mikhail Gorbachev. Strategic balance, mistrust, negotiations, MX missle, Ronald Reagan policies. Paper Introduction: If I were to become Soviet president, I would not allow President Bush to talk to me the way he talks to the current Soviet president. Believe me, Bush would have to take me into consideration because I would put strategic forces on alert just to accomplish this aim (Shogren, 1991, p. H-6, c. 1).  Col. Nikolai S. Petrushenko Soviet Parliament Member A year ago, at the height of the period of Soviet liberalization under Mikhail Gorbachev, the problem of arms control  indeed, the entire question of American and Soviet strategic forces and the strategic balance of the superpowers  seemed to be a hasbeen issue. The new democratizing Soviet Union, or postSoviet confederation, would be America's partner Text of the Paper: The entire text of the paper is shown below. However, the text is somewhat scrambled. We want to give you as much information as we possibly can about our papers and essays, but we cannot give them away for free. In the text below you will find that while disordered, many of the phrases are essentially intact. From this text you will be able to get a solid sense of the writing style, the concepts addressed, and the sources used in the research paper. Moreover, if this shouldhappen, the strategic nuclear balance between the Soviets and the Westwould again become decisive, not only in the event of an actual militaryconfrontation, but in the (vastly more likely) context of politicalstruggle between the superpowers. 37-52. Therefore, the Soviets seek not "parity," in strategic power, butsuperiority (Douglass, 1988, p. The effect ofReagan's overheated defense of SDI was therefore, in practical terms, tohand SDI opponents a convenient straw man, and to set a potentiallysupportive public up for disappointment. "Armageddon," properly a term infundamentalist Christian eschatology, has become a word that the mostsecular anti-nuclear-arms activist throws about freely (Adelman, 1989, p.162ff). Thus, many American support the arms-control process while knowinglittle (and, in fact, having little interest) in the actual specifics undernegotiation. In the new atmosphere, it wasimplied, the strategic-arms issue would take care of itself. with their strategic forces,albeit at the cost of an even more thorough devastation from a U.S.response. Justas the U.S. Onlya working strategic defense system -- not a near-term prospect -- couldprotect against strategic nuclear weapons under no one's effective control. But the U.S. of Gorbachev's weakness tosmash a longtime Soviet ally and establish a U.S. If forsome reason our good relations were dramatically changed -- if, say, theneofascist and stridently anti-American Le Pen movement became dominant inFrance -- then French forces would become a possible strategic threat, notbecause of lack of "dialogue" or arms-control treaties, but because of thehypothesized broader political context of hostility and potentialconfrontation. In consequence, and predictably so, the buildup lost steam in a fewyears, and by the latter part of the Reagan era, real defense spending wasin retreat. Every so often, a concern about weak defensessweeps through American public opinion. Burt, Richard. 81-82). Every president finds himself under strong pressure to show that heis "doing something" about the arms race. In the 195 s and 196 s, overheated rhetoric by Phyllis Schafley andothers about an imminent Soviet "strike from space" painted a grosslyexaggerated picture of Soviet maniacs who were ready to launch a nuclearwar at the drop of a hat. This missile wasconceived as a more accurate follow-on to the Minuteman, one which wouldgive the U.S. Peopleare so used to waiting for everything from the government that independentpeople do not exist (Shogren, 1991, p. Absolute parity, after all, is notattainable in the real world, especially between powers with very differentdoctrines and weapons. In fact, the Soviets -- with much moreexperience of national devastation than we have ever had -- have no wish tosee Mother Russia blasted in a nuclear war. 31ff). Apart from arms control negotiations per se, the ReaganAdministration followed other well-established and corrosive patterns inAmerican defense preparedness. But conservative presidents arealso driven towards arms treaties, for somewhat more subtle reasons. However, the U.S. Holloway, David. Few on either sides of Americandomestic arms debates have made much effort to educate the American publicabout the complex realities of strategic forces and strategic deterrence. Moreover, theReagan Administration was profoundly naive in its approach to the Pentagon. buildup in the PersianGulf in the late 197 s, rejecting the notion that it might really have beenmotivated by the Iranian hostage crisis (p. 111ff). But they understand, asAmericans from both political extremes often do not, the politicaldimension of strategic nuclear forces ("... Scheer, Robert. 5). 13ff) Arms races tend togenerate their own vicious-circle momentum, in which each side builds upfor fear of the other's buildups, at the same time driving up mutual fearsand anxieties. New York: Dodd, Mead and Co. But the numerical limitation meant that, in order to carry therequired number of warheads, each missile would have to carry manywarheads, and therefore be very large. Indeed, the combination of overheated conservative rhetoric and thepublic's implicit faith in the "arms control process" has served to damnSDI -- seemingly one of the most benign of strategic weapons systems -- inthe eyes of much of the public. Los Angeles Times, pp. America's national security: Theview from the Kremlin. One may well imagine howSoviet conservatives must view the present-day U.S. Arms-control treaties won't matter, because theywon't then be needed. -- Col. Nancy Reagan was much concerned with her husband's"place in history" -- and it had been established by the American politicalclass that a principal way for a president to do so was to sign a majorarms-control treaty. There are, broadly, two ways to gain suchsuperiority: to build oneself up, and to weaken the potential enemy. In this new and sobering atmosphere, we must ask whether the "armscontrol process," which has gone on now for a generation, plays aconstructive and stabilizing role in shaping superpower relations, orwhether it is, instead, a destabilizing factor that tends to erode U.S.national security and increase at once the hazards of politicalconfrontations and the ultimate risk of nuclear war. The momentumtowards Soviet strategic superiority, which began in the 196 s, continuedthrough the Reagan years with only a brief interruption during the peakyears of the buildup (Burt, 198 , p. has, through the legal mechanism of the Constitution, achievednearly unbroken internal peace and tranquillity, so can humanity as awhole, through appropriate legal mechanisms (the League of Nations, theUnited Nations, arms-control treaties), establish the basis for a world atpeace. Wilson Quarterly, 7, pp. strategic requirements. Later czars such asCatherine the Great and Alexander II, and (in a somewhat different way)V.I. Mostly they came within the treaties' definitions of what wasto be limited. EvenRonald Reagan, who came into office predisposed to distrust the Soviets andthe "arms control process," was ultimately driven to join into it, forseveral reasons. The upshot was that, between the ABM treaty, theSALT treaty, and domestic U.S. Justifications for cheating can be found in Marxist-Leninistideology, but they are not rooted in this ideology. negotiators intended to accomplish through thetreaties. (1983). politics, the MX was rendered costly,controversial, and quite ineffective in its intended role. More likely, though, is a return to a generally repressive (thoughnot necessarily Stalinist, or even Communist) Soviet or Russian imperialstate. Another factor in making arms control a goal in and of itself, apartfrom any practical gains to be derived from it, is the interaction of U.S.domestic politics with a deep psychological anxiety, felt throughout theWest, regarding nuclear weapons. has lacked a"sustained momentum" in its defense programs (Burt, 198 , p. (1984). If I were to become Soviet president, I would not allow President Bush to talk to me the way he talks to the current Soviet president. 1). Wallop, Malcolm; and Codevilla, Angelo. Since that time, and particularly in the past few months, a newsobriety has taken hold. If relations are poor, arms control treaties alone cannot improvethem, and over-eagerness to reach such treaties can lead to needless andrisky one-sided concessions. (1989). Of course, the Soviets' gains were wholly outside thespirit of what U.S. 9). Shogren, Elizabeth. Conservatives had so many reasons to support Reagan --his prior defense buildup, taxes, social issues -- that he could defy themwith some safety on arms control, or even win them over. Arbator, Georgi; and Ottmans, Willem. Douglass, Joseph D. "ruling circles" (Arbatov and Ottmans, 1983,p. The goal in every case wasto drag Russia, kicking and screaming, into the modern age. These, of course, were Reagan's "base." But forthis very reason, they were often the last people he had to please oncesecurely in office. Thepractical argument, that SDI can protect counterforce missiles, andtherefore make devastating retaliation certain and a first strikeimpractical, is chill comfort to a public that translates this asprotecting missiles while the cities die. Indeed, the secular arms-control activist gets the worst of bothworlds: he or she shares the fundamentalist's anticipation that the EndTime may be at hand, without sharing the fundamentalist's religious hopesof a hereafter (pp. Nikolai S. Few ifany serious students of strategic defense believe that any suchimpenetrable shield is possible (Scheer, 1982, pp. The new democratizingSoviet Union, or post-Soviet confederation, would be America's partner inthe world, not our rival: therefore we no longer had to be concerned abouta strategic military confrontation with it. (1982). negotiated away an effective ABM protection for the MX,while the SALT I treaty limited the number of MXs that could be deployed.The first of these limitations meant that the MX could not be effectivelydefended in fixed sites. 118). This is notnecessarily desirable, though it is not a matter we will have much say overin any case. 39). The arms controldelusion. 26). Gorbachev is increasingly surrounded by, dependent on --and possibly a figurehead for -- the most conservative, authoritarian, andanti-American elements in Soviet society: the army, the KGB, the Partyapparatchiks (Shogren, 1991, p. The statement quoted above, made by a prominent figure in therightist Soyuz political grouping, is a reminder of two enduring realities. reaction to theSoviet invasion of Afghanistan, pinpointing instead supposed internalchanges in the views of U.S. 31ff). 131ff). Herejects the view that detente collapsed at the end of the 197 s because ofthe shocked (and therefore, perhaps, exaggerated) U.S. WhenGorbachev, that most imaginative of Soviet leaders, did accept theseproposals, at Reykjavik, the Reagan Administration found itself boxed in(Wallop and Codevilla, 1987, p. The potential for fundamental rather than superficial liberalizationsimply appears to be largely lacking in the fabric of Russian society. (1987). In the early arms-control debates of thelate 195 s and early 196 s, one of the arguments made by opponents of theAtmospheric Test Ban Treaty was that it would preclude ABM research (whichat that time, before the age of precision weapons, focused on nuclear-armedantimissiles). Moreover, given theuncertainties of both intelligence and comparison, it is only prudent --especially in the Soviets' Hobbesian world -- to assume the worst case.(Thus, the dramatic U.S. Since it would not do,politically, for Reagan at the start of his term to simply follow Carter'slead, rearmament on a grandiose scale was set in hand. By negotiating, each "partner" learns to entersympathetically into the views and concerns of the other. 1 2-1 3). If Soviet policies are fundamentally rooted in a Hobbesian world-view, American attitudes towards arms control are fundamentally rooted inour optimistic Lockean world-view. New York: Harper & Row. Finally, and difficult to interpret, are the effects of Reagan's owngenial personality, and of Nancy Reagan's influence on her husband(Adelman, 1989, p. On the otherhand, he was under political pressure to defuse the "crazy cowboy" imagelong promoted by his political and ideological opponents (Wallop andCodevilla, 1987, p. So it is with respect to relations with the Soviet Union. pursuit of arms control treaties are ideological and(domestic) political, not pragmatic. This obsession is rooted in a long experience ofinvasion, culminating in the Nazi invasion of World War II, which costabout twenty million Soviet lives -- about fifteen times the cost in livesof all of America's wars put together (pp. It was also to be a "survivable" system, asurvivability to be gained by some combination of mobility and activeantimissile defense. The reason, of course, is that we share both deep ties of friendshipand strongly convergent national interests with Britain and France. 2). A future authoritarianRussia based on mystical neo-Czarist ideology rather than on Marx and Lenin(a real possibility given the ties of the Soviet Right to mysticalultranationalist groups such as Pamyat) would be no less inclined to cheatthan the Soviets have been in the past. The very process of negotiating andentering into arms-control treaties teaches lessons in trust and confidenceand is therefore beneficial, regardless of the actual character of theresulting treaties. TheSoviets have, in fact practiced both. Calls in the 198 s for"abrogating" the SALT II treaty for the sake of SDI research and deploymentre-ignited these same old fears -- even though SALT II had never beenratified, was therefore not legally in force, and thus could not beabrogated. In the world of unending struggle, one exploits every opportunity that onecan; surely your enemy is doing so (p. Unfortunately, the prospects of such fundamental change in the SovietUnion are dim, as is becoming increasingly obvious. H-6, c. If SDI couldn't shoot down everyincoming missile, and therefore prevent Armageddon, what good was it? 26). Gorbachev is merely the most recent in a succession of Russianreformers and would-be reformers that stretch back to Czar Peter the Greatin the late seventeenth to early eighteenth century. (198 , Summer). New York: RandomHouse. San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies.----------------------- 18 A byproduct of the very effort to strengthen America's defenses,including its strategic nuclear defenses, was to push the nuclear threat tothe forefront of public awareness, as it had not been from the middle 196 sthrough the 197 s. Interservice and intra-service rivalry andagendas, not a national defense strategy, drove the Reagan buildup (Wallopand Codevilla, 1987, p. It was to be a multiple-warheadmissile because, basically, that is the least expensive way to deliver anygiven number of warheads. Making a large missile mobile isboth difficult and expensive; it also poses political problems. First, suspicion of arms control is heavily concentrated amongpolitical conservatives. Yet this concerns no policymakers and no segment of the public.We hear no calls for us to enter "dialogue" with these formidable nuclearpowers. Even inthe last Carter years, rearmament had begun. Itmay well be that the repression stage of the old Russian reform-repressioncycle will fail, and that the Soviet Union will collapse. Therefore, its only real protection would bemobility. Likewise, Ronald Reagan's exaggerated vision of the Strategic DefenseInitiative as something that would place an impervious "astrodome" over theUnited States, helped in the long run to undermine support for SDI. 39). The effort to "build down" potential enemy forces is obviously moredifficult, since these are not directly under one's own control. If thefondest hopes of the middle Gorbachev years were to somehow bring about ademocratized Soviet state, Soviet-American relations would fundamentallyimprove. In the Soviet view, such cheating is entirely moral (Douglass, 1988,p. Alternatively, Gorbachev may swing back towards reform, and mayconceivably even succeed at it. 1 2-1 3). With enough shovels. In response, a massive rearmamentprogram is set in hand. Arbatov also points ominously at the U.S. The last two great multinational empires to collapse were theOttoman and the Austro-Hungarian -- and much of the twentieth century'stroubled history, from Central Europe to the Middle East, has stemmeddirectly from these breakups. has had no liberal presidents throughmost of the era of arms negotiations (within the context of the DemocraticParty, Carter was quite conservative). The American hare had sped forward for a time, but now it waspanting with exhaustion. Eager to avoid McNamara-style civilian interference in the details ofmilitary planning and procurement, the Reagan Administration simply openedits checkbook to the military. 1. An example of this phenomenon is the tangled history of the MXmissile (Wallop and Codevilla, 1987, pp. In the eyes of Russian conservatives, the PersianGulf War represents not a "new world order" of cooperation between thesuperpowers, but the exploitation by the U.S. Why the Soviets violate arms controltreaties. 5). 1 ). Each finds thatit can talk to the other, and therefore, by implication, can live with theother. If relations genuinely improve, on the otherhand, arms-control can take no credit, and simply becomes irrelevant. Gray, Colin S. One odd consequence of this psychology is that the Soviets have, moreoften than not, found (scarcely to their surprise) that they did not haveto actually cheat on arms-control treaties. [my emphasis] (Wallop and Codevilla, 1987, p. It is impossible to predict what we may expect next in the evolutionof U.S.-Soviet relations, and therefore in U.S. (1983, Winter). Weaknessin others is to be exploited -- as others surely would not hesitate toexploit Soviet weakness. TheSoviets have conducted this effort through two means: promotion of "peace"movements in the west that call for unilateral Western disarmament, andthrough arms-control treaties. The Soviet threat in the 199 s.Global Affairs, 5, pp. Peace means notthe happy day when the lion lies down with the lamb, but is simply thecontinuation of struggle by other means. Finally, the prevalence of nuclear hysteria among the "politicalclasses" in the United States caused the pursuit of arms-control treatiesto become a fixed goal in domestic American politics, one effectivelyforced upon presidents of every ideological persuasion, regardless of theirown inclinations or even their natural political base (Wallop andCodevilla, 1987, p. The goal of arms control is, in the naive (but prevalent) Americanview, to interrupt this momentum. It will also argue that the indifference to armscontrol during the euphoria of a year ago contains a fundamental grain oftruth: that far from arms-control negotiations tending to improvesuperpower relations, it is the state of relations that drives the armsrace. 99-111. In theabsence of even a nominal U.S. Thinking about nuclear weapons, the public becameanxious about them, producing fairly broad public support for a "nuclearfreeze" and similar movements. 25-44. Inthe words of one frustrated contemporary Soviet liberal, Totalitarianism is in the minds and hearts of many people. strategic nuclear defense, Britain andFrance have the power to devastate the U.S. Finally, on top of everything, the ReaganAdministration's "voodoo economics" fiscal policy led inevitably to immensestructural deficits. 174ff). Meanwhile, the Soviet tortoise crept steadilyforward (actually, it was a good deal more than a creep). New York:Simon & Schuster. 25ff). It is important to understand that the "arms controlprocess" cannot solve that problem, and indeed can only deflect attentionfrom the real problems of strategic deterrence and defense, and provide theU.S. These treaties generally call for parity,but the Soviets have never hesitated to violate them (Wallop and Codevilla,1987, p. H-6, c. H-6, c. Dyson, Freedman. Thus,The Soviets' gains [in the strategic balance] came only partially throughviolations. (1988). Instead, struggle is the resultof specific and resolvable problems, or of simple misunderstandings. Americans, by and large, do not viewendless struggle as the fate of humanity. H-6, c. base on the SovietUnion's southern perimeter. Historically, the U.S. 2). 1). 117-18). In that case, political evolution in thepost-Soviet Union will, perhaps, render U.S. Eachhas found out that the liberals were unable to convert their dreams intoeffective action, while dissemination of their ideas led only to disruptionand the threat of chaos. Petrushenko Soviet Parliament Member A year ago, at the height of the period of Soviet liberalizationunder Mikhail Gorbachev, the problem of arms control -- indeed, the entirequestion of American and Soviet strategic forces and the strategic balanceof the superpowers -- seemed to be a has-been issue. Although arms control is sometimesdefended as a practical measure of strategic management, the driving forcesbehind the U.S. The great universal embrace. A shift of power within the Soviet hierarchy (a shift which may behappening, or may already have taken place), could easily plunge Soviet-American relations back into a hard freeze. This having been done, complacency sets back in.The program is scaled back, or at least not followed-up on, and defense isignored until the next panic. Defusing this concern became an importantpolitical goal of the Reagan Administration, and the natural response wasto give at least lip service to arms control. Strength is respected. Someone must always be ahead, if only slightly.Only clear superiority can command clear respect; inferiority, even ifslight, is weakness and invites contempt. In the course of doing so,Reagan Administration officials carelessly put forth some extravagantproposals, confident that the Soviets would never touch them. Wecount their forces alongside our own, not as a potential threat. As a demonstration of this point, consider the situation of theUnited States with respect to British and French nuclear forces. strategic security vis-a-visthe Soviets a moot point. public, as it has in much of the past three decades, with theillusion, not the reality, of security in a dangerous world. The important thing wasto be seen conspicuously as doing something. The Soviet viewpoint. The Soviets willcontinue to be driven by their own experience and deeply-ingrainedattitudes, foremost among which is an obsession with security (Holloway,1983, pp. Misunderstanding Churchill's famous dictum that "jaw, jaw isbetter than war, war," they imagine that the negotiating process can itselfdefuse the arms race. Russians take a Hobbesian view ofinternational relations as a cockpit of unending struggle. In the case of a liberalpresident, this is a direct response to the concerns of the president'spolitical base. This paper will arguefor the latter position. presence in the Gulf. This is not, as somehysterical American conservatives might imagine, because the "Gorbachevrevolution" was all along some sort of deep and dark plot. The Soviets"beat" the MX, without ever having to cheat. Reassessing the strategic balance.International Security, 5, pp. success against a Soviet-equipped Iraq in thePersian Gulf War can only stoke the insecurities of the Soviets, who havelong had the lurking fear that our weapons were fundamentally superior totheirs.) Therefore, the Soviet Union has constantly striven, throughout thepostwar era, first to erase its original strategic inferiority, then togain a convincing -- if possible, overwhelming -- strategic superiority(Douglass, 1988, p. 131ff). Gorbachev'sreformist rhetoric of a year or two ago may well reflect his actualdesires, but the underlying reality is that his motives scarcely matter(Gray, 199 , p. The Reagan Administration followed this pattern in spades. One of themost logical and cost-effective mobility measures -- placing the missileson railroad trains -- was ruled out for fear of a public uproar (Wallop andCodevilla, 1987, p. an effective counterforce capability against the growing andever-more-accurate Soviet missile force. Prominent liberals, most conspicuously formerForeign Minister Sheverdnadze, have resigned or been forced out of thechief positions of influence on Gorbachev and of authority over Sovietpolicy formation. References Adelman, Kenneth. The public, essentially, views nuclearweapons as doomsday machines. public (and often official) view of armscontrol is fundamentally different. 14 ff). Weapons and hope. Believe me, Bush would have to take me into consideration because I would put strategic forces on alert just to accomplish this aim (Shogren, 1991, p. The Soviet strategic threat would be effectively eliminated, notbecause of any success in the "arms control process," but for fundamentalpolitical reasons. Likewise unpromising are the prospects for truly good relationsbetween the Soviet Union and the United States -- the sort of relationsthat would make the strategic balance irrelevant. believe me, Bush would have totake me into consideration because I would put strategic forces on alert..." (Shogren, 1991, p. Each would-bereformer has called on members of a liberalizing intelligentsia (itself aRussian word) to join him or her in forging a new, brighter Russia. The enlargement and improvement ofSoviet strategic nuclear forces has been constant, and continues today(Burt, 198 , p. Thus, the underlying American view of the "arms-control process" isroughly as follows: (Wallop an Codevilla, 1987, p. Instead,the time-tested American pattern has been alternate application ofaccelerator and brake. Unfortunately, the U.S. The public's eyes glazed over, as always, at technicaldiscussion, but the lesson the public took from this early debate was thatmissile-defense was the pet cause of extremists who opposed any armscontrol measures (Dyson, 1984, p. 163-64). Soon, the fears promoted by the arms-race itself overtakeany underlying questions, and become themselves the basis of hostility. The reason is that the mostfundamental justification for cheating is, again, the Hobbesian world-view. H-6, c. The urge to overdramatize, and thus cloud discussion of real securityissues, is one that has been shared by the domestic Right as well as theLeft. Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's. In that event, we will once again have to address the problem ofstrategic security. We can view the harsh facts of Russian history with sympatheticunderstanding without needing to blind ourselves as to the implications ofthis in shaping Soviet policy. Kremlin's rightist tiltcan be linked to Soyuz. In the 195 s the fear was radioactivefallout; in the 198 s it was "nuclear winter." In either case, the result was that a large section of the public hasbeen inclined to fear nuclear weapons and nuclear war not simply as aterrible but finite danger to be dealt with in a practical and clear-headedway, but as something almost theological. Breakup of or civil war in the Soviet Union,with its thousands of nuclear weapons, could be profoundly dangerous. Again, the terms of the treaty scarcely mattered,since only a few specialists would ever read them. The Soviets also continued to interpret history in their own way.The (pre-Gorbachev) words of prominent Soviet defense analyst GeorgiArbatov are a useful introduction to the Soviet view of modern history. 73ff). (199 , Spring). 43). Lenin and Nikita Khrushchev, have followed a somewhat predictablecycle of reform followed by renewed repression. (1991, February 26). 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